Mobile Industrial Robots

There is no mechanism in place to prevent a bad operator to boot from a live OS image, this can lead to extraction of sensible files (such as the shadow file) or privilege escalation by manually adding a new user with sudo privileges on the machine.Show less

The password for the safety PLC is the default and thus easy to find (in manuals, etc.). This allows a manipulated program to be uploaded to the safety PLC, effectively disabling the emergency stop in case an object is too close to the robot. Navigation and any other components dependent on the laser scanner are not affected (thus it is hard to detect before something happens) though the laser scanner configuration can also be affected altering further the safety of the device.Show less

The access tokens for the REST API are directly derived from the publicly available default credentials for the web interface. Given a USERNAME and a PASSWORD, the token string is generated directly with base64(USERNAME:sha256(PASSWORD)). An unauthorized attacker inside the network can use the default credentials to compute the token and interact with the REST API to exfiltrate, infiltrate or delete data.Show less

The access tokens for the REST API are directly derived (sha256 and base64 encoding) from the publicly available default credentials from the Control Dashboard (refer to CVE-2020-10270 for related flaws). This flaw in combination with CVE-2020-10273 allows any attacker connected to the robot networks (wired or wireless) to exfiltrate all stored data (e.g. indoor mapping images) and associated metadata from the robot's database.Show less