Keepkey Firmware

Insufficient length checks in the ShapeShift KeepKey hardware wallet firmware before 7.7.0 allow a global buffer overflow via crafted messages. Flaws in cf_confirmExecTx() in ethereum_contracts.c can be used to reveal arbitrary microcontroller memory on the device screen or crash the device. With physical access to a PIN-unlocked device, attackers can extract the BIP39 mnemonic secret from the hardware wallet.Show less

Insufficient length checks in the ShapeShift KeepKey hardware wallet firmware before 7.1.0 allow a stack buffer overflow via crafted messages. The overflow in ethereum_extractThorchainSwapData() in ethereum.c can circumvent stack protections and lead to code execution. The vulnerable interface is reachable remotely over WebUSB.Show less

Insufficient checks in the finite state machine of the ShapeShift KeepKey hardware wallet before firmware 6.2.2 allow a partial reset of cryptographic secrets to known values via crafted messages. Notably, this breaks the security of U2F for new server registrations and invalidates existing registrations. This vulnerability can be exploited by unauthenticated attackers and the interface is reachable via WebUSB.Show less

On ShapeShift KeepKey devices, a side channel for the row-based OLED display was found. The power consumption of each row-based display cycle depends on the number of illuminated pixels, allowing a partial recovery of display contents. For example, a hardware implant in the USB cable might be able to leverage this behavior to recover secret data shown on the display. In other words, the side channel is relevant only if the attacker has enough control over the device's USB connection to make power-consumption measurements at a time when secret data is displayed. The side channel is not relevant in other circumstances, such as a stolen device that is not currently displaying secret data. NOTE: the vendor's position is that there is "insignificant risk.Show less