Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Chainlit is a Python framework for building production-ready conversational AI applications. From 2.4.0rc0 until 2.12.0, Chainlit deployments with features.mcp.enabled set to true in .chainlit/config.toml expose the POST /mcp endpoint without requiring authentication. For sse and streamable-http transports, ConnectSseMCPRequest and ConnectStreamableHttpMCPRequest in backend/chainlit/types.py accept a user-controlled url and optional headers dictionary without scheme validation, private-address filtering, or an allowlist. The connect_mcp handler in backend/chainlit/server.py passes these values to sse_client() or streamablehttp_client(), allowing the Chainlit server to make blind outbound requests to arbitrary internal or external services, including cloud metadata endpoints, with attacker-controlled Authorization and Cookie headers. The SSE URL sink has existed since 2.4.0rc0, while attacker-controlled header forwarding and streamable-http support were added in 2.6.4. The response is consumed internally and not returned, but the attacker can issue state-changing authenticated requests, discover internal services, scan ports, and probe metadata endpoints. This issue is fixed in version 2.12.0.Show less

In Dradis Community Edition, the ProvidersController and AgentsController gate their admin_required before_action on `defined?(Dradis::Pro)`, a constant that is never defined in CE, so the authorization check is never applied. As a result, any authenticated (non-admin) user can create an AI provider pointing to an arbitrary HTTP/HTTPS address (including internal/link-local hosts such as http://169.254.169.254) and reassign the built-in Roslin agent to use it. When an AI interaction is triggered, the server issues a request to the attacker-supplied URL (server-side request forgery). For non-2xx responses, the target's response body is reflected verbatim to the attacker's browser via ActionCable/Turbo Stream error messages, making the SSRF readable.Show less

Adobe Campaign Classic (ACC) is affected by a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction. Scope is changed.Show less

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was found in galaxy_ng, the Ansible Galaxy server plugin for Pulp. An authenticated user with namespace management permissions can set a namespace avatar URL to an arbitrary address, including internal networks, loopback, or cloud instance metadata endpoints. A background worker fetches that URL without checking the destination, which lets the attacker probe internal services and enumerate reachable IP addresses. The HTTP client is also configured without an overall timeout, so a slow or non-responsive target can pin workers and cause a denial of service.Show less

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonai 4.6.58, JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url() accepts webhook_url when resolution raises socket.gaierror because the exception path uses except socket.gaierror: pass. JobExecutor._send_webhook() later performs a fresh lookup, allowing DNS changes to direct the request to an internal service. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.Show less

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonai 4.6.58, the Jobs API validate_webhook_url() path fails open on socket.gaierror and does not bind the validated address to the later request. An attacker webhook_url can later resolve to 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, or another internal address. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.Show less

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.58, spider_tools._host_is_blocked() does not resolve ordinary hostnames before scrape_page fetches them. A hostname such as 127.0.0.1.nip.io passes validation and resolves to loopback, permitting internal HTTP access. The fix uses socket.getaddrinfo and fails closed on DNS errors. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.58.Show less

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.58, the web_crawl function validates only the initial URL before _crawl_with_httpx uses httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True). Redirect targets are not revalidated, so an attacker who influences a crawl target can redirect a public URL to loopback, private network, or cloud metadata services while ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL remains disabled. The fetched internal response is returned to the agent context. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.58.Show less

Ech0 before 4.4.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the validateWebhookURL function (webhook_setting_service.go), which only validates literal IP addresses via net.ParseIP() and fails to reject hostnames that DNS-resolve to private or internal IPs (e.g., 169.254.169.254.nip.io). An attacker with admin privileges can create a webhook with such a hostname to bypass validation and cause the server to make requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and private network resources. The issue is fixed in 4.4.3.Show less

Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the fetchPeerConnectInfo function that uses unvalidated HTTP requests instead of safe request methods with URL validation. Authenticated attackers can supply arbitrary URLs to access internal services and cloud metadata endpoints by triggering connection health checks or peer connection operations.Show less

