Joomlaworks

The K2 frontend article-attachment upload path accepts files whose extension is `.php`, and Apache's standard mod_php matches `\.php$` and executes them under the K2 web user. A K2 Author can upload a `shell.php`, then fetch `/media/k2/attachments/shell.php` and execute arbitrary PHP code in the web server's context.Show less

The K2 article gallery upload path accepts a zip/tar archive, extracts it under `/media/k2/galleries/<id>/`, and only renames image files (gif/jpg/jpeg/png/webp) to safe names — non-image files (including `.php`) are extracted as-is and remain executable via direct HTTP access.Show less

The K2 frontend article-save handler accepts an `attachment[N][existing]` POST field that is concatenated with `JPATH_SITE/` and passed to `JFile::copy()`. `JPath::clean` does NOT strip `..`, and there is no allow-list of source paths. An Author can therefore copy `configuration.php` (or any other file readable by the web user — including `../../../etc/passwd`) into `/media/k2/attachments/`, then retrieve the contents via the K2 attachment-download endpoint.Show less

K2 ≤ 2.24 contains a mass-assignment defect in the K2 system user plugin `plg_user_k2`. A Registered Joomla user, by including the field `K2UserForm=1` in a standard `com_users` `profile.save` POST, can write arbitrary values into the `notes`, `image`, and `plugins` columns of their own row in the `#__k2_users` table — none of which are exposed by the K2 frontend profile-edit form.Show less

A Joomla user with K2 "create item" rights (Author tier by default) can submit an article whose `embedVideo` POST field contains a raw `<script>` tag; K2 stores it verbatim and renders it unescaped to any visitor of the article page.Show less

class.upload.php in verot.net class.upload through 1.0.3 and 2.x through 2.0.4, as used in the K2 extension for Joomla! and other products, omits .pht from the set of dangerous file extensions, a similar issue to CVE-2019-19576.Show less

The K2 component 2.8.0 for Joomla! has Incorrect Access Control with directory traversal, allowing an attacker to download arbitrary files, as demonstrated by a view=media&task=connector&cmd=file&target=l1_../configuration.php&download=1 request. The specific pathname ../configuration.php should be base64 encoded for a valid attack. NOTE: the vendor disputes this issue because only files under the media-manager path can be downloaded, and the documentation indicates that sensitive information does not belong there. Nonetheless, 2.8.1 has additional blocking of .php downloadsShow less

Directory traversal vulnerability in includes/download.php in the JoomlaWorks AllVideos (Jw_allVideos) plugin 3.0 through 3.2 for Joomla! allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a ./../.../ (modified dot dot) in the file parameter.Show less