Use After Free

A use after free issue was addressed with improved memory management. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.6.1 and iPadOS 26.6.1, macOS Tahoe 26.6.2, tvOS 27, visionOS 27, watchOS 27. A remote attacker may be able to cause unexpected system termination.Show less

The issue was addressed with improved memory handling. This issue is fixed in Safari 26.6.1, iOS 18.7.10 and iPadOS 18.7.10, iOS 26.6.1 and iPadOS 26.6.1, macOS Tahoe 26.6.2, tvOS 27, visionOS 27, watchOS 27. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to memory corruption.Show less

The issue was addressed with improved memory handling. This issue is fixed in Safari 26.6.1, iOS 18.7.10 and iPadOS 18.7.10, iOS 26.6.1 and iPadOS 26.6.1, macOS Tahoe 26.6.2, visionOS 27. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an unexpected Safari crash.Show less

A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory management. This issue is fixed in Safari 26.6.1, iOS 18.7.10 and iPadOS 18.7.10, iOS 26.6.1 and iPadOS 26.6.1, macOS Tahoe 26.6.2, tvOS 27, visionOS 27, watchOS 27. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an unexpected process termination.Show less

A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory management. This issue is fixed in Safari 26.6.1, iOS 18.7.10 and iPadOS 18.7.10, iOS 26.6.1 and iPadOS 26.6.1, macOS Tahoe 26.6.2, tvOS 27, visionOS 27, watchOS 27. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an unexpected process crash.Show less

