Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime

Protocol::HTTP2 versions before 1.14 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via closed streams that stream_state never removes from the connection stream table. When a stream reaches the CLOSED state, stream_state returns the concurrency slot and clears most of the stream's keys, but the entry itself stays in the connection stream table and nothing in the distribution removes it. Stream identifiers increase monotonically, so a peer can open and close streams on one connection indefinitely, each close leaving a residual entry that is retained for the life of the connection. SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS does not bound this. That setting caps how many streams are live at once and is enforced, while the growth is made of streams the cap has already released, so it accumulates with concurrency never exceeding one. The client keeps the same table and grows the same way against a hostile server. Measured against a server built on this module, roughly 920 bytes are retained per closed stream for about 19 bytes on the wire, so 100,000 sequential streams on one connection grow server resident memory by about 88 MiB. The streams are ordinary requests that the application accepts and completes.Show less

rpcapd can allocate up to 65536 bytes per each RPCAP_MSG_UPDATEFILTER_REQ or RPCAP_MSG_STARTCAP_REQ message received from the client, but it never frees the memory, so it leaks memory even under normal use. A malicious client can cause the server to leak memory substantially faster.Show less

A vulnerability in Cisco Desk Phone 9800 Series, Cisco IP Phone 7800 and 8800 Series, and Cisco Video Phone 8875 that are running Cisco Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to improper memory management when an affected device processes HTTP packets. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a continuous stream of crafted HTTP packets to the device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the affected device to continuously consume memory, resulting in a DoS condition. A manual reboot of the device is required to recover from this condition. Note: For this vulnerability to be exploitable, the phone must be registered to Cisco Unified Communications Manager (Unified CM) and have Web Access enabled. Web Access is disabled by default.Show less

net_ipv6_send_ns() in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c allocates a transmit net_pkt for a Neighbor Solicitation. When it is called with a data packet pending on an unresolved neighbor and that neighbor's pending_queue is already non-empty (an NS is already outstanding), the function appends the data packet and returns early without ever sending the NS via net_send_data() or releasing it with net_pkt_unref(). The freshly allocated NS net_pkt and its attached TX buffers are held only by a local variable and are leaked permanently, never returning to CONFIG_NET_PKT_TX_COUNT / CONFIG_NET_BUF_TX_COUNT. The leaking branch sits on the normal IPv6 transmit path: net_ipv6_prepare_for_send() (called from net_if.c) invokes net_ipv6_send_ns() for any outbound or forwarded IPv6 packet whose next hop is not yet in the neighbor cache. An on-link (adjacent) attacker can drive it deterministically by sending a burst of request packets (for example ICMPv6 echo requests or UDP datagrams) that all spoof a single non-existent on-link source address: the node generates a reply to each, the first reply queues an NS, and every subsequent reply during the roughly three-second INCOMPLETE resolution window takes the leaking branch and loses one TX packet. Router-configured nodes forwarding attacker traffic toward a non-existent on-link host leak identically. Because the leaked packets are never reclaimed and CONFIG_NET_PKT_TX_COUNT defaults to only 4 (14 for Ethernet), a brief low-rate burst exhausts the TX pool. Once exhausted the node can no longer allocate any transmit packet and cannot send TCP/UDP, ARP/ND, or any reply at all, producing a complete and persistent network denial of service that does not self-heal until reboot. The fix releases the unsent NS packet with net_pkt_unref(pkt) before the early return.Show less

