Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

The CODESYS Gateway Client allocates memory based on a size field in a gateway response without enforcing an appropriate upper limit. An unauthenticated remote attacker controlling a malicious gateway can exploit this behavior to trigger excessive memory consumption, resulting in a denial-of-service condition thus leading to a total loss of availablity.Show less

Server-side memory exhaustion in Apache MINA SSHD 1.0.0 to 2.19.0 and 3.0.0-M1 to 3.0.0-M5, component sshd-sftp, in the SFTP v6 check-file-name/check-file-handle extension. Apache MINA SSHD is a Java library for client-side and server-side SSH. Using a very small "block size" (for instance 256, which is the minimum) on a huge file generates many (file size / block size) hashes. The resulting SFTP reply message was accumulated fully in memory server-side, which could, with a suitably large (possibly sparse) file exhaust the server-side memory, taking down the server. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.20.0 or 3.0.0-M6, which fix this issue by imposing a maximum limit on the size of the reply. Many SFTP implementations have a general limit on the size of SFTP messages anyway; typically 256kB as in OpenSSH or also in Apache MINA SSHD.Show less

Possible memory exhaustion in SFTP clients (DefaultSftpClient) in component sshd-sftp in Apache MINA SSHD versions 0.9.0 to 2.19.0 and 3.0.0-M1 to 3.0.0-M5. Apache MINA SSHD is a Java library for client-side and server-side SSH. The sshd-sftp component provides support for SFTP. The SFTP client implementation, when receiving a reply, did not check that this reply corresponded to a request sent earlier. Unsolicited replies would be stored but never consumed. A malicious server could keep sending unsolicited replies until available memory in the client was exhausted. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.20.0 or 3.0.0-M6, which fix this issue.Show less

Uncontrolled resource consumption in component ssd-scp in Apache MINA SSHD versions up to 2.19.0 or 3.0.0-M1 to 3.0.0-M5. Apache MINA SSHD is a Java library for client-side and server-side SSH. Component sshd-scp of Apache MINA SSHD provides a Java implementation of SCP. The SCP command protocol is line-oriented with LF-terminated lines. The protocol handler in sshd-scp did not impose any limit on the length of such protocol lines. A malicious peer just sending a junk command containing a never-ending sequence of characters but never a LF would cause the receiver to allocate memory to store this whole junk command, exhausting memory and crashing the application with an OutOfMemoryError. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.20.0 or 3.0.0-M6, which fix this issue by enforcing an upper limit on the length of SCP protocol lines.Show less

Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value, Allocation of Resources Without Limits, and Uncontrolled Recursion in the Java implementation of Apache PLC4X (PLC4J) allow a malicious or impersonated device to exhaust the memory or stack of the client application, causing a denial of service. In the OPC UA driver these defects are reachable before authentication: the offending data is parsed while the secure channel and session are being established, before the server's identity has been bound to it. Configuring a trusted server therefore does not prevent exploitation by an attacker who can impersonate it. The individual defects are: - Length-prefixed byte strings are allocated at the size claimed on the wire before the length is checked against the data actually received (0.10.0 through 0.13.1). - Array fields in generated protocol parsers pre-allocate a list with the element count claimed on the wire, allowing a single count field to trigger a multi-gigabyte allocation. This parser is shared by all PLC4J drivers; the OPC UA driver is the verified pre-authentication path (0.10.0 through 0.13.1). - The OPC UA driver accumulates message chunks without enforcing the negotiated maximum chunk count and message size (0.12.0 through 0.13.1). - The OPC UA driver pre-allocates collections using element counts received from the server (0.10.0 through 0.13.1). - Recursive protocol types are parsed without a nesting-depth limit. The same defect in the Go implementation is covered by CVE-2026-102510 https://cveprocess.apache.org/cve5/CVE-2026-102510 . This issue affects Apache PLC4X: from 0.10.0 before 1.0.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.0.0, which fixes the issue.Show less

Pexip Infinity before 41.0 is affected by improper input validation in the signaling implementation which allows a remote attacker to trigger a software abort resulting in a denial of service. Exploitation of this issue requires accessing a gateway call from a WebRTC/API client.Show less

An uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in Fireware OS's diagnostic tasks feature allows a low-privileged, authenticated user to cause a denial of service of the system's diagnostic tools by repeatedly starting and aborting a specially crafted diagnostic task through the web UI.Show less

LightLLM through 1.2.0 contains a memory exhaustion vulnerability in the NCCL control channel when started with --pd_trans_mode nccl, allowing unauthenticated attackers to exhaust KV-transfer worker memory. Attackers can call the exposed_set_value method to store unbounded key-value pairs without size limits, causing the worker process to crash and triggering node failure.Show less

Russh is a Rust SSH client and server library. Prior to 0.63.2, an authenticated remote peer can send SSH_MSG_KEXINIT without the required SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT and then flood SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN messages while SessionKexState::InProgress prevents priority_receiver in russh/src/server/session.rs from being drained. The server continues processing network input and enqueues a ChannelOpenReply for each request on an unbounded channel, allowing one connection to grow memory until the process is terminated. This issue is fixed in version 0.63.2.Show less

