NULL Pointer Dereference

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Drivers: hv: vmbus: Don't dereference ACPI root object handle Since the commit referenced in the Fixes: tag below the VMBus client driver is walking the ACPI namespace up from the VMBus ACPI device to the ACPI namespace root object trying to find Hyper-V MMIO ranges. However, if it is not able to find them it ends trying to walk resources of the ACPI namespace root object itself. This object has all-ones handle, which causes a NULL pointer dereference in the ACPI code (from dereferencing this pointer with an offset). This in turn causes an oops on boot with VMBus host implementations that do not provide Hyper-V MMIO ranges in their VMBus ACPI device or its ancestors. The QEMU VMBus implementation is an example of such implementation. I guess providing these ranges is optional, since all tested Windows versions seem to be able to use VMBus devices without them. Fix this by explicitly terminating the lookup at the ACPI namespace root object. Note that Linux guests under KVM/QEMU do not use the Hyper-V PV interface by default - they only do so if the KVM PV interface is missing or disabled. Example stack trace of such oops: [ 3.710827] ? __die+0x1f/0x60 [ 3.715030] ? page_fault_oops+0x159/0x460 [ 3.716008] ? exc_page_fault+0x73/0x170 [ 3.716959] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ 3.717957] ? acpi_ns_lookup+0x7a/0x4b0 [ 3.718898] ? acpi_ns_internalize_name+0x79/0xc0 [ 3.720018] acpi_ns_get_node_unlocked+0xb5/0xe0 [ 3.721120] ? acpi_ns_check_object_type+0xfe/0x200 [ 3.722285] ? acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resource+0x37/0x6e0 [ 3.723559] ? down_timeout+0x3a/0x60 [ 3.724455] ? acpi_ns_get_node+0x3a/0x60 [ 3.725412] acpi_ns_get_node+0x3a/0x60 [ 3.726335] acpi_ns_evaluate+0x1c3/0x2c0 [ 3.727295] acpi_ut_evaluate_object+0x64/0x1b0 [ 3.728400] acpi_rs_get_method_data+0x2b/0x70 [ 3.729476] ? vmbus_platform_driver_probe+0x1d0/0x1d0 [hv_vmbus] [ 3.730940] ? vmbus_platform_driver_probe+0x1d0/0x1d0 [hv_vmbus] [ 3.732411] acpi_walk_resources+0x78/0xd0 [ 3.733398] vmbus_platform_driver_probe+0x9f/0x1d0 [hv_vmbus] [ 3.734802] platform_probe+0x3d/0x90 [ 3.735684] really_probe+0x19b/0x400 [ 3.736570] ? __device_attach_driver+0x100/0x100 [ 3.737697] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x160 [ 3.738746] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0x90 [ 3.739743] __driver_attach+0xc2/0x1b0 [ 3.740671] bus_for_each_dev+0x70/0xc0 [ 3.741601] bus_add_driver+0x10e/0x210 [ 3.742527] driver_register+0x55/0xf0 [ 3.744412] ? 0xffffffffc039a000 [ 3.745207] hv_acpi_init+0x3c/0x1000 [hv_vmbus]Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme-tcp: don't access released socket during error recovery While the error recovery work is temporarily failing reconnect attempts, running the 'nvme list' command causes a kernel NULL pointer dereference by calling getsockname() with a released socket. During error recovery work, the nvme tcp socket is released and a new one created, so it is not safe to access the socket without proper check.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: hisi_sas: Grab sas_dev lock when traversing the members of sas_dev.list When freeing slots in function slot_complete_v3_hw(), it is possible that sas_dev.list is being traversed elsewhere, and it may trigger a NULL pointer exception, such as follows: ==>cq thread ==>scsi_eh_6 ==>scsi_error_handler() ==>sas_eh_handle_sas_errors() ==>sas_scsi_find_task() ==>lldd_abort_task() ==>slot_complete_v3_hw() ==>hisi_sas_abort_task() ==>hisi_sas_slot_task_free() ==>dereg_device_v3_hw() ==>list_del_init() ==>list_for_each_entry_safe() [ 7165.434918] sas: Enter sas_scsi_recover_host busy: 32 failed: 32 [ 7165.434926] sas: trying to find task 0x00000000769b5ba5 [ 7165.434927] sas: sas_scsi_find_task: aborting task 0x00000000769b5ba5 [ 7165.434940] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: slot complete: task(00000000769b5ba5) aborted [ 7165.434964] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: slot complete: task(00000000c9f7aa07) ignored [ 7165.434965] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: slot complete: task(00000000e2a1cf01) ignored [ 7165.434968] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 7165.434972] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: slot complete: task(0000000022d52d93) ignored [ 7165.434975] hisi_sas_v3_hw 0000:b4:02.0: slot complete: task(0000000066a7516c) ignored [ 7165.434976] Mem abort info: [ 7165.434982] ESR = 0x96000004 [ 7165.434991] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 7165.434992] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 