Use After Free

Use after free in Aura in Google Chrome on Windows prior to 148.0.7778.96 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)Show less

Use after free in Mobile in Google Chrome on iOS prior to 148.0.7778.96 allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to engage in specific UI gestures to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical)Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Refactor amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl for Handling Last Fence Update and Timeline Management v4 This commit simplifies the amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl function, key updates include: - Moved the logic for managing the last update fence directly into amdgpu_gem_va_update_vm. - Introduced checks for the timeline point to enable conditional replacement or addition of fences. v2: Addressed review comments from Christian. v3: Updated comments (Christian). v4: The previous version selected the fence too early and did not manage its reference correctly, which could lead to stale or freed fences being used. This resulted in refcount underflows and could crash when updating GPU timelines. The fence is now chosen only after the VA mapping work is completed, and its reference is taken safely. After exporting it to the VM timeline syncobj, the driver always drops its local fence reference, ensuring balanced refcounting and avoiding use-after-free on dma_fence. Crash signature: [ 205.828135] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. [ 205.832963] WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 7274 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xbe/0x110 ... [ 206.074014] Call Trace: [ 206.076488] <TASK> [ 206.078608] amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl+0x6ea/0x740 [amdgpu] [ 206.084040] ? __pfx_amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu] [ 206.089994] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x86/0xe0 [drm] [ 206.094415] drm_ioctl+0x26e/0x520 [drm] [ 206.098424] ? __pfx_amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu] [ 206.104402] amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x4b/0x80 [amdgpu] [ 206.109387] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x96/0xe0 [ 206.113156] do_syscall_64+0x66/0x2d0 ... [ 206.553351] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc0dfde90 ... [ 206.553378] RIP: 0010:dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked+0x39/0xe0 ... [ 206.553405] Call Trace: [ 206.553409] <IRQ> [ 206.553415] ? __pfx_drm_sched_fence_free_rcu+0x10/0x10 [gpu_sched] [ 206.553424] dma_fence_signal+0x30/0x60 [ 206.553427] drm_sched_job_done.isra.0+0x123/0x150 [gpu_sched] [ 206.553434] dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked+0x6e/0xe0 [ 206.553437] dma_fence_signal+0x30/0x60 [ 206.553441] amdgpu_fence_process+0xd8/0x150 [amdgpu] [ 206.553854] sdma_v4_0_process_trap_irq+0x97/0xb0 [amdgpu] [ 206.554353] edac_mce_amd(E) ee1004(E) [ 206.554270] amdgpu_irq_dispatch+0x150/0x230 [amdgpu] [ 206.554702] amdgpu_ih_process+0x6a/0x180 [amdgpu] [ 206.555101] amdgpu_irq_handler+0x23/0x60 [amdgpu] [ 206.555500] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4a/0x1c0 [ 206.555506] handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80 [ 206.555509] handle_edge_irq+0x92/0x1e0 [ 206.555513] __common_interrupt+0x3e/0xb0 [ 206.555519] common_interrupt+0x80/0xa0 [ 206.555525] </IRQ> [ 206.555527] <TASK> ... [ 206.555650] RIP: 0010:dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked+0x39/0xe0 ... [ 206.555667] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interruptShow less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/atmel-hlcdc: fix use-after-free of drm_crtc_commit after release The atmel_hlcdc_plane_atomic_duplicate_state() callback was copying the atmel_hlcdc_plane state structure without properly duplicating the drm_plane_state. In particular, state->commit remained set to the old state commit, which can lead to a use-after-free in the next drm_atomic_commit() call. Fix this by calling __drm_atomic_helper_duplicate_plane_state(), which correctly clones the base drm_plane_state (including the ->commit pointer). It has been seen when closing and re-opening the device node while another DRM client (e.g. fbdev) is still attached: ============================================================================= BUG kmalloc-64 (Not tainted): Poison overwritten ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0xc611b344-0xc611b344 @offset=836. