Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/bpf/32: Fix Oops on tail call tests test_bpf tail call tests end up as: test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 85 PASS test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 111 PASS test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 145 PASS test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 170 PASS test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 190 PASS test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xf1b4e000 Faulting instruction address: 0xbe86b710 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] BE PAGE_SIZE=4K MMU=Hash PowerMac Modules linked in: test_bpf(+) CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4+ #195 Hardware name: PowerMac3,1 750CL 0x87210 PowerMac NIP: be86b710 LR: be857e88 CTR: be86b704 REGS: f1b4df20 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.1.0-rc4+) MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 28008242 XER: 00000000 DAR: f1b4e000 DSISR: 42000000 GPR00: 00000001 f1b4dfe0 c11d2280 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000002 00000000 GPR08: f1b4e000 be86b704 f1b4e000 00000000 00000000 100d816a f2440000 fe73baa8 GPR16: f2458000 00000000 c1941ae4 f1fe2248 00000045 c0de0000 f2458030 00000000 GPR24: 000003e8 0000000f f2458000 f1b4dc90 3e584b46 00000000 f24466a0 c1941a00 NIP [be86b710] 0xbe86b710 LR [be857e88] __run_one+0xec/0x264 [test_bpf] Call Trace: [f1b4dfe0] [00000002] 0x2 (unreliable) Instruction dump: XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This is a tentative to write above the stack. The problem is encoutered with tests added by commit 38608ee7b690 ("bpf, tests: Add load store test case for tail call") This happens because tail call is done to a BPF prog with a different stack_depth. At the time being, the stack is kept as is when the caller tail calls its callee. But at exit, the callee restores the stack based on its own properties. Therefore here, at each run, r1 is erroneously increased by 32 - 16 = 16 bytes. This was done that way in order to pass the tail call count from caller to callee through the stack. As powerpc32 doesn't have a red zone in the stack, it was necessary the maintain the stack as is for the tail call. But it was not anticipated that the BPF frame size could be different. Let's take a new approach. Use register r4 to carry the tail call count during the tail call, and save it into the stack at function entry if required. This means the input parameter must be in r3, which is more correct as it is a 32 bits parameter, then tail call better match with normal BPF function entry, the down side being that we move that input parameter back and forth between r3 and r4. That can be optimised later. Doing that also has the advantage of maximising the common parts between tail calls and a normal function exit. With the fix, tail call tests are now successfull: test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 53 PASS test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 115 PASS test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 154 PASS test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 165 PASS test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 101 PASS test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 141 PASS test_bpf: #6 Tail call error path, max count reached jited:1 994 PASS test_bpf: #7 Tail call count preserved across function calls jited:1 140975 PASS test_bpf: #8 Tail call error path, NULL target jited:1 110 PASS test_bpf: #9 Tail call error path, index out of range jited:1 69 PASS test_bpf: test_tail_calls: Summary: 10 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [10/10 JIT'ed]Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: char: tpm: Protect tpm_pm_suspend with locks Currently tpm transactions are executed unconditionally in tpm_pm_suspend() function, which may lead to races with other tpm accessors in the system. Specifically, the hw_random tpm driver makes use of tpm_get_random(), and this function is called in a loop from a kthread, which means it's not frozen alongside userspace, and so can race with the work done during system suspend: tpm tpm0: tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error -52 tpm tpm0: invalid TPM_STS.x 0xff, dumping stack for forensics CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5+ #135 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-20220807_005459-localhost 04/01/2014 Call Trace: tpm_tis_status.cold+0x19/0x20 tpm_transmit+0x13b/0x390 tpm_transmit_cmd+0x20/0x80 tpm1_pm_suspend+0xa6/0x110 tpm_pm_suspend+0x53/0x80 __pnp_bus_suspend+0x35/0xe0 __device_suspend+0x10f/0x350 