Out-of-bounds Write

A stack overflow vulnerability exists in the WebCam Server Login functionality of GeoVision GV-VMS V20 20.0.2. A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to an arbitrary code execution. An attacker can make an unauthenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability. #### Stack-overflow via unconstrained sscanf The call to `sscanf` at [1] to split the `Buffer` variable into the `username` and `password` variables doesn't limit the size of the extracted content to match the destination buffers' sizes. In this case, if either the username or password decoded from the authorization string exceeds `40` characters (the size the stack variables `username` and `password`) then a stack overflow will occur. The data is controlled by an attacker, but sronger constraints (e.g. no null bytes) may make exploitation harder. A successful attack could lead to full code execution as SYSTEM on the machine running the service.Show less

A stack overflow vulnerability exists in the WebCam Server Login functionality of GeoVision GV-VMS V20 20.0.2. A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to an arbitrary code execution. An attacker can make an unauthenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.Show less

GV-VMS V20 is a Video Monitoring Software used to gather the feeds of many surveillance cameras and manage other security devices. It is a native application accessed locally, but it is also possible to enable remote access via the "WebCam Server" feature. Once enabled, it is possible to access to the management and monitoring feature via a regular Web interface. This webersever is another native application, compiled without ASLR, which makes exploitation much easier and more likely. Most of the features require authentication before being reachable and leverage a standard login page to grant access. However the `gvapi` endpoint uses its own authentication mechanism via an `HTTP Authorization` header. It supports both `Basic` authentication and the `Digest` modes of authentication.   #### Stack-overflow via unbound copy of base64 decoded string The `b64decoder` string is sized dynamically, but it is then copied to the `Buffer` stack variable one character at the time at [0], and there's no bound-check. As such, if the decoded string is bigger than 256 characters (the size of the `Buffer` variable) then a stack overflow occurs. Because the data can be fully controlled by an attacker and lack of ASLR, this vulnerability can easily be exploited to gain full code execution as SYSTEM on the machine running the service.Show less

An off-by-one out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the bgp_flowspec_op_decode() function (bgpd/bgp_flowspec_util.c) of FRRouting (FRR) stable/10.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted FlowSpec component.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset() The memset() in hid_report_raw_event() has the good intention of clearing out bogus data by zeroing the area from the end of the incoming data string to the assumed end of the buffer. However, as we have previously seen, doing so can easily result in OOB reads and writes in the subsequent thread of execution. The current suggestion from one of the HID maintainers is to remove the memset() and simply return if the incoming event buffer size is not large enough to fill the associated report. Suggested-by Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss@kernel.org> [bentiss: changed the return value]Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: multitouch: Check to ensure report responses match the request It is possible for a malicious (or clumsy) device to respond to a specific report's feature request using a completely different report ID. This can cause confusion in the HID core resulting in nasty side-effects such as OOB writes. Add a check to ensure that the report ID in the response, matches the one that was requested. If it doesn't, omit reporting the raw event and return early.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() Sashiko AI-review observed: In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2 and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2). IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm at offset 18. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO). This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao. Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that extends past the end of the packet data into skb_shared_info? Should the cb array also be cleared in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() and ip6ip6_err() to prevent this? This patch implements the first suggestion. I am not sure if ip6ip6_err() needs to be changed. A separate patch would be better anyway.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ip6_tunnel: clear skb2->cb[] in ip4ip6_err() Oskar Kjos reported the following problem. ip4ip6_err() calls icmp_send() on a cloned skb whose cb[] was written by the IPv6 receive path as struct inet6_skb_parm. icmp_send() passes IPCB(skb2) to __ip_options_echo(), which interprets that cb[] region as struct inet_skb_parm (IPv4). The layouts differ: inet6_skb_parm.nhoff at offset 14 overlaps inet_skb_parm.opt.rr, producing a non-zero rr value. __ip_options_echo() then reads optlen from attacker-controlled packet data at sptr[rr+1] and copies that many bytes into dopt->__data, a fixed 40-byte stack buffer (IP_OPTIONS_DATA_FIXED_SIZE). To fix this we clear skb2->cb[], as suggested by Oskar Kjos. Also add minimal IPv4 header validation (version == 4, ihl >= 5).Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: validate LTK enc_size on load Load Long Term Keys stores the user-provided enc_size and later uses it to size fixed-size stack operations when replying to LE LTK requests. An enc_size larger than the 16-byte key buffer can therefore overflow the reply stack buffer. Reject oversized enc_size values while validating the management LTK record so invalid keys never reach the stored key state.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wilc1000: fix u8 overflow in SSID scan buffer size calculation The variable valuesize is declared as u8 but accumulates the total length of all SSIDs to scan. Each SSID contributes up to 33 bytes (IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN + 1), and with WILC_MAX_NUM_PROBED_SSID (10) SSIDs the total can reach 330, which wraps around to 74 when stored in a u8. This causes kmalloc to allocate only 75 bytes while the subsequent memcpy writes up to 331 bytes into the buffer, resulting in a 256-byte heap buffer overflow. Widen valuesize from u8 to u32 to accommodate the full range.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix stack buffer overflow in hci_le_big_create_sync hci_le_big_create_sync() uses DEFINE_FLEX to allocate a struct hci_cp_le_big_create_sync on the stack with room for 0x11 (17) BIS entries. However, conn->num_bis can hold up to HCI_MAX_ISO_BIS (31) entries — validated against ISO_MAX_NUM_BIS (0x1f) in the caller hci_conn_big_create_sync(). When conn->num_bis is between 18 and 31, the memcpy that copies conn->bis into cp->bis writes up to 14 bytes past the stack buffer, corrupting adjacent stack memory. This is trivially reproducible: binding an ISO socket with bc_num_bis = ISO_MAX_NUM_BIS (31) and calling listen() will eventually trigger hci_le_big_create_sync() from the HCI command sync worker, causing a KASAN-detectable stack-out-of-bounds write: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in hci_le_big_create_sync+0x256/0x3b0 Write of size 31 at addr ffffc90000487b48 by task kworker/u9:0/71 Fix this by changing the DEFINE_FLEX count from the incorrect 0x11 to HCI_MAX_ISO_BIS, which matches the maximum number of BIS entries that conn->bis can actually carry.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: comedi: me_daq: Fix potential overrun of firmware buffer `me2600_xilinx_download()` loads the firmware that was requested by `request_firmware()`. It is possible for it to overrun the source buffer because it blindly trusts the file format. It reads a data stream length from the first 4 bytes into variable `file_length` and reads the data stream contents of length `file_length` from offset 16 onwards. Although it checks that the supplied firmware is at least 16 bytes long, it does not check that it is long enough to contain the data stream. Add a test to ensure that the supplied firmware is long enough to contain the header and the data stream. On failure, log an error and return `-EINVAL`.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: comedi: me4000: Fix potential overrun of firmware buffer `me4000_xilinx_download()` loads the firmware that was requested by `request_firmware()`. It is possible for it to overrun the source buffer because it blindly trusts the file format. It reads a data stream length from the first 4 bytes into variable `file_length` and reads the data stream contents of length `file_length` from offset 16 onwards. Add a test to ensure that the supplied firmware is long enough to contain the header and the data stream. On failure, log an error and return `-EINVAL`. Note: The firmware loading was totally broken before commit ac584af59945 ("staging: comedi: me4000: fix firmware downloading"), but that is the most sensible target for this fix.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmem: zynqmp_nvmem: Fix buffer size in DMA and memcpy Buffer size used in dma allocation and memcpy is wrong. It can lead to undersized DMA buffer access and possible memory corruption. use correct buffer size in dma_alloc_coherent and memcpy.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate control request size f_audio_complete() copies req->length bytes into a 4-byte stack variable: u32 data = 0; memcpy(&data, req->buf, req->length); req->length is derived from the host-controlled USB request path, which can lead to a stack out-of-bounds write. Validate req->actual against the expected payload size for the supported control selectors and decode only the expected amount of data. This avoids copying a host-influenced length into a fixed-size stack object.Show less

