Keepalived

In Keepalived through 2.2.4, the D-Bus policy does not sufficiently restrict the message destination, allowing any user to inspect and manipulate any property. This leads to access-control bypass in some situations in which an unrelated D-Bus system service has a settable (writable) propertyShow less

keepalived before 2.0.7 has a heap-based buffer overflow when parsing HTTP status codes resulting in DoS or possibly unspecified other impact, because extract_status_code in lib/html.c has no validation of the status code and instead writes an unlimited amount of data to the heap.Show less

keepalived 2.0.8 didn't check for existing plain files when writing data to a temporary file upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats. If a local attacker had previously created a file with the expected name (e.g., /tmp/keepalived.data or /tmp/keepalived.stats), with read access for the attacker and write access for the keepalived process, then this potentially leaked sensitive information.Show less

keepalived 2.0.8 didn't check for pathnames with symlinks when writing data to a temporary file upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats. This allowed local users to overwrite arbitrary files if fs.protected_symlinks is set to 0, as demonstrated by a symlink from /tmp/keepalived.data or /tmp/keepalived.stats to /etc/passwd.Show less

The pidfile_write function in core/pidfile.c in keepalived 1.2.2 and earlier uses 0666 permissions for the (1) keepalived.pid, (2) checkers.pid, and (3) vrrp.pid files in /var/run/, which allows local users to kill arbitrary processes by writing a PID to one of these files.Show less