Fix this by calling tpm_try_get_ops(), which itself is a wrapper around tpm_chip_start(), but takes the appropriate mutex. [Jason: reworked commit message, added metadata]Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/sysfs: fix wrong empty schemes assumption under online tuning in damon_sysfs_set_schemes() Commit da87878010e5 ("mm/damon/sysfs: support online inputs update") made 'damon_sysfs_set_schemes()' to be called for running DAMON context, which could have schemes. In the case, DAMON sysfs interface is supposed to update, remove, or add schemes to reflect the sysfs files. However, the code is assuming the DAMON context wouldn't have schemes at all, and therefore creates and adds new schemes. As a result, the code doesn't work as intended for online schemes tuning and could have more than expected memory footprint. The schemes are all in the DAMON context, so it doesn't leak the memory, though. Remove the wrong asssumption (the DAMON context wouldn't have schemes) in 'damon_sysfs_set_schemes()' to fix the bug.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: raydium_ts_i2c - fix memory leak in raydium_i2c_send() There is a kmemleak when test the raydium_i2c_ts with bpf mock device: unreferenced object 0xffff88812d3675a0 (size 8): comm "python3", pid 349, jiffies 4294741067 (age 95.695s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 11 0e 10 c0 01 00 04 00 ........ backtrace: [<0000000068427125>] __kmalloc+0x46/0x1b0 [<0000000090180f91>] raydium_i2c_send+0xd4/0x2bf [raydium_i2c_ts] [<000000006e631aee>] raydium_i2c_initialize.cold+0xbc/0x3e4 [raydium_i2c_ts] [<00000000dc6fcf38>] raydium_i2c_probe+0x3cd/0x6bc [raydium_i2c_ts] [<00000000a310de16>] i2c_device_probe+0x651/0x680 [<00000000f5a96bf3>] really_probe+0x17c/0x3f0 [<00000000096ba499>] __driver_probe_device+0xe3/0x170 [<00000000c5acb4d9>] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120 [<00000000264fe082>] __device_attach_driver+0xf7/0x150 [<00000000f919423c>] bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x180 [<00000000e067feca>] __device_attach+0x1e5/0x2d0 [<0000000054301fc2>] bus_probe_device+0x126/0x140 [<00000000aad93b22>] device_add+0x810/0x1130 [<00000000c086a53f>] i2c_new_client_device+0x352/0x4e0 [<000000003c2c248c>] of_i2c_register_device+0xf1/0x110 [<00000000ffec4177>] of_i2c_notify+0x100/0x160 unreferenced object 0xffff88812d3675c8 (size 8): comm "python3", pid 349, jiffies 4294741070 (age 95.692s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 22 00 36 2d 81 88 ff ff ".6-.... backtrace: [<0000000068427125>] __kmalloc+0x46/0x1b0 [<0000000090180f91>] raydium_i2c_send+0xd4/0x2bf [raydium_i2c_ts] [<000000001d5c9620>] raydium_i2c_initialize.cold+0x223/0x3e4 [raydium_i2c_ts] [<00000000dc6fcf38>] raydium_i2c_probe+0x3cd/0x6bc [raydium_i2c_ts] [<00000000a310de16>] i2c_device_probe+0x651/0x680 [<00000000f5a96bf3>] really_probe+0x17c/0x3f0 [<00000000096ba499>] __driver_probe_device+0xe3/0x170 [<00000000c5acb4d9>] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120 [<00000000264fe082>] __device_attach_driver+0xf7/0x150 [<00000000f919423c>] bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x180 [<00000000e067feca>] __device_attach+0x1e5/0x2d0 [<0000000054301fc2>] bus_probe_device+0x126/0x140 [<00000000aad93b22>] device_add+0x810/0x1130 [<00000000c086a53f>] i2c_new_client_device+0x352/0x4e0 [<000000003c2c248c>] of_i2c_register_device+0xf1/0x110 [<00000000ffec4177>] of_i2c_notify+0x100/0x160 After BANK_SWITCH command from i2c BUS, no matter success or error happened, the tx_buf should be freed.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: Fix function prototype mismatch in snd_seq_expand_var_event With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. seq_copy_in_user() and seq_copy_in_kernel() did not have prototypes matching snd_seq_dump_func_t. Adjust this and remove the casts. There are not resulting binary output differences. This was found as a result of Clang's new -Wcast-function-type-strict flag, which is more sensitive than the simpler -Wcast-function-type, which only checks for type width mismatches.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: soc-pcm: Add NULL check in BE reparenting Add NULL check in dpcm_be_reparent API, to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference error. The issue occurred in fuzzing test.