The issue was addressed with improved memory handling. This issue is fixed in Safari 26.5, iOS 18.7.10 and iPadOS 18.7.10, iOS 26.5 and iPadOS 26.5, macOS Tahoe 26.5, tvOS 26.5, visionOS 26.5, watchOS 26.5. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an unexpected Safari crash.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: xen: scsiback: Free unsubmitted command instead of double-putting it scsiback_get_pend_req() obtains a command tag and returns a vscsibk_pend whose embedded se_cmd has only been memset to 0, so its cmd_kref is 0; the se_cmd is initialised (kref_init() via target_init_cmd()) only later, in scsiback_cmd_exec(), on the successful VSCSIIF_ACT_SCSI_CDB path. The two error paths in scsiback_do_cmd_fn() taken before the command is submitted -- a failed scsiback_gnttab_data_map() and an unknown ring_req.act -- call transport_generic_free_cmd(&pending_req->se_cmd, 0), which kref_put()s a refcount of 0. That underflows it ("refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free") and, as the release function is not run, leaks the command tag. Impact: a pvSCSI guest can leak every command tag of a LUN's session, stopping the LUN, by submitting requests with a bad grant reference or an unknown request type; under panic_on_warn the refcount underflow panics the host. Add a helper that just returns the tag with target_free_tag() and sends the error response. It frees the tag while the v2p reference still pins the session, and snapshots the response fields beforehand because freeing the tag can let another ring reuse the pending_req slot.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: core: Fix iSCSI ISID use-after-free in REGISTER AND MOVE core_scsi3_emulate_pro_register_and_move() maps the PERSISTENT RESERVE OUT parameter list with transport_kmap_data_sg() and parses the destination TransportID with target_parse_pr_out_transport_id(). For an iSCSI TransportID (FORMAT CODE 01b), iscsi_parse_pr_out_transport_id() returns the ISID in iport_ptr as a raw pointer into that mapped buffer. The function then unmaps the buffer with transport_kunmap_data_sg() before dereferencing iport_ptr in strcmp(), __core_scsi3_locate_pr_reg() and core_scsi3_alloc_registration(). When the parameter list spans more than one page (PARAMETER LIST LENGTH > 4096), transport_kmap_data_sg() uses vmap() and transport_kunmap_data_sg() does vunmap(), so the kernel virtual address backing iport_ptr is torn down and every subsequent dereference is a use-after-free read of the unmapped region. Keep the parameter list mapped until iport_ptr is no longer needed: drop the early transport_kunmap_data_sg() and unmap once on the success path, right before returning. The error paths already unmap through the existing "if (buf) transport_kunmap_data_sg(cmd)" at the out: label, which now runs on every post-map error exit because buf is no longer cleared early. Only reads of the mapping happen while spinlocks are held; the map and unmap calls remain outside any lock. The sibling caller core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port() already uses the buffer before unmapping it and is left unchanged.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/resctrl: Fix use-after-free during unmount During unmount or failure teardown all mon_data structures that contain monitoring event file private data are freed after which kernfs nodes are removed. However, the RDT_DELETED flag is never set for the statically allocated default resource group. A concurrent reader of an event file associated with the default resource group may, after dropping kernfs active protection, block on rdtgroup_mutex while unmount proceeds to free the file private data and destroy the kernfs node without waiting for the reader. When the mutex is released, the reader wakes up, observes that RDT_DELETED is not set for the default group, and dereferences the already-freed file private data. The scenario can be depicted as follows: CPU0 CPU1 /* * Default resource group's * monitoring data accessible via * kernfs file with kernfs_node::priv * pointing to a struct mon_data. * User opens the file for reading. */ rdtgroup_mondata_show() /* arch encounters fatal error */ rdtgroup_kn_lock_live() resctrl_exit() atomic_inc(&rdtgroup_default.waitcount) cpus_read_lock() kernfs_break_active_protection(kn) mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex) cpus_read_lock() resctrl_fs_teardown() mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex) rmdir_all_sub() mon_put_kn_priv() /* Delete all mon_data structures */ rdtgroup_destroy_root() kernfs_destroy_root() rdtgroup_default.kn = NULL mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex) /* * rdtgroup_default.flags is empty so * rdtgroup_kn_lock_live() returns * &rdtgroup_default */ md = of->kn->priv; /* md points to freed mon_data */ Set RDT_DELETED for the default group unconditionally since the flag does not lead to the freeing of this statically allocated group. Do not allow a new resctrl mount if there are any waiters on default group of previous mount. A new mount will re-initialize the default group that would appear to waiters from previous mount as though the default group is accessible causing them to access the mon_data structures from the previous mount that have been removed.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: macsec: fix use-after-free of metadata_dst on RX SC delete When an offloaded MACsec RX SC is deleted, macsec_del_rxsc_ctx() freed the per-SC metadata_dst with metadata_dst_free(), which kfree()s the object unconditionally and ignores the dst reference count. The RX datapath in mlx5e_macsec_offload_handle_rx_skb() looks up the SC under rcu_read_lock() via xa_load(), takes a reference with dst_hold() and attaches the dst to the skb with skb_dst_set(). A reader that already obtained the rx_sc pointer can race with the delete path and operate on freed memory. Fix the owner side by dropping the reference with dst_release() instead of freeing unconditionally, and convert the RX datapath to dst_hold_safe() so a reader racing the SC delete cannot attach a dst whose last reference was just dropped; only attach it when a reference was actually taken. mlx5e_macsec_add_rxsc() also published sc_xarray_element via xa_alloc() before rx_sc->md_dst was allocated and initialised, so a datapath reader that looked the SC up by fs_id could observe rx_sc with md_dst still NULL or, on weakly-ordered architectures, a non-NULL md_dst pointer whose contents were not yet visible. NULL-check the xa_load() result and md_dst on the datapath, and reorder add_rxsc() so the xa_alloc() publish happens only after md_dst is fully initialised; the xarray RCU publish then pairs with the rcu_read_lock()/xa_load() in the datapath. Note: macsec_del_rxsc_ctx() also kfree()s rx_sc->sc_xarray_element without an RCU grace period while the same datapath reads it under rcu_read_lock(); that is a separate pre-existing issue left to a follow-up patch. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: locking/rt: Fix the incorrect RCU protection in rt_spin_unlock() rt_spin_unlock() releases the RCU protection before unlocking the lock. That opens the door for the following UAF scenario: T1 T2 spin_lock(&p->lock); rcu_read_lock(); invalidate(p); p = rcu_dereference(ptr); rcu_assign_pointer(ptr, NULL); if (!p) return; spin_unlock(&p->lock); spin_lock(&p->lock) lock(&lock->lock); rcu_read_lock(); kfree_rcu(p); rcu_read_unlock(); .... spin_unlock(&p->lock) rcu_read_unlock(); // Ends grace period rcu_do_batch() kfree(p); UAF -> rt_mutex_cmpxchg_release(&lock->lock...) Regular spinlocks keep preemption disabled accross the unlock operation, which provides full RCU protection, but the RT substitution fails to resemble that. Same applies for the rwlock substitution. Move the rcu_read_unlock() invocation past the unlock operations to match the non-RT semantics. This makes it asymmetric vs. rt_xxx_lock(), but that's harmless as the caller needs to hold RCU read lock across the lock operation. The migrate_enable() call stays before the unlock operation because there is no per CPU operation in the unlock path which would require migration to be kept disabled.Show less