7165.434993] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 7165.434994] Data abort info: [ 7165.434994] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 7165.434995] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 7165.434997] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000f29543f2 [ 7165.434998] [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000 [ 7165.435003] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 7165.439863] Process scsi_eh_6 (pid: 4109, stack limit = 0x00000000c43818d5) [ 7165.468862] pstate: 00c00009 (nzcv daif +PAN +UAO) [ 7165.473637] pc : dereg_device_v3_hw+0x68/0xa8 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [ 7165.479443] lr : dereg_device_v3_hw+0x2c/0xa8 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [ 7165.485247] sp : ffff00001d623bc0 [ 7165.488546] x29: ffff00001d623bc0 x28: ffffa027d03b9508 [ 7165.493835] x27: ffff80278ed50af0 x26: ffffa027dd31e0a8 [ 7165.499123] x25: ffffa027d9b27f88 x24: ffffa027d9b209f8 [ 7165.504411] x23: ffffa027c45b0d60 x22: ffff80278ec07c00 [ 7165.509700] x21: 0000000000000008 x20: ffffa027d9b209f8 [ 7165.514988] x19: ffffa027d9b27f88 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 7165.520276] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 7165.525564] x15: ffff0000091d9708 x14: ffff0000093b7dc8 [ 7165.530852] x13: ffff0000093b7a23 x12: 6e7265746e692067 [ 7165.536140] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000bb0 [ 7165.541429] x9 : ffff00001d6238f0 x8 : ffffa027d877af00 [ 7165.546718] x7 : ffffa027d6329600 x6 : ffff7e809f58ca00 [ 7165.552006] x5 : 0000000000001f8a x4 : 000000000000088e [ 7165.557295] x3 : ffffa027d9b27fa8 x2 : 0000000000000000 [ 7165.562583] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 000000003000188e [ 7165.567872] Call trace: [ 7165.570309] dereg_device_v3_hw+0x68/0xa8 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [ 7165.575775] hisi_sas_abort_task+0x248/0x358 [hisi_sas_main] [ 7165.581415] sas_eh_handle_sas_errors+0x258/0x8e0 [libsas] [ 7165.586876] sas_scsi_recover_host+0x134/0x458 [libsas] [ 7165.592082] scsi_error_handler+0xb4/0x488 [ 7165.596163] kthread+0x134/0x138 [ 7165.599380] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 [ 7165.602940] Code: d5033e9f b9000040 aa0103e2 eb03003f (f9400021) [ 7165.609004] kernel fault(0x1) notification starting on CPU 75 [ 7165.700728] ---[ end trace fc042cbbea224efc ]--- [ 7165.705326] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception To fix the issue, grab sas_dev lock when traversing the members of sas_dev.list in dereg_device_v3_hw() and hisi_sas_release_tasks() to avoid concurrency of adding and deleting member. When ---truncated---Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/gvt: fix vgpu debugfs clean in remove Check carefully on root debugfs available when destroying vgpu, e.g in remove case drm minor's debugfs root might already be destroyed, which led to kernel oops like below. Console: switching to colour dummy device 80x25 i915 0000:00:02.0: MDEV: Unregistering intel_vgpu_mdev b1338b2d-a709-4c23-b766-cc436c36cdf0: Removing from iommu group 14 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000150 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 3 PID: 1046 Comm: driverctl Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2+ #6 Hardware name: HP HP ProDesk 600 G3 MT/829D, BIOS P02 Ver. 02.44 09/13/2022 RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x5e2/0x1f90 Code: 87 ad 09 00 00 39 05 e1 1e cc 02 0f 82 f1 09 00 00 ba 01 00 00 00 48 83 c4 48 89 d0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 45 31 ff <48> 81 3f 60 9e c2 b6 45 0f 45 f8 83 fe 01 0f 87 55 fa ff ff 89 f0 RSP: 0018:ffff9f770274f948 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000150 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8895d1173300 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000150 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fc9b2ba0740(0000) GS:ffff889cdfcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000150 CR3: 000000010fd93005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2b0 ? simple_recursive_removal+0xa5/0x2b0 ? lock_release+0x13d/0x2d0 down_write+0x2a/0xd0 ? simple_recursive_removal+0xa5/0x2b0 simple_recursive_removal+0xa5/0x2b0 ? start_creating.part.0+0x110/0x110 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40 debugfs_remove+0x40/0x60 intel_gvt_debugfs_remove_vgpu+0x15/0x30 [kvmgt] intel_gvt_destroy_vgpu+0x60/0x100 [kvmgt] intel_vgpu_release_dev+0xe/0x20 [kvmgt] device_release+0x30/0x80 kobject_put+0x79/0x1b0 device_release_driver_internal+0x1b8/0x230 bus_remove_device+0xec/0x160 device_del+0x189/0x400 ? up_write+0x9c/0x1b0 ? mdev_device_remove_common+0x60/0x60 [mdev] mdev_device_remove_common+0x22/0x60 [mdev] mdev_device_remove_cb+0x17/0x20 [mdev] device_for_each_child+0x56/0x80 mdev_unregister_parent+0x5a/0x81 [mdev] intel_gvt_clean_device+0x2d/0xe0 [kvmgt] intel_gvt_driver_remove+0x2e/0xb0 [i915] i915_driver_remove+0xac/0x100 [i915] i915_pci_remove+0x1a/0x30 [i915] pci_device_remove+0x31/0xa0 device_release_driver_internal+0x1b8/0x230 unbind_store+0xd8/0x100 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x156/0x210 vfs_write+0x236/0x4a0 ksys_write+0x61/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x80 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? lock_release+0x13d/0x2d0 ? up_read+0x17/0x20 ? lock_is_held_type+0xe3/0x140 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7fc9b2c9e0c4 Code: 15 71 7d 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 3d 05 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffec29c81c8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000d RCX: 00007fc9b2c9e0c4 RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: 0000559f8b5f48a0 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000559f8b5f48a0 R08: 0000559f8b5f3540 R09: 00007fc9b2d76d30 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000000000000000d R13: 00007fc9b2d77780 R14: 000000000000000d R15: 00007fc9b2d72a00 </TASK> Modules linked in: sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_pmc_core_pltdrv intel_pmc_core intel_tcc_cooling x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel ee1004 igbvf rapl vfat fat intel_cstate intel_uncore pktcdvd i2c_i801 pcspkr wmi_bmof i2c_smbus acpi_pad vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_virqfd zram fuse dm ---truncated---Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: memcontrol: ensure memcg acquired by id is properly set up In the eviction recency check, we attempt to retrieve the memcg to which the folio belonged when it was evicted, by the memcg id stored in the shadow entry. However, there is a chance that the retrieved memcg is not the original memcg that has been killed, but a new one which happens to have the same id. This is a somewhat unfortunate, but acceptable and rare inaccuracy in the heuristics. However, if we retrieve this new memcg between its allocation and when it is properly attached to the memcg hierarchy, we could run into the following NULL pointer exception during the memcg hierarchy traversal done in mem_cgroup_get_nr_swap_pages(): [ 155757.793456] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c0 [ 155757.807568] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 155757.818024] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 155757.828482] PGD 401f77067 P4D 401f77067 PUD 401f76067 PMD 0 [ 155757.839985] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 155757.887870] RIP: 0010:mem_cgroup_get_nr_swap_pages+0x3d/0xb0 [ 155757.899377] Code: 29 19 4a 02 48 39 f9 74 63 48 8b 97 c0 00 00 00 48 8b b7 58 02 00 00 48 2b b7 c0 01 00 00 48 39 f0 48 0f 4d c6 48 39 d1 74 42 <48> 8b b2 c0 00 00 00 48 8b ba 58 02 00 00 48 2b ba c0 01 00 00 48 [ 155757.937125] RSP: 0018:ffffc9002ecdfbc8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 155757.947755] RAX: 00000000003a3b1c RBX: 000007ffffffffff RCX: ffff888280183000 [ 155757.962202] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0007ffffffffffff RDI: ffff888bbc2d1000 [ 155757.976648] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 000000000000000b R09: ffff888ad9cedba0 [ 155757.991094] R10: ffffea0039c07900 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: ffff888b23a7b000 [ 155758.005540] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888bbc2d1000 R15: 000007ffffc71354 [ 155758.019991] FS: 00007f6234c68640(0000) GS:ffff88903f9c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 155758.036356] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 155758.048023] CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000000a83eb8004 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [ 155758.062473] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 155758.076924] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 155758.091376] PKRU: 55555554 [ 155758.096957] Call Trace: [ 155758.102016] <TASK> [ 155758.106502] ? __die+0x78/0xc0 [ 155758.112793] ? page_fault_oops+0x286/0x380 [ 155758.121175] ? exc_page_fault+0x5d/0x110 [ 155758.129209] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ 155758.137763] ? mem_cgroup_get_nr_swap_pages+0x3d/0xb0 [ 155758.148060] workingset_test_recent+0xda/0x1b0 [ 155758.157133] workingset_refault+0xca/0x1e0 [ 155758.165508] filemap_add_folio+0x4d/0x70 [ 155758.173538] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0xed/0x190 [ 155758.182919] page_cache_sync_ra+0xd6/0x1e0 [ 155758.191738] filemap_read+0x68d/0xdf0 [ 155758.199495] ? mlx5e_napi_poll+0x123/0x940 [ 155758.207981] ? __napi_schedule+0x55/0x90 [ 155758.216095] __x64_sys_pread64+0x1d6/0x2c0 [ 155758.224601] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80 [ 155758.232058] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 155758.242473] RIP: 0033:0x7f62c29153b5 [ 155758.249938] Code: e8 48 89 75 f0 89 7d f8 48 89 4d e0 e8 b4 e6 f7 ff 41 89 c0 4c 8b 55 e0 48 8b 55 e8 48 8b 75 f0 8b 7d f8 b8 11 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 33 44 89 c7 48 89 45 f8 e8 e7 e6 f7 ff 48 8b [ 155758.288005] RSP: 002b:00007f6234c5ffd0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000011 [ 155758.303474] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f628c4e70c0 RCX: 00007f62c29153b5 [ 155758.318075] RDX: 000000000003c041 RSI: 00007f61d2986000 RDI: 0000000000000076 [ 155758.332678] RBP: 00007f6234c5fff0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000064d5230c [ 155758.347452] R10: 000000000027d450 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000000000003c041 [ 155758.362044] R13: 00007f61d2986000 R14: 00007f629e11b060 R15: 000000000027d450 [ 155758.376661] </TASK> This patch fixes the issue by moving the memcg's id publication from the alloc stage to ---truncated---Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix a null-ptr-deref in tipc_topsrv_accept syzbot found a crash in tipc_topsrv_accept: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] Workqueue: tipc_rcv tipc_topsrv_accept RIP: 0010:kernel_accept+0x22d/0x350 net/socket.c:3487 Call Trace: <TASK> tipc_topsrv_accept+0x197/0x280 net/tipc/topsrv.c:460 process_one_work+0x991/0x1610 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306 It was caused by srv->listener that might be set to null by tipc_topsrv_stop() in net .exit whereas it's still used in tipc_topsrv_accept() worker. srv->listener is protected by srv->idr_lock in tipc_topsrv_stop(), so add a check for srv->listener under srv->idr_lock in tipc_topsrv_accept() to avoid the null-ptr-deref. To ensure the lsock is not released during the tipc_topsrv_accept(), move sock_release() after tipc_topsrv_work_stop() where it's waiting until the tipc_topsrv_accept worker to be done. Note that sk_callback_lock is used to protect sk->sk_user_data instead of srv->listener, and it should check srv in tipc_topsrv_listener_data_ready() instead. This also ensures that no more tipc_topsrv_accept worker will be started after tipc_conn_close() is called in tipc_topsrv_stop() where it sets sk->sk_user_data to null.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vme: Fix error not catched in fake_init() In fake_init(), __root_device_register() is possible to fail but it's ignored, which can cause unregistering vme_root fail when exit. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000008c KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000460-0x0000000000000467] RIP: 0010:root_device_unregister+0x26/0x60 Call Trace: <TASK> __x64_sys_delete_module+0x34f/0x540 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Return error when __root_device_register() fails.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Fix potential null-deref in dm_resume [Why] Fixing smatch error: dm_resume() error: we previously assumed 'aconnector->dc_link' could be null [How] Check if dc_link null at the beginning of the loop, so further checks can be dropped.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: mlme: fix null-ptr deref on failed assoc If association to an AP without a link 0 fails, then we crash in tracing because it assumes that either ap_mld_addr or link 0 BSS is valid, since we clear sdata->vif.valid_links and then don't add the ap_mld_addr to the struct. Since we clear also sdata->vif.cfg.ap_addr, keep a local copy of it and assign it earlier, before clearing valid_links, to fix this.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-mq: fix null pointer dereference in blk_mq_clear_rq_mapping() Our syzkaller report a null pointer dereference, root cause is following: __blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs set->tags[hctx_idx] = blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs blk_mq_alloc_rqs // failed due to oom alloc_pages_node // set->tags[hctx_idx] is still NULL blk_mq_free_rqs drv_tags = set->tags[hctx_idx]; // null pointer dereference is triggered blk_mq_clear_rq_mapping(drv_tags, ...) This is because commit 63064be150e4 ("blk-mq: Add blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs()") merged the two steps: 1) set->tags[hctx_idx] = blk_mq_alloc_rq_map() 2) blk_mq_alloc_rqs(..., set->tags[hctx_idx]) into one step: set->tags[hctx_idx] = blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs() Since tags is not initialized yet in this case, fix the problem by checking if tags is NULL pointer in blk_mq_clear_rq_mapping().Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Fix size validation for non-exclusive domains (v4) Fix amdgpu_bo_validate_size() to check whether the TTM domain manager for the requested memory exists, else we get a kernel oops when dereferencing "man". v2: Make the patch standalone, i.e. not dependent on local patches. v3: Preserve old behaviour and just check that the manager pointer is not NULL. v4: Complain if GTT domain requested and it is uninitialized--most likely a bug.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/mediatek: Check return value after calling platform_get_resource() platform_get_resource() may return NULL pointer, we need check its return value to avoid null-ptr-deref in resource_size().Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: dlm: fix invalid derefence of sb_lvbptr I experience issues when putting a lkbsb on the stack and have sb_lvbptr field to a dangled pointer while not using DLM_LKF_VALBLK. It will crash with the following kernel message, the dangled pointer is here 0xdeadbeef as example: [ 102.749317] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000deadbeef [ 102.749320] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 102.749323] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 102.749325] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 102.749332] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 102.749336] CPU: 0 PID: 1567 Comm: lock_torture_wr Tainted: G W 5.19.0-rc3+ #1565 [ 102.749343] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 1.16.0-2.module+el8.7.0+15506+033991b0 04/01/2014 [ 102.749344] RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 [ 102.749353] Code: cc cc cc cc eb 1e 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 d1 48 c1 e9 03 83 e2 07 f3 48 a5 89 d1 f3 a4 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 d1 <f3> a4 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 83 fa 20 72 7e 40 38 fe [ 102.749355] RSP: 0018:ffff97a58145fd08 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 102.749358] RAX: ffff901778b77070 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000040 [ 102.749360] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00000000deadbeef RDI: ffff901778b77070 [ 102.749362] RBP: ffff97a58145fd10 R08: ffff901760b67a70 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 102.749364] R10: ffff9017008e2cb8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff901760b67a70 [ 102.749366] R13: ffff901760b78f00 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 102.749368] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff901876e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 102.749372] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 102.749374] CR2: 00000000deadbeef CR3: 000000017c49a004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 102.749376] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 102.749378] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 102.749379] PKRU: 55555554 [ 102.749381] Call Trace: [ 102.749382] <TASK> [ 102.749383] ? send_args+0xb2/0xd0 [ 102.749389] send_common+0xb7/0xd0 [ 102.749395] _unlock_lock+0x2c/0x90 [ 102.749400] unlock_lock.isra.56+0x62/0xa0 [ 102.749405] dlm_unlock+0x21e/0x330 [ 102.749411] ? lock_torture_stats+0x80/0x80 [dlm_locktorture] [ 102.749416] torture_unlock+0x5a/0x90 [dlm_locktorture] [ 102.749419] ? preempt_count_sub+0xba/0x100 [ 102.749427] lock_torture_writer+0xbd/0x150 [dlm_locktorture] [ 102.786186] kthread+0x10a/0x130 [ 102.786581] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 102.787156] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 102.787588] </TASK> [ 102.787855] Modules linked in: dlm_locktorture torture rpcsec_gss_krb5 intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common kvm_intel iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support kvm vmw_vsock_virtio_transport qxl irqbypass vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common drm_ttm_helper crc32_pclmul joydev crc32c_intel ttm vsock virtio_scsi virtio_balloon snd_pcm drm_kms_helper virtio_console snd_timer snd drm soundcore syscopyarea i2c_i801 sysfillrect sysimgblt i2c_smbus pcspkr fb_sys_fops lpc_ich serio_raw [ 102.792536] CR2: 00000000deadbeef [ 102.792930] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This patch fixes the issue by checking also on DLM_LKF_VALBLK on exflags is set when copying the lvbptr array instead of if it's just null which fixes for me the issue. I think this patch can fix other dlm users as well, depending how they handle the init, freeing memory handling of sb_lvbptr and don't set DLM_LKF_VALBLK for some dlm_lock() calls. It might a there could be a hidden issue all the time. However with checking on DLM_LKF_VALBLK the user always need to provide a sb_lvbptr non-null value. There might be more intelligent handling between per ls lvblen, DLM_LKF_VALBLK and non-null to report the user the way how DLM API is used is wrong but can be added for later, this will only fix the current behaviour.