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/khugepaged: invoke MMU notifiers in shmem/file collapse paths Any codepath that zaps page table entries must invoke MMU notifiers to ensure that secondary MMUs (like KVM) don't keep accessing pages which aren't mapped anymore. Secondary MMUs don't hold their own references to pages that are mirrored over, so failing to notify them can lead to page use-after-free. I'm marking this as addressing an issue introduced in commit f3f0e1d2150b ("khugepaged: add support of collapse for tmpfs/shmem pages"), but most of the security impact of this only came in commit 27e1f8273113 ("khugepaged: enable collapse pmd for pte-mapped THP"), which actually omitted flushes for the removal of present PTEs, not just for the removal of empty page tables.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix use-after-free during gpu recovery [Why] [ 754.862560] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. [ 754.862898] Call Trace: [ 754.862903] <TASK> [ 754.862913] amdgpu_job_free_cb+0xc2/0xe1 [amdgpu] [ 754.863543] drm_sched_main.cold+0x34/0x39 [amd_sched] [How] The fw_fence may be not init, check whether dma_fence_init is performed before job freeShow less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fscache: Fix oops due to race with cookie_lru and use_cookie If a cookie expires from the LRU and the LRU_DISCARD flag is set, but the state machine has not run yet, it's possible another thread can call fscache_use_cookie and begin to use it. When the cookie_worker finally runs, it will see the LRU_DISCARD flag set, transition the cookie->state to LRU_DISCARDING, which will then withdraw the cookie. Once the cookie is withdrawn the object is removed the below oops will occur because the object associated with the cookie is now NULL. Fix the oops by clearing the LRU_DISCARD bit if another thread uses the cookie before the cookie_worker runs. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 ... CPU: 31 PID: 44773 Comm: kworker/u130:1 Tainted: G E 6.0.0-5.dneg.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/26/2022 Workqueue: events_unbound netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work [netfs] RIP: 0010:cachefiles_prepare_write+0x28/0x90 [cachefiles] ... Call Trace: netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work+0x11c/0x320 [netfs] process_one_work+0x217/0x3e0 worker_thread+0x4a/0x3b0 kthread+0xd6/0x100Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: memcg: fix possible use-after-free in memcg_write_event_control() memcg_write_event_control() accesses the dentry->d_name of the specified control fd to route the write call. As a cgroup interface file can't be renamed, it's safe to access d_name as long as the specified file is a regular cgroup file. Also, as these cgroup interface files can't be removed before the directory, it's safe to access the parent too. Prior to 347c4a874710 ("memcg: remove cgroup_event->cft"), there was a call to __file_cft() which verified that the specified file is a regular cgroupfs file before further accesses. The cftype pointer returned from __file_cft() was no longer necessary and the commit inadvertently dropped the file type check with it allowing any file to slip through. With the invarients broken, the d_name and parent accesses can now race against renames and removals of arbitrary files and cause use-after-free's. Fix the bug by resurrecting the file type check in __file_cft(). Now that cgroupfs is implemented through kernfs, checking the file operations needs to go through a layer of indirection. Instead, let's check the superblock and dentry type.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: v4l2-dv-timings.c: fix too strict blanking sanity checks Sanity checks were added to verify the v4l2_bt_timings blanking fields in order to avoid integer overflows when userspace passes weird values. But that assumed that userspace would correctly fill in the front porch, backporch and sync values, but sometimes all you know is the total blanking, which is then assigned to just one of these fields. And that can fail with these checks. So instead set a maximum for the total horizontal and vertical blanking and check that each field remains below that. That is still sufficient to avoid integer overflows, but it also allows for more flexibility in how userspace fills in these fields.