Hyper

An issue was discovered in hyper v0.13.7. h2-0.2.4 Stream stacking occurs when the H2 component processes HTTP2 RST_STREAM frames. As a result, the memory and CPU usage are high which can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).Show less

hyper is an HTTP library for rust. hyper's HTTP/1 server code had a flaw that incorrectly parses and accepts requests with a `Content-Length` header with a prefixed plus sign, when it should have been rejected as illegal. This combined with an upstream HTTP proxy that doesn't parse such `Content-Length` headers, but forwards them, can result in "request smuggling" or "desync attacks". The flaw exists in all prior versions of hyper prior to 0.14.10, if built with `rustc` v1.5.0 or newer. The vulnerability is patched in hyper version 0.14.10. Two workarounds exist: One may reject requests manually that contain a plus sign prefix in the `Content-Length` header or ensure any upstream proxy handles `Content-Length` headers with a plus sign prefix.Show less

hyper is an HTTP library for Rust. In versions prior to 0.14.10, hyper's HTTP server and client code had a flaw that could trigger an integer overflow when decoding chunk sizes that are too big. This allows possible data loss, or if combined with an upstream HTTP proxy that allows chunk sizes larger than hyper does, can result in "request smuggling" or "desync attacks." The vulnerability is patched in version 0.14.10. Two possible workarounds exist. One may reject requests manually that contain a `Transfer-Encoding` header or ensure any upstream proxy rejects `Transfer-Encoding` chunk sizes greater than what fits in 64-bit unsigned integers.Show less

hyper is an open-source HTTP library for Rust (crates.io). In hyper from version 0.12.0 and before versions 0.13.10 and 0.14.3 there is a vulnerability that can enable a request smuggling attack. The HTTP server code had a flaw that incorrectly understands some requests with multiple transfer-encoding headers to have a chunked payload, when it should have been rejected as illegal. This combined with an upstream HTTP proxy that understands the request payload boundary differently can result in "request smuggling" or "desync attacks". To determine if vulnerable, all these things must be true: 1) Using hyper as an HTTP server (the client is not affected), 2) Using HTTP/1.1 (HTTP/2 does not use transfer-encoding), 3) Using a vulnerable HTTP proxy upstream to hyper. If an upstream proxy correctly rejects the illegal transfer-encoding headers, the desync attack cannot succeed. If there is no proxy upstream of hyper, hyper cannot start the desync attack, as the client will repair the headers before forwarding. This is fixed in versions 0.14.3 and 0.13.10. As a workaround one can take the following options: 1) Reject requests that contain a `transfer-encoding` header, 2) Ensure any upstream proxy handles `transfer-encoding` correctly.Show less