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b FIX kmalloc-64: Restoring Poison 0xc611b344-0xc611b344=0x6b Allocated in drm_atomic_helper_setup_commit+0x1e8/0x7bc age=178 cpu=0 pid=29 drm_atomic_helper_setup_commit+0x1e8/0x7bc drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x3c/0x15c drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xf4 drm_framebuffer_remove+0x4cc/0x5a8 drm_mode_rmfb_work_fn+0x6c/0x80 process_one_work+0x12c/0x2cc worker_thread+0x2a8/0x400 kthread+0xc0/0xdc ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 Freed in drm_atomic_helper_commit_hw_done+0x100/0x150 age=8 cpu=0 pid=169 drm_atomic_helper_commit_hw_done+0x100/0x150 drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail+0x64/0x8c commit_tail+0x168/0x18c drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x138/0x15c drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xf4 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x84/0xb8 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x32c/0x810 drm_ioctl+0x20c/0x488 sys_ioctl+0x14c/0xc20 ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54 Slab 0xef8bc360 objects=21 used=16 fp=0xc611b7c0 flags=0x200(workingset|zone=0) Object 0xc611b340 @offset=832 fp=0xc611b7c0Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: wan: farsync: Fix use-after-free bugs caused by unfinished tasklets When the FarSync T-series card is being detached, the fst_card_info is deallocated in fst_remove_one(). However, the fst_tx_task or fst_int_task may still be running or pending, leading to use-after-free bugs when the already freed fst_card_info is accessed in fst_process_tx_work_q() or fst_process_int_work_q(). A typical race condition is depicted below: CPU 0 (cleanup) | CPU 1 (tasklet) | fst_start_xmit() fst_remove_one() | tasklet_schedule() unregister_hdlc_device()| | fst_process_tx_work_q() //handler kfree(card) //free | do_bottom_half_tx() | card-> //use The following KASAN trace was captured: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_bottom_half_tx+0xb88/0xd00 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800aad101c by task ksoftirqd/3/32 ... Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70 print_report+0xcb/0x5d0 ? do_bottom_half_tx+0xb88/0xd00 kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0 ? do_bottom_half_tx+0xb88/0xd00 do_bottom_half_tx+0xb88/0xd00 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x85/0xe0 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___hrtimer_run_queues+0x10/0x10 fst_process_tx_work_q+0x67/0x90 tasklet_action_common+0x1fa/0x720 ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x31f/0x780 handle_softirqs+0x176/0x530 __irq_exit_rcu+0xab/0xe0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80 ... Allocated by task 41 on cpu 3 at 72.330843s: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90 fst_add_one+0x1a5/0x1cd0 local_pci_probe+0xdd/0x190 pci_device_probe+0x341/0x480 really_probe+0x1c6/0x6a0 __driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310 driver_probe_device+0x48/0x210 __device_attach_driver+0x160/0x320 bus_for_each_drv+0x101/0x190 __device_attach+0x198/0x3a0 device_initial_probe+0x78/0xa0 pci_bus_add_device+0x81/0xc0 pci_bus_add_devices+0x7e/0x190 enable_slot+0x9b9/0x1130 acpiphp_check_bridge.part.0+0x2e1/0x460 acpiphp_hotplug_notify+0x36c/0x3c0 acpi_device_hotplug+0x203/0xb10 acpi_hotplug_work_fn+0x59/0x80 ... Freed by task 41 on cpu 1 at 75.138639s: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70 kfree+0x135/0x410 fst_remove_one+0x2ca/0x540 pci_device_remove+0xa6/0x1d0 device_release_driver_internal+0x364/0x530 pci_stop_bus_device+0x105/0x150 pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0xd/0x20 disable_slot+0x116/0x260 acpiphp_disable_and_eject_slot+0x4b/0x190 acpiphp_hotplug_notify+0x230/0x3c0 acpi_device_hotplug+0x203/0xb10 acpi_hotplug_work_fn+0x59/0x80 ... The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800aad1000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte region The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xaad0 head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0x100000000000040(head|node=0|zone=1) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0100000000000040 ffff888007042dc0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0100000000000040 ffff888007042dc0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0100000000000003 ffffea00002ab401 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff head: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88800aad0f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88800aad0f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88800aad1000: fa fb ---truncated---Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: atm: fore200e: fix use-after-free in tasklets during device removal When the PCA-200E or SBA-200E adapter is being detached, the fore200e is deallocated. However, the tx_tasklet or rx_tasklet may still be running or pending, leading to use-after-free bug when the already freed fore200e is accessed again in fore200e_tx_tasklet() or fore200e_rx_tasklet(). One of the race conditions can occur as follows: CPU 0 (cleanup) | CPU 1 (tasklet) fore200e_pca_remove_one() | fore200e_interrupt() fore200e_shutdown() | tasklet_schedule() kfree(fore200e) | fore200e_tx_tasklet() | fore200e-> // UAF Fix this by ensuring tx_tasklet or rx_tasklet is properly canceled before the fore200e is released. Add tasklet_kill() in fore200e_shutdown() to synchronize with any pending or running tasklets. Moreover, since fore200e_reset() could prevent further interrupts or data transfers, the tasklet_kill() should be placed after fore200e_reset() to prevent the tasklet from being rescheduled in fore200e_interrupt(). Finally, it only needs to do tasklet_kill() when the fore200e state is greater than or equal to FORE200E_STATE_IRQ, since tasklets are uninitialized in earlier states. In a word, the tasklet_kill() should be placed in the FORE200E_STATE_IRQ branch within the switch...case structure. This bug was identified through static analysis.