The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than four bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not against the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one missing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none. The handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX: ```c /* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */ status = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, &temp_ptr, server_ptr -> nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER); ... fx_file_write(&(client_request_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_request_file), packet_ptr -> nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4, packet_ptr -> nx_packet_length - 4); ``` `nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the end of the first packet: ``` ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5 #0 __interceptor_memcpy #1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78 0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region ``` Those bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them back, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel. The same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs ceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the attacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never returns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and the server thread suspended, and no later client is served. Reject `nx_packet_length > 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call, and use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy.Show less

urllib3 is an HTTP client library for Python. From 1.10.3 until 2.8.0, the HTTPResponse.read_chunked and HTTPResponse.stream methods can allocate unbounded memory because the streaming chunk parser buffers the chunk-size field until newline or EOF without a length bound. The trigger is that a malicious server returns Transfer-Encoding: chunked followed by a very long run of bytes without a newline. The attack mechanism is that a malicious HTTP server sends a very long unterminated chunk-size line. The impact is that unbounded memory allocation can exhaust the client process. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.0.Show less

Issue summary: A malicious remote peer may flood the local QUIC stack with NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames by avoiding a limit check on how many connection IDs the remote QUIC stack can use. Impact summary: The local QUIC stack sends a RETIRE_CONN_ID frame for every NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame it receives. The RETIRE_CONN_ID frame is dispatched via the Control Frame Queue (CFQ). If the remote peer also withholds ACKs, then it can force the local stack to allocate ~400MB (depending on ACK delay). CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling Description: RFC 9000 sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 [1] describe the mechanism by which a remote peer can notify the local QUIC stack to change the destination connection ID (a.k.a. CID) the local stack uses to identify the connection at the remote peer. Each CID is associated with a sequence number. The sequence number is transmitted in NEW_CONNECTION_ID and RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames to identify the CID which is being either associated with a connection or retired. The remote peer sends a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame to let the local stack know a new CID is being associated with an existing connection. The NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame carries the new CID, its sequence number, and the retire-prior-to number. The retire-prior-to identifies existing CIDs that are to be retired. The local QUIC stack must send a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID for every destination CID whose sequence number is less than retire-prior-to. The CID becomes retired after the local stack receives an ACK for its RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame. Although the OpenSSL QUIC stack supports at most one destination CID for every connection, it can be tricked into processing more than one RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame per connection. The OpenSSL QUIC stack currently retires the destination CID as soon as it receives the NEW_CONNECTION_ID, while in fact the destination CID must be retired after an ACK for the RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame is received. Correcting the flawed logic also fixes the backlog growth. [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#name-issuing-connection-ids FIPS impact: no The FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.Show less

Issue summary: OpenSSL QUIC stack does not enforce connection level flow control for streams. Remote peers may send more bytes as long as they fit within the stream flow control limits. Impact summary: A malicious remote peer may exploit the lack of connection flow control for streams to make the QUIC stack receive ~100MB of memory instead of 768 KiB (default flow control window size). CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling Description: The local QUIC stack advertises two flow control limits to its remote peer: stream flow control limit and connection flow control limit. The remote peer must follow both limits when transmitting stream data. Whenever the local QUIC stack receives a stream frame, it validates that the size of the received stream frame stays within flow control limits. If either limit is exceeded (stream level or connection level), then the QUIC stack must close the connection with a flow control error. The vulnerable OpenSSL QUIC stack enforces the stream-level but not the connection-level limit. To exploit the issue, three conditions must be met: - the remote peer opens several streams - each stream must stay within the stream-level flow control limit - there must be no zero-offset byte sent on any of the streams (to prevent the vulnerable QUIC stack from consuming data). By meeting the conditions above, the remote peer may make the local stack allocate 2 x MAX_STREAMS x (stream flow control limit) bytes of memory. MAX_STREAMS defaults to 100, and the limit applies to both bidirectional and unidirectional streams, making it 200 in total. The default flow control window for a stream is 512kB. The remote peer may force the vulnerable QUIC stack to allocate 100MB of heap per connection. FIPS impact: no The FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.Show less

Issue summary: QUIC process may keep memory for QUIC packet buffer for much longer period than necessary. Impact summary: Remote peer can exploit this vulnerability by sending maliciously crafted packets, making the local QUIC stack to keep the memory for packet buffers allocated. The time for which the memory remains allocated is entirely under the control of the potentially malicious remote peer. CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling Description: To save copy operation from the packet buffer to the stream reassemble buffer the QUIC stack leaves the stream data on the packet buffer waiting to be copied to a buffer provided by the local receiving application. The QUIC stack releases a reference to the packet buffer only after the data are copied to the application buffer. This design is more efficient for legitimate data transfers but enables an attacker to allocate a lot more memory than actually required by the data kept in the receiving stream buffer. To mitigate the vulnerability, the QUIC stack now calculates and monitors memory overhead for every stream. The memory overhead for a single stream frame is calculated as a difference between the size of the whole packet that carries the stream frame and the size of the stream frame itself. The memory overhead for a single stream frame is added to the total (cumulative) memory overhead QUIC stack keeps for each stream. Once the cumulative memory overhead exceeds 64kB, the QUIC stack moves the stream frame data from the packet buffer to the stream buffer, starting with the next packet received. FIPS impact: no The FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.Show less

Issue summary: A certificate with many nameRelativeToCRLIssuer CRL distribution points causes disproportionate heap growth when OpenSSL caches X.509 extensions. Impact summary: Receiving a crafted certificate from a malicious peer can lead to significant memory pressure and possible Denial of Service in clients or in servers that solicit client certificates. CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling Description: A certificate or a set of certificates that fits under the limit for size of certificates accepted from the peer (~100 KiB) can result in allocation of several hundred MiB of resident memory on the receiving side during a normal TLS handshake. This may be enough to crash the client or server, if multiple concurrent connections lead to similarly large memory allocations. The fix postpones processing of the CRL distribution points extensions in certificates to the time when the processed value is required for CRL processing. This avoids keeping large memory allocations for a long time when such certificates are received. FIPS impact: no The affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary.Show less