When Ethernet bridging is enabled (CONFIG_NET_ETHERNET_BRIDGE), eth_bridge_input_process() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/bridge/bridge_input.c decides how each frame received on a bridge member interface is handled. For frames that must also be delivered to the local stack, the code called eth_bridge_handle_locally() and returned NET_OK. That helper does not consume the packet — it only calls bridge_iface_recv() (via virtual_recv()), which returns NET_CONTINUE without taking ownership of pkt. The NET_OK verdict then propagates through ethernet_recv() up to processing_data() in subsys/net/ip/net_core.c, where NET_OK is interpreted as "the packet was consumed, do not free it." Because no consumer actually took ownership, the RX net_pkt is never returned to the pool and is leaked. The concretely reproducible leak occurs for frames whose EtherType has no registered L3 handler when CONFIG_NET_ETHERNET_FORWARD_UNRECOGNISED_ETHERTYPE is set (default y when CONFIG_NET_SOCKETS_PACKET is enabled): the fall-through L3 dispatch does not overwrite the NET_OK verdict, so ethernet_recv() returns NET_OK and the buffer is never released. Any device on a bridged L2 segment can emit broadcast/multicast frames carrying an arbitrary EtherType with no authentication. Each such frame permanently consumes one buffer from the finite RX pool (CONFIG_NET_PKT_RX_COUNT), so a brief broadcast flood exhausts the pool and the device can no longer receive traffic until it is rebooted — a persistent denial of service. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact. The fix makes eth_bridge_handle_locally() propagate the real net_verdict and return NET_CONTINUE for locally-kept frames, writing the bridge interface back through a new dst_iface out-parameter so the packet follows the normal receive path and is unreferenced exactly once.Show less

A Spring RSocket application is exposed to a memory leak via a malformed SETUP frame. Spring Framework 7.0.0 - 7.0.8 Spring Framework 6.2.0 - 6.2.19 Spring Framework 6.1.0 - 6.1.28 Spring Framework 6.0.0 - 6.0.30 Spring Framework 5.3.0 - 5.3.49 Spring Framework 5.2.0.RELEASE - 5.2.25.RELEASEShow less

Nokogiri versions before 1.19.3 contain a memory leak in the XSLT Stylesheet transform method when processing Ruby strings containing null bytes. Attackers can exploit this by passing attacker-controlled input with null bytes to transform parameters, causing heap allocations to leak and enabling denial of service against long-running processes.Show less

It is possible for outbound HTTP requests using a Micrometer-instrumented client to cause a denial-of-service (DoS) condition due to an unbounded memory leak. Micrometer 1.17.0 Micrometer 1.16.0 - 1.16.6 Micrometer 1.15.0 - 1.15.12 Micrometer 1.14.0 - 1.14.16 Micrometer 1.9.18 and earlierShow less

The Infineon Airoc Wi-Fi driver's transmit callback airoc_mgmt_send() in drivers/wifi/infineon/airoc_wifi.c allocates a net_buf from the fixed airoc_pool for every outbound packet. When whd_network_send_ethernet_data() returns a synchronous failure, the underlying WHD library does not take ownership of the buffer, but the pre-fix driver returned -EIO without releasing it. Each failed transmit therefore permanently leaks one buffer from the pool. airoc_pool is small and fixed (AIROC_WIFI_TX_PACKET_POOL_COUNT + AIROC_WIFI_RX_PACKET_POOL_COUNT, default 20 buffers) and is shared by WHD's whd_host_buffer_get callback for both transmit and receive. Once enough send failures have leaked the pool dry, airoc_wifi_host_buffer_get() returns WHD_BUFFER_ALLOC_FAIL for all subsequent allocations, so both transmit and the WHD-driven receive path fail and Wi-Fi connectivity is lost until the device is rebooted. The leak occurs only on the transmit error path. A Wi-Fi-adjacent attacker can influence the conditions that cause synchronous send failures (for example by deauthenticating/disassociating the station while the local stack continues to attempt transmits), and ordinary transient failures over the device's lifetime accumulate toward the same state. Reliable on-demand triggering is of high complexity and the impact is availability-only, but the resulting denial of service is permanent and non-recoverable without a reboot. The fix releases the buffer with airoc_wifi_buffer_release() on the failure branch, returning it to the pool. The commit also removes a redundant k_sem_give() in airoc_mgmt_disconnect(); because data->sema_common is a binary semaphore (limit 1) the duplicate give merely saturated at 1 and had no security impact.Show less

A memory leak flaw was found in cockpit-ws. The login page handler leaks a heap allocation on every unauthenticated request that carries a CockpitLang cookie, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to exhaust memory on the host and cause a denial of service.Show less