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: remove xfs_attr_leaf_hasname The calling convention of xfs_attr_leaf_hasname() is problematic, because it returns a NULL buffer when xfs_attr3_leaf_read fails, a valid buffer when xfs_attr3_leaf_lookup_int returns -ENOATTR or -EEXIST, and a non-NULL buffer pointer for an already released buffer when xfs_attr3_leaf_lookup_int fails with other error values. Fix this by simply open coding xfs_attr_leaf_hasname in the callers, so that the buffer release code is done by each caller of xfs_attr3_leaf_read.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: reset: gpio: suppress bind attributes in sysfs This is a special device that's created dynamically and is supposed to stay in memory forever. We also currently don't have a devlink between it and the actual reset consumer. Suppress sysfs bind attributes so that user-space can't unbind the device because - as of now - it will cause a use-after-free splat from any user that puts the reset control handle.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: roccat: fix use-after-free in roccat_report_event roccat_report_event() iterates over the device->readers list without holding the readers_lock. This allows a concurrent roccat_release() to remove and free a reader while it's still being accessed, leading to a use-after-free. Protect the readers list traversal with the readers_lock mutex.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: Wait for RCU readers during policy netns exit xfrm_policy_fini() frees the policy_bydst hash tables after flushing the policy work items and deleting all policies, but it does not wait for concurrent RCU readers to leave their read-side critical sections first. The policy_bydst tables are published via rcu_assign_pointer() and are looked up through rcu_dereference_check(), so netns teardown must also wait for an RCU grace period before freeing the table memory. Fix this by adding synchronize_rcu() before freeing the policy hash tables.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: make hash table per queue Sharing a global hash table among all queues is tempting, but it can cause crash: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x11ac/0x15e0 [nfnetlink_queue] [..] nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x11ac/0x15e0 [nfnetlink_queue] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x46a/0x930 kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x11e/0x450 struct nf_queue_entry is freed via kfree, but parallel cpu can still encounter such an nf_queue_entry when walking the list. Alternative fix is to free the nf_queue_entry via kfree_rcu() instead, but as we have to alloc/free for each skb this will cause more mem pressure.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data. If the filesystem is corrupted, an inode's i_size can exceed the actual inline data capacity (id_count). This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from freed memory. In the syzbot report: - i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB) - Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically <256 bytes - A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx->pos to jump out of bounds - This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry() Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure inodes with inline data have i_size <= id_count. This catches the corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code from operating on invalid data.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventpoll: defer struct eventpoll free to RCU grace period In certain situations, ep_free() in eventpoll.c will kfree the epi->ep eventpoll struct while it still being used by another concurrent thread. Defer the kfree() to an RCU callback to prevent UAF.Show less

Redis is an in-memory data structure store. In all versions of redis-server with Lua scripting, an authenticated attacker can exploit the master-replica synchronization mechanism to trigger a use-after-free on replicas where replica-read-only is disabled or can be disabled, which may lead to remote code execution. A workaround is to prevent users from executing Lua scripts or avoid using replicas where replica-read-only is disabled. This is patched in version 8.6.3.Show less