Aironet 1815i Firmware

A vulnerability in the client forwarding code of multiple Cisco Access Points (APs) could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to inject packets from the native VLAN to clients within nonnative VLANs on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to a logic error on the AP that forwards packets that are destined to a wireless client if they are received on the native VLAN. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by obtaining access to the native VLAN and directing traffic directly to the client through their MAC/IP combination. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to bypass VLAN separation and potentially also bypass any Layer 3 protection mechanisms that are deployed.Show less

A vulnerability in the SSH management feature of multiple Cisco Access Points (APs) platforms could allow a local, authenticated user to modify files on the affected device and possibly gain escalated privileges. The vulnerability is due to improper checking on file operations within the SSH management interface. A network administrator user could exploit this vulnerability by accessing an affected device through SSH management to make a configuration change. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to gain privileges equivalent to the root user.Show less

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.Show less

An issue was discovered in the kernel in NetBSD 7.1. An Access Point (AP) forwards EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This might be abused in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against connected clients and makes it easier to exploit other vulnerabilities in connected clients.Show less

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.Show less

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.Show less