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CVE-2026-43472

nvd nist
Published: May 8, 2026Modified: Jun 17, 2026

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5.5
Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Exploitability: 1.8 / Impact: 3.6
Source: NVD

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling There's an unpleasant corner case in unshare(2), when we have a CLONE_NEWNS in flags and current->fs hadn't been shared at all; in that case copy_mnt_ns() gets passed current->fs instead of a private copy, which causes interesting warts in proof of correctness] > I guess if private means fs->users == 1, the condition could still be true. Unfortunately, it's worse than just a convoluted proof of correctness. Consider the case when we have CLONE_NEWCGROUP in addition to CLONE_NEWNS (and current->fs->users == 1). We pass current->fs to copy_mnt_ns(), all right. Suppose it succeeds and flips current->fs->{pwd,root} to corresponding locations in the new namespace. Now we proceed to copy_cgroup_ns(), which fails (e.g. with -ENOMEM). We call put_mnt_ns() on the namespace created by copy_mnt_ns(), it's destroyed and its mount tree is dissolved, but... current->fs->root and current->fs->pwd are both left pointing to now detached mounts. They are pinning those, so it's not a UAF, but it leaves the calling process with unshare(2) failing with -ENOMEM _and_ leaving it with pwd and root on detached isolated mounts. The last part is clearly a bug. There is other fun related to that mess (races with pivot_root(), including the one between pivot_root() and fork(), of all things), but this one is easy to isolate and fix - treat CLONE_NEWNS as "allocate a new fs_struct even if it hadn't been shared in the first place". Sure, we could go for something like "if both CLONE_NEWNS *and* one of the things that might end up failing after copy_mnt_ns() call in create_new_namespaces() are set, force allocation of new fs_struct", but let's keep it simple - the cost of copy_fs_struct() is trivial. Another benefit is that copy_mnt_ns() with CLONE_NEWNS *always* gets a freshly allocated fs_struct, yet to be attached to anything. That seriously simplifies the analysis... FWIW, that bug had been there since the introduction of unshare(2) ;-/

Affected (14)

Products: Linux: Linux Kernel
1 product
Linux Kernel
Configuration A
14 vulnerable
Vulnerable SoftwareAffected Versions
Linux
From 2.6.16.1 to 5.10.253
From 5.11 to 5.15.203
From 5.16 to 6.1.167
From 6.13 to 6.18.19
From 6.19 to 6.19.9
From 6.2 to 6.6.130
From 6.7 to 6.12.78
Version 2.6.16
Version 2.6.16 rc3
Version 2.6.16 rc4
Version 2.6.16 rc5
Version 2.6.16 rc6
Version 2.6.16 rc7
Version 7.0 rc1

References (8)

Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch

Timeline

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