Uncontrolled Recursion

Next.js is a React Framework for the Web. Cersions on the 10.x, 11.x, 12.x, 13.x, and 14.x branches before version 14.2.7 contain a vulnerability in the image optimization feature which allows for a potential Denial of Service (DoS) condition which could lead to excessive CPU consumption. Neither the `next.config.js` file that is configured with `images.unoptimized` set to `true` or `images.loader` set to a non-default value nor the Next.js application that is hosted on Vercel are affected. This issue was fully patched in Next.js `14.2.7`. As a workaround, ensure that the `next.config.js` file has either `images.unoptimized`, `images.loader` or `images.loaderFile` assigned.Show less

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. Authenticated users can trigger a denial-of-service by using specially crafted, long string match patterns on supported commands such as `KEYS`, `SCAN`, `PSUBSCRIBE`, `FUNCTION LIST`, `COMMAND LIST` and ACL definitions. Matching of extremely long patterns may result in unbounded recursion, leading to stack overflow and process crash. This problem has been fixed in Redis versions 6.2.16, 7.2.6, and 7.4.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.Show less

Any project that parses untrusted Protocol Buffers data containing an arbitrary number of nested groups / series of SGROUP tags can corrupted by exceeding the stack limit i.e. StackOverflow. Parsing nested groups as unknown fields with DiscardUnknownFieldsParser or Java Protobuf Lite parser, or against Protobuf map fields, creates unbounded recursions that can be abused by an attacker.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock: fix recursive ->recvmsg calls After a vsock socket has been added to a BPF sockmap, its prot->recvmsg has been replaced with vsock_bpf_recvmsg(). Thus the following recursiion could happen: vsock_bpf_recvmsg() -> __vsock_recvmsg() -> vsock_connectible_recvmsg() -> prot->recvmsg() -> vsock_bpf_recvmsg() again We need to fix it by calling the original ->recvmsg() without any BPF sockmap logic in __vsock_recvmsg().Show less

Apollo Federation is an architecture for declaratively composing APIs into a unified graph. Each team can own their slice of the graph independently, empowering them to deliver autonomously and incrementally. Instances of @apollo/query-planner >=2.0.0 and <2.8.5 are impacted by a denial-of-service vulnerability. @apollo/gateway versions >=2.0.0 and < 2.8.5 and Apollo Router <1.52.1 are also impacted through their use of @apollo/query-panner. If @apollo/query-planner is asked to plan a sufficiently complex query, it may loop infinitely and never complete. This results in unbounded memory consumption and either a crash or out-of-memory (OOM) termination. This issue can be triggered if you have at least one non-@key field that can be resolved by multiple subgraphs. To identify these shared fields, the schema for each subgraph must be reviewed. The mechanism to identify shared fields varies based on the version of Federation your subgraphs are using. You can check if your subgraphs are using Federation 1 or Federation 2 by reviewing their schemas. Federation 2 subgraph schemas will contain a @link directive referencing the version of Federation being used while Federation 1 subgraphs will not. For example, in a Federation 2 subgraph, you will find a line like @link(url: "https://specs.apollo.dev/federation/v2.0"). If a similar @link directive is not present in your subgraph schema, it is using Federation 1. Note that a supergraph can contain a mix of Federation 1 and Federation 2 subgraphs. This issue results from the Apollo query planner attempting to use a Number exceeding Javascript’s Number.MAX_VALUE in some cases. In Javascript, Number.MAX_VALUE is (2^1024 - 2^971). When the query planner receives an inbound graphql request, it breaks the query into pieces and for each piece, generates a list of potential execution steps to solve the piece. These candidates represent the steps that the query planner will take to satisfy the pieces of the larger query. As part of normal operations, the query planner requires and calculates the number of possible query plans for the total query. That is, it needs the product of the number of query plan candidates for each piece of the query. Under normal circumstances, after generating all query plan candidates and calculating the number of all permutations, the query planner moves on to stack rank candidates and prune less-than-optimal options. In particularly complex queries, especially those where fields can be solved through multiple subgraphs, this can cause the number of all query plan permutations to balloon. In worst-case scenarios, this can end up being a number larger than Number.MAX_VALUE. In Javascript, if Number.MAX_VALUE is exceeded, Javascript represents the value as “infinity”. If the count of candidates is evaluated as infinity, the component of the query planner responsible for pruning less-than-optimal query plans does not actually prune candidates, causing the query planner to evaluate many orders of magnitude more query plan candidates than necessary. This issue has been addressed in @apollo/query-planner v2.8.5, @apollo/gateway v2.8.5, and Apollo Router v1.52.1. Users are advised to upgrade. This issue can be avoided by ensuring there are no fields resolvable from multiple subgraphs. If all subgraphs are using Federation 2, you can confirm that you are not impacted by ensuring that none of your subgraph schemas use the @shareable directive. If you are using Federation 1 subgraphs, you will need to validate that there are no fields resolvable by multiple subgraphs.Show less

matrix-js-sdk is a Matrix messaging protocol Client-Server SDK for JavaScript. A malicious homeserver can craft a room or room structure such that the predecessors form a cycle. The matrix-js-sdk's getRoomUpgradeHistory function will infinitely recurse in this case, causing the code to hang. This method is public but also called by the 'leaveRoomChain()' method, so leaving a room will also trigger the bug. This was patched in matrix-js-sdk 34.3.1.Show less