A vulnerability was detected in AcademySoftwareFoundation OpenImageIO up to 3.2.0.1-dev. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file src/dds.imageio/ddsinput.cpp of the component DDS Image Handler. The manipulation results in out-of-bounds write. The attack needs to be approached locally. The exploit is now public and may be used. The patch is identified as 94ec2deec3e3bf2f2e2ff84d008e27425d626fe2. Applying a patch is advised to resolve this issue.Show less

A heap-based buffer overflow in hex_to_binary in the PKZIP hash parser in hashcat v7.1.2 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PKZIP hash file. The issue affects modules 17200, 17210, 17220, 17225, and 17230. When data_type_enum<=1, attacker-controlled hex data from a user-supplied hash string is decoded into a fixed-size buffer without proper input-length validation.Show less

A heap-based buffer overflow in the Kerberos hash parser in hashcat v7.1.2 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted Kerberos hash file. The issue affects module_hash_decode in multiple Kerberos-related modules because account_info_len is calculated from untrusted delimiter positions without upper-bound validation before memcpy copies the data into a fixed-size account_info buffer.Show less

A stack-based buffer overflow in mangle_to_hex_lower() and mangle_to_hex_upper() in src/rp_cpu.c in hashcat v7.1.2 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted rule file, or via the -j or -k rule options used with password candidates of 128 or more characters. The vulnerability is caused by a bounds check that fails to account for the 2x expansion that occurs when password bytes are converted to hexadecimal.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: validate rec->used in journal-replay file record check check_file_record() validates rec->total against the record size but never validates rec->used. The do_action() journal-replay handlers read rec->used from disk and use it to compute memmove lengths: DeleteAttribute: memmove(attr, ..., used - asize - roff) CreateAttribute: memmove(..., attr, used - roff) change_attr_size: memmove(..., used - PtrOffset(rec, next)) When rec->used is smaller than the offset of a validated attribute, or larger than the record size, these subtractions can underflow allowing us to copy huge amounts of memory in to a 4kb buffer, generally considered a bad idea overall. This requires a corrupted filesystem, which isn't a threat model the kernel really needs to worry about, but checking for such an obvious out-of-bounds value is good to keep things robust, especially on journal replay Fix this up by bounding rec->used correctly. This is much like commit b2bc7c44ed17 ("fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in DeleteIndexEntryRoot") which checked different values in this same switch statement.Show less