Gitea

Gitea validated the initial remote URL for push mirrors, wiki remote checks, and fetches of migrated pull request heads, but the subsequent raw Git operations followed HTTP redirects without revalidating the destination. A repository administrator using a policy-allowed endpoint that redirects could make Gitea's Git client send requests to an address that the outbound host policy would otherwise block. The impact depends on the configured policy and the internal services reachable from the server.Show less

Gitea Actions blocks the jobs of workflow runs from first-time fork pull request contributors until a maintainer approves the run. The rerun path only required a run to be finished and built the new attempt's jobs without considering the pending approval, so when a user with Actions write access cancelled a run that was awaiting approval and then re-ran it, the new jobs were created as waiting rather than blocked while the run still recorded that approval was required. Cancelling and re-running stale fork checks is a routine action that does not involve the approval control, so where Actions is enabled and a matching runner is registered, workflow code taken from the fork pull request head could run on the repository's runners without an explicit approval.Show less

A user who can open a fork pull request can place workflow content with a shared run-level concurrency group into a Gitea Actions run that is awaiting approval. When a later run in that group cancels the blocked job, the run becomes terminal while still marked as needing approval. If a maintainer later approves the run, Gitea passed the already-cancelled job back through concurrency preparation, set it to waiting, and made it claimable by a matching runner, executing fork-controlled workflow code. Exploitation requires the maintainer's later approval action, Actions to be enabled, and a runner that accepts the repository's jobs.Show less

When a Gitea Actions run was inserted, older runs in the same workflow-level concurrency group were cancelled without checking whether the new run still needed approval. Because fork pull request runs are inserted under the base repository, a user who can open a pull request from a fork could cancel trusted in-progress runs that share a concurrency group with `cancel-in-progress` enabled, without approval and without running any code. On self-hosted runners this can interrupt deployments and leave partial state behind.Show less

Gitea's container registry served blob downloads with a `Content-Type` taken from the media type declared in pushed image manifests, without a `Content-Disposition` or restrictive content security policy. A user who can push container images can publish a blob containing HTML and JavaScript with a `text/html` media type. When a victim who is authenticated to the instance opens the blob URL in a browser, the script runs on the Gitea origin and can perform actions as the victim, such as creating API tokens.Show less

When Gitea's built-in SSH server is enabled (`START_SSH_SERVER = true`), the presented public key was looked up with an SQL `LIKE` comparison of its encoded content, which is case-insensitive on some databases, including the default SQLite. An attacker who can construct a case variant of another user's registered RSA public key for which they can derive the private key could have that key matched to the victim's account and authenticate over SSH as that user. Keys are now looked up by fingerprint.Show less

Gitea's repository migration and pull mirror egress checks could be bypassed with a hostname that returns multiple DNS answers, because the address that was validated was not necessarily the address Git later connected to. A low-privileged user who can create migrations or mirrors could direct the server to internal services, reading from and writing to reachable internal Git or HTTP endpoints. Content from internal responses could additionally be disclosed through migration and mirror error messages.Show less

When `[migrations] ALLOWED_DOMAINS` was configured, a hostname matching the allow list was accepted without checking its resolved address against the local-network restrictions. A user who can start repository migrations and control the DNS of an allowed hostname could make it resolve to loopback or private addresses and bypass `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false`, reaching internal services from the Gitea server. Instances without `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` configured are not affected by this specific bypass.Show less

Gitea does not properly validate repository ownership when linking attachments to releases. An attachment uploaded to a private repository could potentially be linked to a release in a different public repository, making it accessible to unauthorized users.Show less

Gitea's stopwatch API does not re-validate repository access permissions. After a user's access to a private repository is revoked, they may still view issue titles and repository names through previously started stopwatches.Show less

Gitea's notification API does not re-validate repository access permissions when returning notification details. After a user's access to a private repository is revoked, they may still view issue and pull request titles through previously received notifications.Show less

Gitea does not properly verify repository context when deleting attachments. A user who previously uploaded an attachment to a repository may be able to delete it after losing access to that repository by making the request through a different repository they can access.Show less

Gitea may send release notification emails for private repositories to users whose access has been revoked. When a repository is changed from public to private, users who previously watched the repository may continue to receive release notifications, potentially disclosing release titles, tags, and content.Show less