Apache

Due to multiple time-of-check time-of-use race conditions in the resource count check and increment logic, as well as missing validations, users of the platform are able to exceed the allocation limits configured for their accounts/domains. This can be used by an attacker to degrade the infrastructure's resources and lead to denial of service conditions. Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache CloudStack versions 4.20.3.0 or 4.22.0.1, or later, which fixes this issue.Show less

Missing MinIO policy cleanup on bucket deletion via Apache CloudStack allows users to retain access to buckets which they previously owned. If another user creates a new bucket with the same name, the previous owners can gain unauthorized read and write access to it by using the previously generated access and secret keys. Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache CloudStack versions 4.20.3.0 or 4.22.0.1, or later, which fixes this issue.Show less

The CloudStack Backup plugin has an improper access logic in versions 4.21.0.0 and 4.22.0.0. Anyone with authenticated user-account access in CloudStack 4.21.0.0+ environments, where this plugin is enabled and have access to specific APIs can restore a volume from any other user's backups and attach the volume to their own VMs. Backup plugin users using CloudStack 4.21.0.0+ are recommended to upgrade to CloudStack version 4.22.0.1, which fixes this issue.Show less

The CloudStack Backup plugin has an improper access logic in versions 4.21.0.0 and 4.22.0.0. Anyone with authenticated user-account access in CloudStack 4.21.0.0+ environments, where this plugin is enabled and have access to specific APIs can create new VMs using backups of any other user of the environment. Backup plugin users using CloudStack 4.21.0.0+ are recommended to upgrade to CloudStack version 4.22.0.1, which fixes this issue.Show less

The CloudStack Backup plugin has an improper authorization logic in versions 4.21.0.0 and 4.22.0.0. Anyone with authenticated user-account access in CloudStack 4.21.0.0+ environments, where this plugin is enabled and has access to specific APIs can list backups from any account in the environment. This vulnerability does not allow them to see the contents of the backup. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.0.1, which fixes the issue.Show less

FolderUploadsFileManager in Apache Wicket does not validate or sanitize the uploadFieldId parameter or the clientFileName before constructing file paths, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to write arbitrary files outside the intended upload directory or read files from arbitrary locations on the server. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.17.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.22.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.8.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 10.9.0, which fixes the issue.Show less

Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Apache Wicket. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.17.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.22.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.8.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 10.9.0, which fixes the issue.Show less

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Apache Wicket. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.17.0, 9.0.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.8.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 10.9.0, which fixes the issue.Show less

Missing invocation of Servlet http web request method changeSessionId after session binding can be exploited for a session fixation attack in Apache Wicket. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.17.0, 9.0.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.8.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 10.9.0, which fixes the issue.Show less

Heap-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability in mod_proxy_ajp of Apache HTTP Server. If mod_proxy_ajp connects to a malicious AJP server this AJP server can send a malicious AJP message back to mod_proxy_ajp and cause it to write 4 attacker controlled bytes after the end of a heap based buffer. This issue affects Apache HTTP Server: through 2.4.66. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.4.67, which fixes the issue.Show less

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server's  mod_md via OCSP response data. This issue affects Apache HTTP Server: from 2.4.30 through 2.4.66. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.4.67, which fixes the issue.Show less

Origin Validation Error, Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting'), Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in Apache Thrift. This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.23.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.23.0, which fixes the issue.Show less