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: coda: Add check for kmalloc As the kmalloc may return NULL pointer, it should be better to check the return value in order to avoid NULL poineter dereference, same as the others.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (coretemp) Simplify platform device handling Coretemp's platform driver is unconventional. All the real work is done globally by the initcall and CPU hotplug notifiers, while the "driver" effectively just wraps an allocation and the registration of the hwmon interface in a long-winded round-trip through the driver core. The whole logic of dynamically creating and destroying platform devices to bring the interfaces up and down is error prone, since it assumes platform_device_add() will synchronously bind the driver and set drvdata before it returns, thus results in a NULL dereference if drivers_autoprobe is turned off for the platform bus. Furthermore, the unusual approach of doing that from within a CPU hotplug notifier, already commented in the code that it deadlocks suspend, also causes lockdep issues for other drivers or subsystems which may want to legitimately register a CPU hotplug notifier from a platform bus notifier. All of these issues can be solved by ripping this unusual behaviour out completely, simply tying the platform devices to the lifetime of the module itself, and directly managing the hwmon interfaces from the hotplug notifiers. There is a slight user-visible change in that /sys/bus/platform/drivers/coretemp will no longer appear, and /sys/devices/platform/coretemp.n will remain present if package n is hotplugged off, but hwmon users should really only be looking for the presence of the hwmon interfaces, whose behaviour remains unchanged.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Avoid fcport pointer dereference Klocwork reported warning of NULL pointer may be dereferenced. The routine exits when sa_ctl is NULL and fcport is allocated after the exit call thus causing NULL fcport pointer to dereference at the time of exit. To avoid fcport pointer dereference, exit the routine when sa_ctl is NULL.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: af_alg - Fix missing initialisation affecting gcm-aes-s390 Fix af_alg_alloc_areq() to initialise areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl to point to the scatterlist array in areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgl. Without this, the gcm-aes-s390 driver will oops when it tries to do gcm_walk_start() on req->dst because req->dst is set to the value of areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgl by _aead_recvmsg() calling aead_request_set_crypt(). The problem comes if an empty ciphertext is passed: the loop in af_alg_get_rsgl() just passes straight out and doesn't set areq->first_rsgl up. This isn't a problem on x86_64 using gcmaes_crypt_by_sg() because, as far as I can tell, that ignores req->dst and only uses req->src[*]. [*] Is this a bug in aesni-intel_glue.c? The s390x oops looks something like: Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space Failing address: 0000000a00000000 TEID: 0000000a00000803 Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE. AS:00000000a43a0007 R3:0000000000000024 Oops: 003b ilc:2 [#1] SMP ... Call Trace: [<000003ff7fc3d47e>] gcm_walk_start+0x16/0x28 [aes_s390] [<00000000a2a342f2>] crypto_aead_decrypt+0x9a/0xb8 [<00000000a2a60888>] aead_recvmsg+0x478/0x698 [<00000000a2e519a0>] sock_recvmsg+0x70/0xb0 [<00000000a2e51a56>] sock_read_iter+0x76/0xa0 [<00000000a273e066>] vfs_read+0x26e/0x2a8 [<00000000a273e8c4>] ksys_read+0xbc/0x100 [<00000000a311d808>] __do_syscall+0x1d0/0x1f8 [<00000000a312ff30>] system_call+0x70/0x98 Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<000003ff7fc3e6b4>] gcm_aes_crypt+0x104/0xa68 [aes_s390]Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-pf: mcs: Fix NULL pointer dereferences When system is rebooted after creating macsec interface below NULL pointer dereference crashes occurred. This patch fixes those crashes by using correct order of teardown [ 3324.406942] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 3324.415726] Mem abort info: [ 3324.418510] ESR = 0x96000006 [ 