A vulnerability was found in Undertow, where the chunked response hangs after the body was flushed. The response headers and body were sent but the client would continue waiting as Undertow does not send the expected 0\r\n termination of the chunked response. This results in uncontrolled resource consumption, leaving the server side to a denial of service attack. This happens only with Java 17 TLSv1.3 scenarios.Show less

A Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the `SitemapLoader` class of the `langchain-ai/langchain` repository, affecting all versions. The `parse_sitemap` method, responsible for parsing sitemaps and extracting URLs, lacks a mechanism to prevent infinite recursion when a sitemap URL refers to the current sitemap itself. This oversight allows for the possibility of an infinite loop, leading to a crash by exceeding the maximum recursion depth in Python. This vulnerability can be exploited to occupy server socket/port resources and crash the Python process, impacting the availability of services relying on this functionality.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest() In commit 10d91611f426 ("powerpc/64s: Reimplement book3s idle code in C") kvm_start_guest() became idle_kvm_start_guest(). The old code allocated a stack frame on the emergency stack, but didn't use the frame to store anything, and also didn't store anything in its caller's frame. idle_kvm_start_guest() on the other hand is written more like a normal C function, it creates a frame on entry, and also stores CR/LR into its callers frame (per the ABI). The problem is that there is no caller frame on the emergency stack. The emergency stack for a given CPU is allocated with: paca_ptrs[i]->emergency_sp = alloc_stack(limit, i) + THREAD_SIZE; So emergency_sp actually points to the first address above the emergency stack allocation for a given CPU, we must not store above it without first decrementing it to create a frame. This is different to the regular kernel stack, paca->kstack, which is initialised to point at an initial frame that is ready to use. idle_kvm_start_guest() stores the backchain, CR and LR all of which write outside the allocation for the emergency stack. It then creates a stack frame and saves the non-volatile registers. Unfortunately the frame it creates is not large enough to fit the non-volatiles, and so the saving of the non-volatile registers also writes outside the emergency stack allocation. The end result is that we corrupt whatever is at 0-24 bytes, and 112-248 bytes above the emergency stack allocation. In practice this has gone unnoticed because the memory immediately above the emergency stack happens to be used for other stack allocations, either another CPUs mc_emergency_sp or an IRQ stack. See the order of calls to irqstack_early_init() and emergency_stack_init(). The low addresses of another stack are the top of that stack, and so are only used if that stack is under extreme pressue, which essentially never happens in practice - and if it did there's a high likelyhood we'd crash due to that stack overflowing. Still, we shouldn't be corrupting someone else's stack, and it is purely luck that we aren't corrupting something else. To fix it we save CR/LR into the caller's frame using the existing r1 on entry, we then create a SWITCH_FRAME_SIZE frame (which has space for pt_regs) on the emergency stack with the backchain pointing to the existing stack, and then finally we switch to the new frame on the emergency stack.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: VMAP_STACK overflow detection thread-safe commit 31da94c25aea ("riscv: add VMAP_STACK overflow detection") added support for CONFIG_VMAP_STACK. If overflow is detected, CPU switches to `shadow_stack` temporarily before switching finally to per-cpu `overflow_stack`. If two CPUs/harts are racing and end up in over flowing kernel stack, one or both will end up corrupting each other state because `shadow_stack` is not per-cpu. This patch optimizes per-cpu overflow stack switch by directly picking per-cpu `overflow_stack` and gets rid of `shadow_stack`. Following are the changes in this patch - Defines an asm macro to obtain per-cpu symbols in destination register. - In entry.S, when overflow is detected, per-cpu overflow stack is located using per-cpu asm macro. Computing per-cpu symbol requires a temporary register. x31 is saved away into CSR_SCRATCH (CSR_SCRATCH is anyways zero since we're in kernel). Please see Links for additional relevant disccussion and alternative solution. Tested by `echo EXHAUST_STACK > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT` Kernel crash log below Insufficient stack space to handle exception!