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/gup: fix gup_pud_range() for dax For dax pud, pud_huge() returns true on x86. So the function works as long as hugetlb is configured. However, dax doesn't depend on hugetlb. Commit 414fd080d125 ("mm/gup: fix gup_pmd_range() for dax") fixed devmap-backed huge PMDs, but missed devmap-backed huge PUDs. Fix this as well. This fixes the below kernel panic: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x69e7c000cc478: 0000 [#1] SMP < snip > Call Trace: <TASK> get_user_pages_fast+0x1f/0x40 iov_iter_get_pages+0xc6/0x3b0 ? mempool_alloc+0x5d/0x170 bio_iov_iter_get_pages+0x82/0x4e0 ? bvec_alloc+0x91/0xc0 ? bio_alloc_bioset+0x19a/0x2a0 blkdev_direct_IO+0x282/0x480 ? __io_complete_rw_common+0xc0/0xc0 ? filemap_range_has_page+0x82/0xc0 generic_file_direct_write+0x9d/0x1a0 ? inode_update_time+0x24/0x30 __generic_file_write_iter+0xbd/0x1e0 blkdev_write_iter+0xb4/0x150 ? io_import_iovec+0x8d/0x340 io_write+0xf9/0x300 io_issue_sqe+0x3c3/0x1d30 ? sysvec_reschedule_ipi+0x6c/0x80 __io_queue_sqe+0x33/0x240 ? fget+0x76/0xa0 io_submit_sqes+0xe6a/0x18d0 ? __fget_light+0xd1/0x100 __x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x199/0x880 ? __context_tracking_enter+0x1f/0x70 ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x24/0x30 ? irqentry_exit+0x1d/0x30 ? __context_tracking_exit+0xe/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb RIP: 0033:0x7fc97c11a7be < snip > </TASK> ---[ end trace 48b2e0e67debcaeb ]--- RIP: 0010:internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x340/0x990 < snip > Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: disabledShow less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mana: Fix race on per-CQ variable napi work_done After calling napi_complete_done(), the NAPIF_STATE_SCHED bit may be cleared, and another CPU can start napi thread and access per-CQ variable, cq->work_done. If the other thread (for example, from busy_poll) sets it to a value >= budget, this thread will continue to run when it should stop, and cause memory corruption and panic. To fix this issue, save the per-CQ work_done variable in a local variable before napi_complete_done(), so it won't be corrupted by a possible concurrent thread after napi_complete_done(). Also, add a flag bit to advertise to the NIC firmware: the NAPI work_done variable race is fixed, so the driver is able to reliably support features like busy_poll.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: slcan: fix freed work crash The LTP test pty03 is causing a crash in slcan: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 348 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 6.0.8-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 9d20364b934f5aab0a9bdf84e8f45cfdfae39dab Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: 0x0 (events) RIP: 0010:process_one_work (/home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/workqueue.c:706 /home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/workqueue.c:2185) Code: 49 89 ff 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 89 f3 48 83 ec 10 48 8b 06 48 8b 6f 48 49 89 c4 45 30 e4 a8 04 b8 00 00 00 00 4c 0f 44 e0 <49> 8b 44 24 08 44 8b a8 00 01 00 00 41 83 e5 20 f6 45 10 04 75 0e RSP: 0018:ffffaf7b40f47e98 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9d644e1b8b48 RCX: ffff9d649e439968 RDX: 00000000ffff8455 RSI: ffff9d644e1b8b48 RDI: ffff9d64764aa6c0 RBP: ffff9d649e4335c0 R08: 0000000000000c00 R09: ffff9d64764aa734 R10: 0000000000000007 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff9d649e4335e8 R14: ffff9d64490da780 R15: ffff9d64764aa6c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9d649e400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000036424000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> worker_thread (/home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/workqueue.c:2436) kthread (/home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/kthread.c:376) ret_from_fork (/home/rich/kernel/linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:312) Apparently, the slcan's tx_work is freed while being scheduled. While slcan_netdev_close() (netdev side) calls flush_work(&sl->tx_work), slcan_close() (tty side) does not. So when the netdev is never set UP, but the tty is stuffed with bytes and forced to wakeup write, the work is scheduled, but never flushed. So add an additional flush_work() to slcan_close() to be sure the work is flushed under all circumstances. The Fixes commit below moved flush_work() from slcan_close() to slcan_netdev_close(). What was the rationale behind it? Maybe we can drop the one in slcan_netdev_close()? I see the same pattern in can327. So it perhaps needs the very same fix.