Zephyr's dynamic kernel-object disposal path unref_check() in kernel/userspace/userspace.c frees an object's storage (k_free(dyn->data)) once its reference count reaches zero, after running a per-object-type cleanup. The cleanup switch handled only K_OBJ_MSGQ and K_OBJ_STACK; there was no K_OBJ_TIMER case. A dynamically-allocated, initialized, and armed k_timer keeps its embedded struct _timeout dnode linked in the global timeout queue (_timeout_q), so freeing the timer storage without cancelling the timeout leaves a dangling node in that queue. When the timer next expires, the timeout machinery walks _timeout_q and invokes z_timer_expiration_handler() on the freed node, dereferencing and writing freed (and reusable) kernel heap in kernel/ISR context. This is a deterministic use-after-free that does not depend on SMP: the queued node is simply never unlinked at free time. The disposal is reachable from an unprivileged user thread under CONFIG_USERSPACE + CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS: a thread that holds the last permission on such a timer drops it via the k_object_release() syscall (or by exiting, through k_thread_perms_all_clear()), and can arm the timer itself via the k_timer_start() syscall. The free and the expiration handler run at kernel privilege while the actor is a user thread, so the bug is a sandbox-escape memory-corruption primitive usable for privilege escalation. The fix adds k_timer_cleanup() (cancel the timeout and wait for any in-flight handler) and calls it for K_OBJ_TIMER before freeing.Show less

A use-after-free exists in the Zephyr second-generation work queue (kernel/work.c) in the handling of delayable work timeouts. When a delayable work item's timeout has been dequeued and its handler work_timeout() is in flight (blocked acquiring the work-queue spinlock), a concurrent cancellation does not wait for that handler to finish. In unschedule_locked() the pre-fix code called z_abort_timeout(), which for an already-announcing record returns -EINVAL without removing it; cancel_async_locked() then observes the work as idle, so even k_work_cancel_delayable_sync() and k_work_flush_delayable() return without blocking on the in-flight handler. Because those are the APIs the kernel header documents as the safe way to cancel before freeing a k_work_delayable, a caller that frees the object immediately after a successful sync cancel can race the still-pending handler. work_timeout() subsequently dereferences the freed record: it reads to->dticks via z_is_timeout_handler_canceled() and, if the freed slot has been reused so the bail check fails, performs a read-modify-write of wp->flags (K_WORK_DELAYED_BIT) and submits work against a stale dw->queue pointer — a use-after-free read and write. The k_work API is kernel-mode only (no __syscall entry point), so this is a kernel-internal concurrency defect rather than a userspace privilege escalation. Triggering it requires an SMP build and a subsystem that schedules and then frees (or reschedules) a delayable work item in the narrow window while its timeout is announcing; an attacker able to influence the timing of such teardown (for example via connection churn driving subsystem timers) has a plausible but probabilistic path. The impact is kernel memory corruption or crash (denial of service). The fix makes unschedule_locked() wait, by spinning on z_try_abort_timeout() returning -EAGAIN while releasing and re-acquiring the work spinlock, until any in-flight handler completes before returning, and switches work_timeout() to atomic K_WORK_DELAYED_BIT ownership. This closes both the free-then-handler use-after-free and the related reschedule early-fire race.Show less