In Apache Iceberg, the table's metadata files are control files: they tell readers which data files belong to the table and which table version to read. `write.metadata.path` is an optional table property that tells Polaris where to write those metadata files. For a table already registered in a Polaris-managed catalog, changing only that property through an `ALTER TABLE`-style settings change (not a row-level `INSERT`, `SELECT`, `UPDATE`, or `DELETE`) bypasses the commit-time branch that is supposed to revalidate storage locations. The full persisted / credential-vending variant requires the affected catalog to have `polaris.config.allow.unstructured.table.location=true`, with `allowedLocations` broad enough to include the attacker-chosen target. `allowedLocations` is the admin-configured allowlist of storage paths that the catalog is allowed to use. Public project materials suggest that this flag is a real supported compatibility / layout mode, not just a contrived lab-only prerequisite. In that configuration, a user who can change table settings can cause Apache Polaris itself to write new table metadata to an attacker-chosen reachable storage location before the intended location-validation branch runs. If the later concrete-path validation also accepts that location, Polaris persists the resulting metadata path into stored table state. Later table-load and credential APIs can then return temporary cloud-storage credentials for the same location without revalidating it. In plain terms, Polaris can later hand out temporary storage access for the same attacker-chosen area. That attacker-chosen area does not need to be limited to the poisoned table's own files. If it is a broader storage prefix, another table's prefix, or, depending on configuration or provider behavior, even a bucket/container root, the resulting disclosure or corruption scope can extend to any data and metadata Polaris can reach there. The practical consequences are therefore similar to the staged-create credential-vending issue already discussed: data and metadata reachable in that storage scope can be exposed and, if write-capable credentials are later issued, modified, corrupted, or removed. Even before that later credential step, Polaris itself performs the metadata write to the unchecked location. So the core issue is not only later credential vending. The primary defect is that Polaris skips its intended location checks before performing a security- sensitive metadata write when only `write.metadata.path` changes. When `polaris.config.allow.unstructured.table.location=false`, current code review suggests the later `updateTableLike(...)` validation usually rejects out-of-tree metadata locations before the unsafe path is persisted. That may reduce the persisted / credential-vending variant, but it does not prevent the underlying defect: Polaris still skips the intended pre-write location check when only `write.metadata.path` changes.Show less

In plain terms, Apache Polaris is supposed to issue short-lived GCS credentials that only work for one table's files, but a crafted namespace or table name can cause those credentials to work across the configured bucket instead. Apache Polaris builds Google Cloud Storage downscoped credentials by creating a Credential Access Boundary (CAB) with CEL conditions that are intended to restrict access to the requested table's storage path. The relevant CEL string is built from the bucket name and the table path. That table path is derived from namespace and table identifiers. In current code, that path appears to be inserted into the CEL expression without escaping. As a result, a namespace or table identifier containing a single quote and other URI-safe CEL fragments can break out of the intended quoted string and change the meaning of the CEL condition. In private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 on real Google Cloud Storage, it was confirmed that Polaris accepted a crafted identifier and returned delegated GCS credentials whose CEL path restriction had effectively collapsed. Those delegated credentials could then: - list another table's object prefix; - read another table's metadata control file (Iceberg metadata JSON); - create and delete an object under another table's object prefix; - and also list, read, create, and delete objects under an unrelated external prefix in the same bucket that was not part of any table path. That last point is important. The issue is not limited to "another table". In the confirmed setup, once Apache Polaris returned credentials for the crafted table, the path restriction inside the configured bucket was effectively gone. The practical effect is that temporary credentials for one crafted table can be broader than the table Polaris was asked to authorize, and can become effectively bucket-wide within the configured bucket. The current GCS testing used a Polaris principal with broad catalog privileges for setup. A separate least-privilege Polaris RBAC variant has not yet been tested on GCS. However, the storage-credential broadening behavior itself has been confirmed on GCS.Show less

Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it later builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those same characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns and `s3:prefix` conditions. In S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as ordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table can match the storage path of a different table. In private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary- credential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for crafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other tables' S3 locations. The confirmed behavior includes: - reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]); - listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]); - and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating and deleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix. A control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same cross-table access. A least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker principal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the minimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table (namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that setup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the attacker could still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use those credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`. In Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which data files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table version to read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful confidentiality problem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited to disclosure.Show less