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring: Fix a null-ptr-deref in io_tctx_exit_cb() Syzkaller reports a NULL deref bug as follows: BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3 Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000138 by task file1/1955 CPU: 1 PID: 1955 Comm: file1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7-00103-gef4d3ea40565 #75 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 ? io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3 kasan_report+0xbb/0x1f0 ? io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3 kasan_check_range+0x140/0x190 io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3 task_work_run+0x164/0x250 ? task_work_cancel+0x30/0x30 get_signal+0x1c3/0x2440 ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0 ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0 ? exit_signals+0x8b0/0x8b0 ? do_raw_read_unlock+0x3b/0x70 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x50/0x230 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x82/0x2470 ? kmem_cache_free+0x260/0x4b0 ? putname+0xfe/0x140 ? get_sigframe_size+0x10/0x10 ? do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x226/0x710 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100 ? putname+0xfe/0x140 ? do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x238/0x710 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0023:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. RSP: 002b:00000000fffb7790 EFLAGS: 00000200 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000000b RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... This happens because the adding of task_work from io_ring_exit_work() isn't synchronized with canceling all work items from eg exec. The execution of the two are ordered in that they are both run by the task itself, but if io_tctx_exit_cb() is queued while we're canceling all work items off exec AND gets executed when the task exits to userspace rather than in the main loop in io_uring_cancel_generic(), then we can find current->io_uring == NULL and hit the above crash. It's safe to add this NULL check here, because the execution of the two paths are done by the task itself. [axboe: add code comment and also put an explanation in the commit msg]Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: Fix crash when replugging CSR fake controllers It seems fake CSR 5.0 clones can cause the suspend notifier to be registered twice causing the following kernel panic: [ 71.986122] Call Trace: [ 71.986124] <TASK> [ 71.986125] blocking_notifier_chain_register+0x33/0x60 [ 71.986130] hci_register_dev+0x316/0x3d0 [bluetooth 99b5497ea3d09708fa1366c1dc03288bf3cca8da] [ 71.986154] btusb_probe+0x979/0xd85 [btusb e1e0605a4f4c01984a4b9c8ac58c3666ae287477] [ 71.986159] ? __pm_runtime_set_status+0x1a9/0x300 [ 71.986162] ? ktime_get_mono_fast_ns+0x3e/0x90 [ 71.986167] usb_probe_interface+0xe3/0x2b0 [ 71.986171] really_probe+0xdb/0x380 [ 71.986174] ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90 [ 71.986177] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x170 [ 71.986180] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0x90 [ 71.986183] __device_attach_driver+0x89/0x110 [ 71.986186] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x70/0x70 [ 71.986189] bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xe0 [ 71.986192] __device_attach+0xb2/0x1e0 [ 71.986195] bus_probe_device+0x92/0xb0 [ 71.986198] device_add+0x422/0x9a0 [ 71.986201] ? sysfs_merge_group+0xd4/0x110 [ 71.986205] usb_set_configuration+0x57a/0x820 [ 71.986208] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x4f/0x70 [ 71.986211] usb_probe_device+0x3a/0x110 [ 71.986213] really_probe+0xdb/0x380 [ 71.986216] ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90 [ 71.986219] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x170 [ 71.986221] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0x90 [ 71.986224] __device_attach_driver+0x89/0x110 [ 71.986227] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x70/0x70 [ 71.986230] bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xe0 [ 71.986232] __device_attach+0xb2/0x1e0 [ 71.986235] bus_probe_device+0x92/0xb0 [ 71.986237] device_add+0x422/0x9a0 [ 71.986239] ? _dev_info+0x7d/0x98 [ 71.986242] ? blake2s_update+0x4c/0xc0 [ 71.986246] usb_new_device.cold+0x148/0x36d [ 71.986250] hub_event+0xa8a/0x1910 [ 71.986255] process_one_work+0x1c4/0x380 [ 71.986259] worker_thread+0x51/0x390 [ 71.986262] ? rescuer_thread+0x3b0/0x3b0 [ 71.986264] kthread+0xdb/0x110 [ 71.986266] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 71.986268] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 71.986273] </TASK> [ 71.986274] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 71.986284] btusb: probe of 2-1.6:1.0 failed with error -17Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/shmem-helper: Remove errant put in error path drm_gem_shmem_mmap() doesn't own this reference, resulting in the GEM object getting prematurely freed leading to a later use-after-free.