Mintplexlabs

A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in mintplex-labs/anything-llm, allowing users with 'default' role to delete documents uploaded by 'admin'. Despite the intended restriction that prevents 'default' role users from deleting admin-uploaded documents, an attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted DELETE request to the /api/system/remove-document endpoint. This vulnerability is due to improper access control checks, enabling unauthorized document deletion and potentially leading to loss of data integrity.Show less

The inclusion of the web scraper for AnythingLLM means that any user with the proper authorization level (manager, admin, and when in single user) could put in the URL ``` http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance ``` which is a special IP and URL that resolves only when the request comes from within an EC2 instance. This would allow the user to see the connection/secret credentials for their specific instance and be able to manage it regardless of who deployed it. The user would have to have pre-existing knowledge of the hosting infra which the target instance is deployed on, but if sent - would resolve if on EC2 and the proper `iptable` or firewall rule is not configured for their setup.Show less

As a manager, you should not be able to modify a series of settings. In the UI this is indeed hidden as a convenience for the role since most managers would not be savvy enough to modify these settings. They can use their token to still modify those settings though through a standard HTTP request While this is not a critical vulnerability, it does indeed need to be patched to enforce the expected permission level.Show less

Theoretically, it would be possible for an attacker to brute-force the password for an instance in single-user password protection mode via a timing attack given the linear nature of the `!==` used for comparison. The risk is minified by the additional overhead of the request, which varies in a non-constant nature making the attack less reliable to executeShow less

User can send a chat that contains an XSS opportunity that will then run when the chat is sent and on subsequent page loads. Given the minimum requirement for a user to send a chat is to be given access to a workspace via an admin the risk is low. Additionally, the location in which the XSS renders is only limited to the user who submits the XSS. Ultimately, this attack is limited to the user attacking themselves. There is no anonymous chat submission unless the user does not take the minimum steps required to protect their instance.Show less

AnythingLLM is an application that turns any document, resource, or piece of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. In versions prior to commit `08d33cfd8` an unauthenticated API route (file export) can allow attacker to crash the server resulting in a denial of service attack. The “data-export” endpoint is used to export files using the filename parameter as user input. The endpoint takes the user input, filters it to avoid directory traversal attacks, fetches the file from the server, and afterwards deletes it. An attacker can trick the input filter mechanism to point to the current directory, and while attempting to delete it the server will crash as there is no error-handling wrapper around it. Moreover, the endpoint is public and does not require any form of authentication, resulting in an unauthenticated Denial of Service issue, which crashes the instance using a single HTTP packet. This issue has been addressed in commit `08d33cfd8`. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.Show less