/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT Task stack: [0xff20000010a98000..0xff20000010a9c000] Overflow stack: [0xff600001f7d98370..0xff600001f7d99370] CPU: 1 PID: 205 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2-00001-g328a1f96f7b9 #34 Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) epc : __memset+0x60/0xfc ra : recursive_loop+0x48/0xc6 [lkdtm] epc : ffffffff808de0e4 ra : ffffffff0163a752 sp : ff20000010a97e80 gp : ffffffff815c0330 tp : ff600000820ea280 t0 : ff20000010a97e88 t1 : 000000000000002e t2 : 3233206874706564 s0 : ff20000010a982b0 s1 : 0000000000000012 a0 : ff20000010a97e88 a1 : 0000000000000000 a2 : 0000000000000400 a3 : ff20000010a98288 a4 : 0000000000000000 a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : fffffffffffe43f0 a7 : 00007fffffffffff s2 : ff20000010a97e88 s3 : ffffffff01644680 s4 : ff20000010a9be90 s5 : ff600000842ba6c0 s6 : 00aaaaaac29e42b0 s7 : 00fffffff0aa3684 s8 : 00aaaaaac2978040 s9 : 0000000000000065 s10: 00ffffff8a7cad10 s11: 00ffffff8a76a4e0 t3 : ffffffff815dbaf4 t4 : ffffffff815dbaf4 t5 : ffffffff815dbab8 t6 : ff20000010a9bb48 status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: ff20000010a97e88 cause: 000000000000000f Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel stack overflow CPU: 1 PID: 205 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2-00001-g328a1f96f7b9 #34 Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) Call Trace: [<ffffffff80006754>] dump_backtrace+0x30/0x38 [<ffffffff808de798>] show_stack+0x40/0x4c [<ffffffff808ea2a8>] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5c [<ffffffff808ea2d8>] dump_stack+0x18/0x20 [<ffffffff808dec06>] panic+0x126/0x2fe [<ffffffff800065ea>] walk_stackframe+0x0/0xf0 [<ffffffff0163a752>] recursive_loop+0x48/0xc6 [lkdtm] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel stack overflow ]---Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: Fix infinite recursion in fib6_dump_done(). syzkaller reported infinite recursive calls of fib6_dump_done() during netlink socket destruction. [1] From the log, syzkaller sent an AF_UNSPEC RTM_GETROUTE message, and then the response was generated. The following recvmmsg() resumed the dump for IPv6, but the first call of inet6_dump_fib() failed at kzalloc() due to the fault injection. [0] 12:01:34 executing program 3: r0 = socket$nl_route(0x10, 0x3, 0x0) sendmsg$nl_route(r0, ... snip ...) recvmmsg(r0, ... snip ...) (fail_nth: 8) Here, fib6_dump_done() was set to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done, and the next call of inet6_dump_fib() set it to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3]. syzkaller stopped receiving the response halfway through, and finally netlink_sock_destruct() called nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done(). fib6_dump_done() calls fib6_dump_end() and nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() if it is still not NULL. fib6_dump_end() rewrites nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() by nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3], but it has the same function, not NULL, calling itself recursively and hitting the stack guard page. To avoid the issue, let's set the destructor after kzalloc(). [0]: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0 CPU: 1 PID: 432110 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117) should_fail_ex (lib/fault-inject.c:52 lib/fault-inject.c:153) should_failslab (mm/slub.c:3733) kmalloc_trace (mm/slub.c:3748 mm/slub.c:3827 mm/slub.c:3992) inet6_dump_fib (./include/linux/slab.h:628 ./include/linux/slab.h:749 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:662) rtnl_dump_all (net/core/rtnetlink.c:4029) netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2269) netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988) ____sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1046 net/socket.c:2801) ___sys_recvmsg (net/socket.c:2846) do_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:2943) __x64_sys_recvmmsg (net/socket.c:3041 net/socket.c:3034 net/socket.c:3034) [1]: BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at 00000000f2fa9af1 (stack is 00000000b7912430..000000009a436beb) stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 223719 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events netlink_sock_destruct_work RIP: 0010:fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:570) Code: 3c 24 e8 f3 e9 51 fd e9 28 fd ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd <53> 48 8d 5d 60 e8 b6 4d 07 fd 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d980000 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff84405990 RCX: ffffffff844059d3 RDX: ffff8881028e0000 RSI: ffffffff84405ac2 RDI: ffff88810c02f358 RBP: ffff88810c02f358 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000224 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff888007c82c78 R14: ffff888007c82c68 R15: ffff888007c82c68 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffc9000d97fff8 CR3: 0000000102309002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <#DF> </#DF> <TASK> fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) ... fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) fib6_dump_done (net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:572 (discriminator 1)) netlink_sock_destruct (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:401) __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2177 (discriminator 2)) sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2224) __sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2235) sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2246) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3259) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3329 kernel/workqueue. ---truncated---Show less