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: dsa: sja1105: avoid out of bounds access in sja1105_init_l2_policing() The SJA1105 family has 45 L2 policing table entries (SJA1105_MAX_L2_POLICING_COUNT) and SJA1110 has 110 (SJA1110_MAX_L2_POLICING_COUNT). Keeping the table structure but accounting for the difference in port count (5 in SJA1105 vs 10 in SJA1110) does not fully explain the difference. Rather, the SJA1110 also has L2 ingress policers for multicast traffic. If a packet is classified as multicast, it will be processed by the policer index 99 + SRCPORT. The sja1105_init_l2_policing() function initializes all L2 policers such that they don't interfere with normal packet reception by default. To have a common code between SJA1105 and SJA1110, the index of the multicast policer for the port is calculated because it's an index that is out of bounds for SJA1105 but in bounds for SJA1110, and a bounds check is performed. The code fails to do the proper thing when determining what to do with the multicast policer of port 0 on SJA1105 (ds->num_ports = 5). The "mcast" index will be equal to 45, which is also equal to table->ops->max_entry_count (SJA1105_MAX_L2_POLICING_COUNT). So it passes through the check. But at the same time, SJA1105 doesn't have multicast policers. So the code programs the SHARINDX field of an out-of-bounds element in the L2 Policing table of the static config. The comparison between index 45 and 45 entries should have determined the code to not access this policer index on SJA1105, since its memory wasn't even allocated. With enough bad luck, the out-of-bounds write could even overwrite other valid kernel data, but in this case, the issue was detected using KASAN. Kernel log: sja1105 spi5.0: Probed switch chip: SJA1105Q ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sja1105_setup+0x1cbc/0x2340 Write of size 8 at addr ffffff880bd57708 by task kworker/u8:0/8 ... Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: ... sja1105_setup+0x1cbc/0x2340 dsa_register_switch+0x1284/0x18d0 sja1105_probe+0x748/0x840 ... Allocated by task 8: ... sja1105_setup+0x1bcc/0x2340 dsa_register_switch+0x1284/0x18d0 sja1105_probe+0x748/0x840 ...Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: fix array index out of bound error in DCN32 DML [Why&How] LinkCapacitySupport array is indexed with the number of voltage states and not the number of max DPPs. Fix the error by changing the array declaration to use the correct (larger) array size of total number of voltage states.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in hid_report_raw_event Syzbot reported shift-out-of-bounds in hid_report_raw_event. microsoft 0003:045E:07DA.0001: hid_field_extract() called with n (128) > 32! (swapper/0) ====================================================================== UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1323:20 shift exponent 127 is too large for 32-bit type 'int' CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4-syzkaller-00159-g4bbf3422df78 #0 Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e3/0x2cb lib/dump_stack.c:106 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:151 [inline] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x3a6/0x420 lib/ubsan.c:322 snto32 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1323 [inline] hid_input_fetch_field drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1572 [inline] hid_process_report drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1665 [inline] hid_report_raw_event+0xd56/0x18b0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1998 hid_input_report+0x408/0x4f0 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2066 hid_irq_in+0x459/0x690 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:284 __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x369/0x530 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1671 dummy_timer+0x86b/0x3110 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1988 call_timer_fn+0xf5/0x210 kernel/time/timer.c:1474 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1519 [inline] __run_timers+0x76a/0x980 kernel/time/timer.c:1790 run_timer_softirq+0x63/0xf0 kernel/time/timer.c:1803 __do_softirq+0x277/0x75b kernel/softirq.c:571 __irq_exit_rcu+0xec/0x170 kernel/softirq.c:650 irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:662 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x91/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1107 ====================================================================== If the size of the integer (unsigned n) is bigger than 32 in snto32(), shift exponent will be too large for 32-bit type 'int', resulting in a shift-out-of-bounds bug. Fix this by adding a check on the size of the integer (unsigned n) in snto32(). To add support for n greater than 32 bits, set n to 32, if n is greater than 32.Show less