Phpmyfaq

phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7 fails to apply parent FAQ visibility checks before returning child resources including comments and attachments. Unauthenticated attackers can retrieve restricted comment text, commenter email addresses, and attachment filenames for FAQ records they cannot directly access by querying the comments and attachments API endpoints.Show less

phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7 fails to persist the WebAuthn login challenge generated by prepareForLogin, because neither WebAuthn controller saves the mutated key objects back to the database. At login the anti-replay comparison is skipped by its own null guard, allowing an attacker who captures a successful WebAuthn assertion to replay it indefinitely and authenticate as the user without any interaction or hardware key.Show less

phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7 contains a brute-force vulnerability in the two-factor authentication step where the failure counter is session-scoped and reset on each successful password re-authentication. Attackers with a valid password can bypass the five-attempt limit by obtaining a fresh session cookie and repeatedly re-authenticating to reset the counter, enabling unbounded TOTP code guessing.Show less

phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7, when configured to use PostgreSQL via the native pgsql PHP extension, declares an incorrect LIKE ESCAPE character ('=') in the Search/Database/Pgsql.php backend while escapeLikeWildcards() escapes user input with the '|' prefix. As a result, wildcard escaping is a no-op and user-supplied % and _ characters remain active LIKE wildcards. An unauthenticated attacker can submit such characters in the public FAQ search form to force maximally broad pattern matches and expensive sequential scans, resulting in a denial of service. The PDO PostgreSQL backend is not affected, and quotes remain escaped so this does not enable quote-breaking SQL injection or data exfiltration.Show less

phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7 fails to properly enforce CONFIGURATION_EDIT permission on admin API read endpoints for LDAP, Elasticsearch, OpenSearch, and dashboard configuration, allowing any authenticated user to access sensitive administrative data. Attackers can retrieve LDAP server topology, bind account names, search bases, index statistics, and site analytics by calling these endpoints with a valid session.Show less

phpMyFAQ before 4.1.6 does not adequately sanitize HTML in FAQ answers before generating PDFs via TCPDF. An attacker with permission to create or edit FAQ content can embed an <img> tag whose src references a local file under the web root's content/ directory (e.g., content/core/config/database.php). When the PDF is generated, phpMyFAQ attempts to read the referenced file; because it is not a valid image the resulting error is converted into an uncaught exception whose stack trace discloses part of the file's contents to any user who triggers the PDF export. By default the disclosed portion is truncated (zend.exception_string_param_max_len), but a larger configured value can result in disclosure of entire files, including database credentials.Show less

phpMyFAQ versions before v4.1.6 fail to validate the security.enableRegistration setting in API endpoints, allowing attackers to create user accounts when registration is disabled. Attackers can bypass the registration restriction by submitting requests to POST /api/register or POST /api/v3.1/register endpoints, which do not check the configuration flag enforced by the HTML registration page.Show less

phpMyFAQ versions 3.1.0 through 4.1.6 contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in AuthLdap::create(). When LDAP authentication is enabled, after a successful LDAP bind the code calls User::setStatus('active') unconditionally, which overwrites the account_status column of a pre-existing local account from 'blocked' to 'active'. As a result, a user whose local phpMyFAQ account has been administratively blocked can restore their account and log in by authenticating via LDAP. The state transition is not logged, so administrators cannot detect that the block was overridden. Fixed in 4.1.7.Show less

phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7 contains a two-factor authentication bypass vulnerability where remember-me tokens are issued before 2FA verification completes. Attackers with valid credentials can obtain a remember-me cookie, skip the 2FA challenge, and replay the cookie to gain full authenticated access without second-factor verification.Show less

phpMyFAQ versions before 4.1.7 fail to validate active status in the PDF export endpoint, allowing unauthenticated attackers to retrieve draft FAQ metadata. Attackers can access the public PDF export route with sequential FAQ identifiers to obtain titles, solution IDs, author names, and last-update timestamps of inactive or unpublished FAQs.Show less

phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the glossary create and update endpoints caused by truncating an escaped string before embedding it in a SQL literal. Authenticated users with glossary add or edit permissions can craft a payload with a dangling backslash to escape the closing quote and inject arbitrary SQL commands to read sensitive database information.Show less

phpMyFAQ before v4.1.6 writes content backup ZIP archives to the web-accessible document root at content.zip, exposing sensitive files including database credentials. Unauthenticated attackers can race concurrent requests to download the temporary ZIP file before deletion, or exploit XSS in admin contexts to trigger authenticated backups and retrieve the archive.Show less

phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in SetupController that allows unauthenticated attackers to run database migrations and create configuration backups when maintenance mode is enabled. Attackers can call POST /api/setup/update-database and POST /api/setup/backup endpoints to execute database updates, disable maintenance mode, and extract database credentials from generated ZIP archives.Show less

phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7 stores password reset tokens in a publicly accessible tracking file when user tracking is enabled. Unauthenticated attackers can read the tracking file at content/core/data/trackingDDMMYYYY to extract reset tokens and replay them against the password reset API to take over user accounts.Show less

phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, the regex-based SVG sanitizer in phpMyFAQ (SvgSanitizer.php) can be bypassed using HTML entity encoding in javascript: URLs within SVG <a href> attributes. Any user with edit_faq permission can upload a malicious SVG that executes arbitrary JavaScript when viewed, enabling privilege escalation from editor to full admin takeover. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.Show less

phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, the searchCustomPages() method in phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Search.php uses real_escape_string() (via escape()) to sanitize the search term before embedding it in LIKE clauses. However, real_escape_string() does not escape SQL LIKE metacharacters % (match any sequence) and _ (match any single character). An unauthenticated attacker can inject these wildcards into search queries, causing them to match unintended records — including content that was not meant to be surfaced — resulting in information disclosure. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.Show less

phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, the MediaBrowserController::index() method handles file deletion for the media browser. When the fileRemove action is triggered, the user-supplied name parameter is concatenated with the base upload directory path without any path traversal validation. The FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS filter only encodes HTML special characters (&, ', ", <, >) and characters with ASCII value < 32, and does not prevent directory traversal sequences like ../. Additionally, the endpoint does not validate CSRF tokens, making it exploitable via CSRF attacks. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.Show less

phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, an unauthenticated attacker can submit a guest FAQ with an email address that is syntactically valid per RFC 5321 (quoted local part) yet contains raw HTML — for example "<script>alert(1)</script>"@evil.com. PHP's FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL accepts this email as valid. The email is stored in the database without HTML sanitization and later rendered in the admin FAQ editor template using Twig's |raw filter, which bypasses auto-escaping entirely. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.Show less

phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.0.18, the WebAuthn prepare endpoint (`/api/webauthn/prepare`) creates new active user accounts without any authentication, CSRF protection, captcha, or configuration checks. This allows unauthenticated attackers to create unlimited user accounts even when registration is disabled. Version 4.0.18 fixes the issue.Show less