Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

OAuth is a Ruby wrapper for the OAuth 1.0 and 1.0a protocols, providing clients and servers. From 0.5.5 to 1.1.5, OAuth::Consumer#token_request parses the raw Location header of a 300 to 399 redirect returned by the OAuth server and follows the redirect recursively, which can mutate the consumer's configuration and expose signed OAuth request metadata, including the Authorization header, to a cross-origin host. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.6.Show less

Appium Java Client is the Java language binding for writing Appium tests that conform to the W3C WebDriver protocol. From 8.2.1 until 10.1.1, when directConnect(true) is enabled, AppiumCommandExecutor.setDirectConnect() reads the directConnectHost, directConnectPort, and directConnectPath fields from the server's NEW_SESSION response and rebuilds the client's server URL from them, validating only that the protocol is https, with no host allowlist or IP validation; a rogue or compromised server can therefore redirect all subsequent session traffic to an arbitrary destination, enabling full interception of session traffic and a server-side request forgery pivot to internal hosts, including cloud metadata (IMDS) credential theft. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.1.1.Show less

Pivotick did not validate the URL scheme of node imagePath values derived from graph data before assigning them to SVG image resources. An attacker able to supply crafted graph data could set an image path to a malicious URI. When a victim rendered the affected graph, the browser could resolve the attacker-controlled URI and initiate an unintended request or invoke scheme-specific handling in the victim’s context. Depending on the URI, browser behaviour, and installed protocol handlers, exploitation could disclose limited client or network metadata, facilitate rendering-based tracking, or attempt to access local or internal resources. Exploitation requires a victim to load or render graph data containing the malicious imagePath. The patch normalizes ASCII whitespace and control characters in URI schemes and restricts image paths to relative URLs or the http, https, data, and blob schemes.Show less

JFrog Artifactory support for Terraform remote repositories was found to be susceptible to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). An authenticated user - or, if anonymous access is enabled on the repository, an unauthenticated user - could cause Artifactory to issue outbound HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations and receive the response content.Show less

A URL validation weakness in JFrog Artifactory Ansible repository handling could allow a user, under specific repository access conditions, to cause unintended server-side requests. The issue primarily affects confidentiality and integrity and has been addressed in fixed Artifactory versions.Show less

Next.js is a React framework for building full-stack web applications. In versions 14.1.1 through 15.5.20 and 16.0.0 through 16.2.10, when a Server Action forwards or redirects a request, an attacker can cause the server to send that outbound request to a malicious host (Server-Side Request Forgery). This requires the attacker's request to control Host-associated headers. In some configurations, it's also possible to obtain internal values that weaken middleware/proxy authorization. Applications that use Server Actions are affected when the incoming host header is not fixed to a trusted value. This typically occurs on custom servers, or on deployments not behind a proxy that pins the host. Managed hosting pins the host upstream and is not affected; next start and standalone output do the same from version 14.2 onward. This issue has been fixed in versions 15.5.21 and 16.2.11.Show less

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and credential exfiltration vulnerability exists in the cloud-healthcare-fhir-fetch-page tool of googleapis/mcp-toolbox. The tool takes an unvalidated pageURL parameter from the client and issues an HTTP GET request to it using an authenticated client. The underlying transport automatically attaches an Authorization: Bearer header to every outbound request regardless of the destination host. An attacker can supply an arbitrary external URL to the pageURL parameter (either directly via the tool execution payload or implicitly via data-driven pagination tracking loops), leading Toolbox into sending its OAuth/service-account access token to an attacker-controlled listener. Depending on the configuration, this leaks either the end-user's token or the broader service-account access token (ADC), potentially exposing Protected Health Information (PHI) and secondary Google Cloud Platform services.Show less

Next.js is a React framework for building full-stack web applications. In versions 12.0.0 through 15.5.20 and 16.0.0 through 16.2.10, a rewrites() or redirects() rule that builds its external destination hostname from request-controlled input can be pointed at an arbitrary hostname, regardless of the rule's hostname suffix. For a rewrite, Next.js proxies the request to that arbitrary host and serves the response from the application's origin, leading to Server-Side Request forgery. A redirects() rule configured this way is vulnerable to an Open Redirect. This issue has been fixed in versions 15.5.21 and 16.2.11.Show less

ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Versions 10.1.1 through 10.2.0 are vulnerable to SSRF through misclassification of IPv4-mapped/NAT64 IPv6 addresses. Address6.getType() classifies an address by matching it against a table of known IPv6 special-use prefixes, returning Global unicast when nothing matches. That table had no entry for the IPv4-mapped range (::ffff:0:0/96), so every mapped address fell through to Global unicast; NAT64 addresses matched their own NAT64 … labels. The boolean checks isLoopback, isUnspecified, and isMulticast compared getType() against a fixed label and so returned false, while isLinkLocal and isULA checked only the native IPv6 ranges. The library already exposed isMapped4() and to4(), but did not apply them inside these checks, so a mapped or NAT64 address was never normalized to its embedded IPv4 address before classification. For IPv4-mapped addresses the host OS routes to the IPv4 stack, so the misclassification is reachable on any dual-stack host. For NAT64, the classification bypass is unconditional but end-to-end reachability additionally requires a NAT64/DNS64 gateway in the deployment network.This issue has been fixed in version 10.2.1.Show less

Papra is a minimalistic document management and archiving platform. Prior to version 26.5.0, Papra's webhook delivery system contains an SSRF protection bypass that allows any authenticated organisation member to cause the server to make HTTP requests to internal addresses — loopback, link-local, and RFC-1918 ranges. The SSRF protection validates the registered webhook URL but ignores redirect destinations. The HTTP client (ofetch) follows 3xx responses automatically, and the redirect target is never checked against the blocklist. An attacker registers a webhook pointing to an attacker-controlled server, which redirects incoming POSTs to any internal address. Exploitation was confirmed by live test against the official Docker image. The fix is a single-line change to the webhook HTTP client. This issue has been patched in version 26.5.0.Show less

Plack::App::Prerender versions before 0.3.0 for Perl can proxy to an arbitrary host via unvalidated REQUEST_URI concatenation in call. When the rewrite base is a plain string, the REQUEST_URI is appended to it, with no check that the path starts with a forward slash ('/'). When the rewrite base does not contain a path (which is the standard given in the SYNOPSIS), an attacker can create a request that changes the hostname. A request target starting with an at-sign ('@') changes the base to a RFC 3986 userinfo component. For example, a rewrite base of "https://example.com" with the submitted request "GET @192.168.1.2/" will send a request to "https://example.com@192.168.1.2/", with the rendered content returned to the attacker. This allows an attacker to access internal or restricted hosts that only the webserver has access to.Show less

A VCO feature does not sufficiently validate caller-supplied input, allowing requests to be made on behalf of authenticated tenant accounts to internal services that are not otherwise accessible. This vulnerability requires a minimum role of Enterprise Standard Admin. This issue was discovered internally by Arista and the company is not aware of any malicious uses of this issue in customer networks.Show less

Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.Show less