Migration Toolkit For Applications

Starlette is a lightweight ASGI framework/toolkit. Prior to version 1.0.1, the HTTP `Host` request header was not validated before being used to reconstruct `request.url`. Because the routing algorithm relies on the raw HTTP path while `request.url` is rebuilt from the `Host` header, a malformed header could make `request.url.path` differ from the path that was actually requested. Middleware and endpoints that apply security restrictions based on `request.url` (rather than the raw `scope` path) could therefore be bypassed. Users should upgrade to a version greater than or equal to version 1.0.1, which validates the `Host` header against the grammar of RFC 9112 §3.2 / RFC 3986 §3.2.2 when constructing `request.url` and falls back to `scope["server"]` for malformed values.Show less

A flaw was found in Keycloak, where it does not properly validate URLs included in a redirect. This issue could allow an attacker to construct a malicious request to bypass validation and access other URLs and sensitive information within the domain or conduct further attacks. This flaw affects any client that utilizes a wildcard in the Valid Redirect URIs field, and requires user interaction within the malicious URL.Show less

A flaw was found in the redirect_uri validation logic in Keycloak. This issue may allow a bypass of otherwise explicitly allowed hosts. A successful attack may lead to an access token being stolen, making it possible for the attacker to impersonate other users.Show less

The undertow client is not checking the server identity presented by the server certificate in https connections. This is a compulsory step (at least it should be performed by default) in https and in http/2. I would add it to any TLS client protocol.Show less