Spring Batch

Spring Batch's FlatFileItemReader supports files where a single logical record spans multiple physical lines — for example, a CSV field that contains embedded newlines wrapped in quotes. A specially crafted input file could exploit the way the reader assembles those multi-line records to consume excessive CPU time and memory, causing the batch job to stall or run out of memory. Spring Batch 6.0.0 - 6.0.4 Spring Batch 5.2.0 - 5.2.6 Spring Batch 4.3.0 - 4.3.13Show less

Applications that deserialize execution contexts with Jackson2ExecutionContextStringSerializer are vulnerable to a deserialization attack if they use an untrusted data source for the job repository. The JobParameterDeserializer does not properly enforce the trusted-types allowlist, allowing an attacker to craft malicious input that can lead to arbitrary code execution, including known Jackson RCE gadgets. Spring Batch 6.0.0 - 6.0.4 Spring Batch 5.2.0 - 5.2.6Show less

When configured to enable default typing, Jackson contained a deserialization vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary code execution. Jackson fixed this vulnerability by blacklisting known "deserialization gadgets". Spring Batch configures Jackson with global default typing enabled which means that through the previous exploit, arbitrary code could be executed if all of the following is true: * Spring Batch's Jackson support is being leveraged to serialize a job's ExecutionContext. * A malicious user gains write access to the data store used by the JobRepository (where the data to be deserialized is stored). In order to protect against this type of attack, Jackson prevents a set of untrusted gadget classes from being deserialized. Spring Batch should be proactive against blocking unknown "deserialization gadgets" when enabling default typing.Show less