Apache Polaris can issue broad temporary ("vended") storage credentials during staged table creation before the effective table location has been validated or durably reserved. Those temporary credentials are meant to limit the scope of accessible table data and metadata, but this scope limitation becomes attacker- directed because the attacker can choose a reachable target location. In the confirmed variant, if the caller supplies a custom `location` during stage create and requests credential vending, Apache Polaris uses that location to construct delegated storage credentials immediately. The stage-create path itself neither runs the normal location validation nor the overlap checks before those credentials are issued. Closely related to that, the staged-create flow also accepts `write.data.path` / `write.metadata.path` in the request properties and feeds those location overrides into the same effective table location set used for credential vending. Those fields are secondary to the main custom-`location` exploit, but they are still attacker-influenced location inputs that should be validated before any credentials are issued.Show less

OOM Denial of Service via Unbounded Array Allocation in Apache OpenNLP AbstractModelReader  Versions Affected:  before 1.9.5 before 2.5.9 before 3.0.0-M3  Description: The AbstractModelReader methods getOutcomes(), getOutcomePatterns(), and getPredicates() each read a 32-bit signed integer count field from a binary model stream and pass that value directly to an array allocation (new String[numOutcomes], new int[numOCTypes][], new String[NUM_PREDS]) without validating that the value is non-negative or within a reasonable bound. The count is therefore fully attacker-controlled when the model file originates from an untrusted source. A crafted .bin model file in which any of these count fields is set to Integer.MAX_VALUE (or any value large enough to exhaust the available heap) triggers an OutOfMemoryError at the array allocation itself, before the corresponding label or pattern data is consumed from the stream. The error occurs very early in deserialization: for a GIS model, getOutcomes() is reached after only the model-type string, the correction constant, and the correction parameter have been read; so the attacker pays no meaningful size cost to weaponize a payload, and a single small file can crash a JVM that loads it. Any code path that deserializes a .bin model is affected, including direct use of GenericModelReader and any higher-level component that delegates to it during model load. The practical impact is denial of service against processes that load model files from untrusted or semi-trusted origins.   Mitigation: * 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9. * 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3. Note: The fix introduces an upper bound on each of the three count fields, checked before array allocation; counts that are negative or exceed the bound cause an IllegalArgumentException to be thrown and the read to fail fast with no large allocation. The default bound is 10,000,000, which is well above the entry counts of legitimate OpenNLP models but far below any value that would threaten heap exhaustion. Deployments that legitimately need to load models with more entries than the default can raise the limit at JVM startup by setting the OPENNLP_MAX_ENTRIES system property to the desired positive integer (e.g. -DOPENNLP_MAX_ENTRIES=50000000); invalid or non-positive values fall back to the default. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should treat all .bin model files as untrusted input unless their provenance is verified, and should avoid loading models supplied by end users or fetched from third-party repositories without integrity checks.Show less

Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader Versions Affected: before 1.9.5, before 2.5.9, before 3.0.0-M3 Description:  The ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(Class, String) method loads a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invokes its no-arg constructor, with the class name sourced from the manifest.properties entry of a model archive. The existing isAssignableFrom check correctly rejects classes that are not subtypes of the expected extension interface (BaseToolFactory for factory=, ArtifactSerializer for serializer-class-*), but the check runs after Class.forName() has already loaded and initialized the named class. Class.forName() with default initialization semantics executes the target class's static initializer before returning, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive can cause the static initializer of any class on the classpath to run during model loading, regardless of whether that class passes the subsequent type check. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer (for example, JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, or filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not a drop-in remote code execution; however, the attack surface grows as third-party model distribution becomes more common (community model repositories, Hugging Face-style sharing), where users routinely load model files from origins they do not control. A secondary, narrower vector affects deployments that ship legitimate BaseToolFactory or ArtifactSerializer subclasses with side-effecting no-arg constructors: a malicious manifest can name such a class and force its constructor to run during model load. Mitigation:  * 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9. * 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3. Note: The fix introduces a package-prefix allowlist that is consulted before Class.forName() is invoked, so the static initializer of a disallowed class is never executed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing factories or serializers outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that all model files are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors, particularly any that perform JNDI lookups, network requests, or filesystem operations during class initialization.Show less