Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

An issue in MyBB 1.8.38 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the Add Mycode function. NOTE: the Supplier disputes this because of the allowed actions of Board administrators and because of SSRF mitigation.Show less

An issue in MyBB 1.8.38 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the Mail function. NOTE: the Supplier disputes this because of the allowed actions of Board administrators and because of SSRF mitigation.Show less

An issue in MyBB 1.8.38 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the Change Avatar function. NOTE: the Supplier disputes this because of the allowed actions of Board administrators and because of SSRF mitigation.Show less

An issue in MyBB 1.8.38 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the Import a Theme function. NOTE: the Supplier disputes this because of the allowed actions of Board administrators and because of SSRF mitigation.Show less

A vulnerability was found in mirweiye Seven Bears Library CMS 2023. It has been classified as problematic. Affected is an unknown function of the component Add Link Handler. The manipulation leads to server-side request forgery. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.Show less

AutoGPT is a platform that allows users to create, deploy, and manage continuous artificial intelligence agents that automate complex workflows. Prior to 0.6.1, AutoGPT allows SSRF due to DNS Rebinding in requests wrapper. AutoGPT is built with a wrapper around Python's requests library, hardening the application against SSRF. The code for this wrapper can be found in autogpt_platform/backend/backend/util/request.py. The requested hostname of a URL which is being requested is validated, ensuring that it does not resolve to any local ipv4 or ipv6 addresses. However, this check is not sufficient, as a DNS server may initially respond with a non-blocked address, with a TTL of 0. This means that the initial resolution would appear as a non-blocked address. In this case, validate_url() will return the url as successful. After validate_url() has successfully returned the url, the url is then passed to the real request() function. When the real request() function is called with the validated url, request() will once again resolve the address of the hostname, because the record will not have been cached (due to TTL 0). This resolution may be in the "invalid range". This type of attack is called a "DNS Rebinding Attack". This vulnerability is fixed in 0.6.1.Show less