Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

A Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') vulnerability in the packet forwarding engine (PFE) of Juniper Networks Junos OS on SRX Series allows an unauthenticated, network-based attacker to cause a Denial-of-Service (DoS). As part of the stateful traffic processing on SRX Series devices flows are being established, and removed when not needed anymore. During the removal process the timeout of a flow should be set to 3 seconds and consequentially the flow should be removed shortly after. Due to a race condition occurring when setting the timeout there is a chance (the exact conditions are outside the attackers control) that the timeout is instead set to a very high value of larger than 10,000 seconds: user@host> show security flow session | match timeout Session ID: 98784248524, Policy name: PROD-FLOW/4, HA State: Active, Timeout: 85250, Session State: Valid This will lead to an accumulation of flows which can be observed by an ever-increasing value of invalidated sessions in the output of 'show security flow session summary': user@host> show security flow session summary | match invalid Invalidated sessions: 216931These sessions can't be cleared manually with the 'clear security flow session' command, which will either lead to forwarding to stop (and the system needs to be manually recovered with a reboot) or to a flowd core and automatic reboot. This issue affects Junos OS on SRX Series: * 24.2 versions before 24.2R2-S3, * 24.4 versions before 24.4R2-S1, 24.4R2-S2, * 25.2 versions before 25.2R1-S2, 25.2R2. This issue does not affect releases earlier than 24.2R1;Show less

CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF UnixDomainSocket POSIX peer identity resolution uses non-reentrant getpwuid and getgrgid calls, allowing concurrent connections to attribute one connection's identity to another or crash the host process under contention. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.Show less

Race in GetUserMedia in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.115 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)Show less

Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 4.11.8 before 4.12.27, hono/jsx did not isolate context values per request during server-side rendering, allowing createContext, useContext, jsxRenderer, or useRequestContext data from a different in-flight request to be used after an await in an async component. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.27.Show less

FreeRDP before 3.22.0 contains a use-after-free vulnerability in dvcman_channel_close and dvcman_call_on_receive due to improper synchronization of channel_callback access. A malicious RDP server can trigger a race condition by sending DYNVC_DATA and DYNVC_CLOSE messages concurrently, causing heap-use-after-free in the drdynvc client thread and potentially enabling remote code execution or denial of service.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: signal: clear JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for caller in zap_other_threads() When a multi-threaded process receives a stop signal (e.g., SIGSTOP), do_signal_stop() sets JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING and JOBCTL_STOP_CONSUME on all threads and sets signal->group_stop_count to the number of threads. If one of the threads concurrently calls execve(), de_thread() invokes zap_other_threads() to kill all other threads. zap_other_threads() aborts the pending group stop by resetting signal->group_stop_count to 0 and clears the JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for all other threads. However, it fails to clear the job control flags for the calling thread. When execve() completes, the calling thread returns to user mode and checks for pending signals. Seeing the stale JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING flag, it calls do_signal_stop(), which invokes task_participate_group_stop(). Since JOBCTL_STOP_CONSUME is still set, it attempts to decrement the already-zero signal->group_stop_count, triggering a warning: sig->group_stop_count == 0 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6475 at kernel/signal.c:373 task_participate_group_stop+0x215/0x2d0 Call Trace: <TASK> do_signal_stop+0x3be/0x5c0 kernel/signal.c:2619 get_signal+0xa8c/0x1330 kernel/signal.c:2884 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xbc/0x840 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x8c/0x4d0 kernel/entry/common.c:98 do_syscall_64+0x33e/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Fix this race condition by clearing the JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for the calling thread in zap_other_threads(), ensuring it does not retain any stale job control state after the thread group is destroyed. This aligns with other functions that tear down a thread group and abort group stops, such as zap_process() and complete_signal(), which correctly clear these flags for all threads including the current one.Show less