3324.421557] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 3324.426865] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 3324.429913] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 3324.433047] Data abort info: [ 3324.435921] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006 [ 3324.439748] CM = 0, WnR = 0 .... [ 3324.575915] Call trace: [ 3324.578353] cn10k_mdo_del_secy+0x24/0x180 [ 3324.582440] macsec_common_dellink+0xec/0x120 [ 3324.586788] macsec_notify+0x17c/0x1c0 [ 3324.590529] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x70 [ 3324.594965] call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x34/0x7c [ 3324.599921] rollback_registered_many+0x354/0x5bc [ 3324.604616] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x88/0x10c [ 3324.609399] unregister_netdev+0x20/0x30 [ 3324.613313] otx2_remove+0x8c/0x310 [ 3324.616794] pci_device_shutdown+0x30/0x70 [ 3324.620882] device_shutdown+0x11c/0x204 [ 966.664930] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 966.673712] Mem abort info: [ 966.676497] ESR = 0x96000006 [ 966.679543] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 966.684848] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 966.687895] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 966.691028] Data abort info: [ 966.693900] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006 [ 966.697729] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 966.833467] Call trace: [ 966.835904] cn10k_mdo_stop+0x20/0xa0 [ 966.839557] macsec_dev_stop+0xe8/0x11c [ 966.843384] __dev_close_many+0xbc/0x140 [ 966.847298] dev_close_many+0x84/0x120 [ 966.851039] rollback_registered_many+0x114/0x5bc [ 966.855735] unregister_netdevice_many.part.0+0x14/0xa0 [ 966.860952] unregister_netdevice_many+0x18/0x24 [ 966.865560] macsec_notify+0x1ac/0x1c0 [ 966.869303] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x70 [ 966.873738] call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x34/0x7c [ 966.878694] rollback_registered_many+0x354/0x5bc [ 966.883390] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x88/0x10c [ 966.888173] unregister_netdev+0x20/0x30 [ 966.892090] otx2_remove+0x8c/0x310 [ 966.895571] pci_device_shutdown+0x30/0x70 [ 966.899660] device_shutdown+0x11c/0x204 [ 966.903574] __do_sys_reboot+0x208/0x290 [ 966.907487] __arm64_sys_reboot+0x20/0x30 [ 966.911489] el0_svc_handler+0x80/0x1c0 [ 966.915316] el0_svc+0x8/0x180 [ 966.918362] Code: f9400000 f9400a64 91220014 f94b3403 (f9400060) [ 966.924448] ---[ end trace 341778e799c3d8d7 ]---Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: ensure CLM version is null-terminated to prevent stack-out-of-bounds Fix a stack-out-of-bounds read in brcmfmac that occurs when 'buf' that is not null-terminated is passed as an argument of strreplace() in brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds(). This buffer is filled with a CLM version string by memcpy() in brcmf_fil_iovar_data_get(). Ensure buf is null-terminated. Found by a modified version of syzkaller. [ 33.004414][ T1896] brcmfmac: brcmf_c_process_clm_blob: no clm_blob available (err=-2), device may have limited channels available [ 33.013486][ T1896] brcmfmac: brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds: Firmware: BCM43236/3 wl0: Nov 30 2011 17:33:42 version 5.90.188.22 [ 33.021554][ T1896] ================================================================== [ 33.022379][ T1896] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in strreplace+0xf2/0x110 [ 33.023122][ T1896] Read of size 1 at addr ffffc90001d6efc8 by task kworker/0:2/1896 [ 33.023852][ T1896] [ 33.024096][ T1896] CPU: 0 PID: 1896 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G O 5.14.0+ #132 [ 33.024927][ T1896] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 33.026065][ T1896] Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event [ 33.026581][ T1896] Call Trace: [ 33.026896][ T1896] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d [ 33.027372][ T1896] print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xf/0x334 [ 33.028037][ T1896] ? strreplace+0xf2/0x110 [ 33.028403][ T1896] ? strreplace+0xf2/0x110 [ 33.028807][ T1896] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf [ 33.029283][ T1896] ? strreplace+0xf2/0x110 [ 33.029666][ T1896] strreplace+0xf2/0x110 [ 33.029966][ T1896] brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds+0xab1/0xc40 [ 33.030351][ T1896] ? brcmf_c_set_joinpref_default+0x100/0x100 [ 33.030787][ T1896] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 [ 33.031223][ T1896] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0 [ 33.031661][ T1896] ? lock_acquire+0x19d/0x4e0 [ 33.032091][ T1896] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110 [ 33.032605][ T1896] ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1a7/0x260 [ 33.033087][ T1896] ? brcmf_usb_rx_fill_all+0x5a/0xf0 [ 33.033582][ T1896] brcmf_attach+0x246/0xd40 [ 33.034022][ T1896] ? wiphy_new_nm+0x1476/0x1d50 [ 33.034383][ T1896] ? kmemdup+0x30/0x40 [ 33.034722][ T1896] brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690 [ 33.035223][ T1896] ? brcmf_usbdev_qinit.constprop.0+0x470/0x470 [ 33.035833][ T1896] usb_probe_interface+0x25f/0x710 [ 33.036315][ T1896] really_probe+0x1be/0xa90 [ 33.036656][ T1896] __driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460 [ 33.037026][ T1896] ? usb_match_id.part.0+0x88/0xc0 [ 33.037383][ T1896] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120 [ 33.037790][ T1896] __device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250 [ 33.038300][ T1896] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x120/0x120 [ 33.038986][ T1896] bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.039906][ T1896] ? bus_rescan_devices+0x20/0x20 [ 33.041412][ T1896] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 [ 33.041861][ T1896] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120 [ 33.042330][ T1896] __device_attach+0x207/0x330 [ 33.042664][ T1896] ? device_bind_driver+0xb0/0xb0 [ 33.043026][ T1896] ? kobject_uevent_env+0x230/0x12c0 [ 33.043515][ T1896] bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260 [ 33.043914][ T1896] device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0 [ 33.044227][ T1896] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xe7/0x660 [ 33.044891][ T1896] ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x550/0x550 [ 33.045531][ T1896] usb_set_configuration+0x984/0x1770 [ 33.046051][ T1896] ? kernfs_create_link+0x175/0x230 [ 33.046548][ T1896] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x69/0x90 [ 33.046931][ T1896] usb_probe_device+0x9c/0x220 [ 33.047434][ T1896] really_probe+0x1be/0xa90 [ 33.047760][ T1896] __driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460 [ 33.048134][ T1896] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120 [ 33.048516][ T1896] __device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250 [ 33.048910][ T1896] ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x120/0x120 ---truncated---Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: null_blk: Always check queue mode setting from configfs Make sure to check device queue mode in the null_validate_conf() and return error for NULL_Q_RQ as we don't allow legacy I/O path, without this patch we get OOPs when queue mode is set to 1 from configfs, following are repro steps :- modprobe null_blk nr_devices=0 mkdir config/nullb/nullb0 echo 1 > config/nullb/nullb0/memory_backed echo 4096 > config/nullb/nullb0/blocksize echo 20480 > config/nullb/nullb0/size echo 1 > config/nullb/nullb0/queue_mode echo 1 > config/nullb/nullb0/power Entering kdb (current=0xffff88810acdd080, pid 2372) on processor 42 Oops: (null) due to oops @ 0xffffffffc041c329 CPU: 42 PID: 2372 Comm: sh Tainted: G O N 6.3.0-rc5lblk+ #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:null_add_dev.part.0+0xd9/0x720 [null_blk] Code: 01 00 00 85 d2 0f 85 a1 03 00 00 48 83 bb 08 01 00 00 00 0f 85 f7 03 00 00 80 bb 62 01 00 00 00 48 8b 75 20 0f 85 6d 02 00 00 <48> 89 6e 60 48 8b 75 20 bf 06 00 00 00 e8 f5 37 2c c1 48 8b 75 20 RSP: 0018:ffffc900052cbde0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88811084d800 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888100042e00 RBP: ffff8881053d8200 R08: ffffc900052cbd68 R09: ffff888105db2000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: ffff888104765200 R14: ffff88810eec1748 R15: ffff88810eec1740 FS: 00007fd445fd1740(0000) GS:ffff8897dfc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000060 CR3: 0000000166a00000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 DR0: ffffffff8437a488 DR1: ffffffff8437a489 DR2: ffffffff8437a48a DR3: ffffffff8437a48b DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> nullb_device_power_store+0xd1/0x120 [null_blk] configfs_write_iter+0xb4/0x120 vfs_write+0x2ba/0x3c0 ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x7fd4460c57a7 Code: 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 RSP: 002b:00007ffd3792a4a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00007fd4460c57a7 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 000055b43c02e4c0 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000055b43c02e4c0 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 00007fd44615b4e0 R10: 00007fd44615b3e0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: 00007fd446198520 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 00007fd446198700 </TASK>Show less