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Avro SerDe schema resolution in Apache Hive before 4.2.1 allows an authenticated remote attacker with CREATE TABLE privilege to cause the Hive server to fetch an attacker-controlled URL when resolving the avro.schema.url table property on an Avro table that is subsequently queried. This can expose cloud instance metadata, internal network services, or local server files to the Hive process identity. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.2.1, which fixes this issue. Attacker access requirements: * Network access to HiveServer2 / Metastore: required (remote attacker model). * Valid Hive authentication: required. * CREATE TABLE (or equivalent) privilege: required, so the attacker can set avro.schema.url in table properties. * SELECT privilege on the malicious table: not required for the creator, who can typically query their own table; any other user granted SELECT can also trigger the fetch. * Write access to the table LOCATION: not required; the attack uses the schema URL, not the data path. * Admin / superuser privileges: not required; an ordinary authenticated user with DDL rights is sufficient. * External tables enabled: typically required in practice, and enabled by default in most deployments. Detection guidance: * Inspect metastore / Hive table metadata for Avro tables whose avro.schema.url uses unexpected schemes such as http, https, file, or ftp, or points at link-local / cloud metadata addresses (for example 169.254.169.254) or other internal hosts. * Review HiveServer2 and Metastore logs around CREATE/ALTER TABLE and queries against Avro tables for schema-resolution failures or outbound fetches of avro.schema.url. * Correlate CREATE TABLE / ALTER TABLE activity that sets avro.schema.url with subsequent SELECT activity on the same table, especially when the URL target is unusual for schema distribution. * On cloud deployments, check instance / VPC flow logs and metadata service access logs for unexpected requests from Hive host identities shortly after Avro DDL or query activity.Show less

NLTK before 3.10.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in nltk.pathsec.urlopen (and callers nltk.data.load, nltk.downloader.Downloader.index/download) when an HTTP proxy is configured. pathsec.urlopen validates the requested hostname locally, but proxy-handler inheritance disables the safe HTTP/HTTPS handlers so the actual fetch is performed by the proxy against a destination that is never re-validated. An attacker can supply a validated public URL that the proxy forwards to an internal loopback-only service, allowing disclosure of internal HTTP resources, loading of forged downloader indexes, and installation of attacker-chosen package content.Show less

Adminer before 5.5.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the login form's server field validator, which only inspects leading integers for privileged ports and fails to reject non-numeric port values. Attackers can inject PDO DSN keys like host= and port= into the server parameter to bypass the privileged-port restriction and establish TCP connections to arbitrary internal hosts and ports before authentication.Show less

jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. Prior to versions 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1 on their respective release lines, the java.net.InetAddress branch of FromStringDeserializer.Std._deserialize() calls InetAddress.getByName() on attacker-controlled input, causing eager DNS resolution during deserialization and enabling DNS-based server-side request forgery and internal-host enumeration. This issue is fixed in versions 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1.Show less

Hi.Events validates a webhook destination only when it is registered, never when it is used. NoInternalUrlRule in backend/app/Validators/Rules/NoInternalUrlRule.php resolves the hostname with gethostbyname() and rejects private and reserved ranges, which any public hostname passes. At dispatch, WebhookDispatchService takes the stored URL and calls it through spatie/laravel-webhook-server without repeating the check, and backend/config/webhook-server.php sets no Guzzle options, so redirect following remains enabled by default. A destination that answers with a redirect to a loopback, private or cloud metadata address therefore causes the server to issue that request, and changing the hostname's DNS record after registration reaches the same result because no resolution is repeated. The response is not discarded: WebhookResponseHandlerService stores the body on the webhook log and WebhookLogResource returns it from the webhook logs endpoint, so the requester reads what the internal service replied rather than inferring it. Both event and organizer webhooks share the rule and the dispatch path. Version 1.11.1-beta revalidates at dispatch, pins the validated address, checks every redirect hop, and decodes IPv6 transition addresses that previously bypassed the filter.Show less

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was found in multiple AWX notification backends. The webhook, Mattermost, Rocket.Chat, and Grafana notification backends use notification template URLs as direct HTTP request targets without validating the target address against private, loopback, or reserved IP ranges. An organization notification administrator can create notification templates pointing to internal or loopback addresses, causing the AWX control node to issue HTTP requests to services that are not externally accessible. Additionally, the webhook notification backend follows HTTP redirects and resends configured Basic Authentication credentials to redirect targets regardless of host change, allowing an attacker to exfiltrate notification credentials by redirecting to an attacker-controlled host. The Grafana backend sends its API key in the Authorization header to the configured target URL.Show less

RansomLook contains insufficient resource validation in the analysis PDF generation functionality. Analysis documents are converted from Markdown to HTML and passed to WeasyPrint for PDF rendering. Prior to the fix, WeasyPrint used its default URL fetcher, allowing resource references contained in an analysis to be resolved without restrictions. An authenticated attacker able to create or modify an analysis could embed crafted resource references using schemes such as file:// or http://. When the analysis was subsequently rendered as PDF, WeasyPrint would process these references with the privileges and network access of the RansomLook server. A malicious file:// reference could cause the renderer to access arbitrary files readable by the RansomLook process, potentially exposing sensitive configuration, credentials, or other local data through rendered resources. Network URLs could cause the server to initiate requests to localhost, internal network services, or external systems, resulting in server-side request forgery (SSRF) and potentially bypassing network-level access restrictions. The patch introduces a dedicated WeasyPrint URL fetcher that permits only data: resources, the RansomLook report logo, and files contained within the analysis asset directory. Network resources and filesystem paths outside these explicitly permitted locations are rejected.Show less