Use of Less Trusted Source

The wpForo Forum WordPress plugin from 3.0.0 before 3.1.6 does not verify the source of client-supplied IP address headers before using them to key its per-visitor rate limit on paid AI requests, allowing unauthenticated attackers to bypass the limit by spoofing the header and exhaust the site owner's metered AI credits.Show less

In OpenStack Zaqar before 22.0.2, WSGI transport mishandles the URL-Signature header. By sending a request with an empty URL-Signature header, an unauthenticated remote attacker who knows a target project's UUID may bypass both Keystone authentication and pre-signed URL verification, resulting in the ability to read, enumerate, create, and delete that project's queues, messages, claims, and subscriptions. By additionally claiming an administrative role, the attacker may also perform administrative operations, such as managing pools and flavors in admin_mode deployments. Only deployments using the WSGI transport with an authentication strategy configured are affected; the websocket transport is not affected.Show less

GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 19.1 before 19.2.7, 19.3 before 19.3.3, and 19.4 before 19.4.1 that under certain conditions could have allowed an authenticated user to spoof merge request authorship and attribute content to arbitrary existing users on the target instance due to improper reliance on ephemeral cache state during Direct Transfer imports.Show less

A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller. In the shipped production configuration, the Controller trusts the client-supplied X-Forwarded-For header as the request's client IP without verifying that it originated from a trusted proxy, and selects the leftmost (attacker-controlled) header value. As a result, an attacker can forge the source IP address recorded for their requests in the Controller's audit and access logs, degrading the integrity of forensic and SIEM attribution. The flaw does not grant additional access.Show less

The Forminator Forms WordPress plugin before 1.57.2.1 does not verify that a request came from a trusted proxy before preferring client-supplied forwarding headers over the connecting address, and it uses that value both to enforce its per-visitor voting limit and to record who submitted an entry. Unauthenticated visitors can therefore vote without limit on any poll and can choose the address stored against every submission they make.Show less

Fabio is an HTTP(S) and TCP router for deploying applications managed by consul. From 1.6.6 until 1.7.2, the CVE-2025-48865 fix in proxy/http_headers.go uses protectHeaders for a hardcoded set of forwarded headers but omits the operator-configured ClientIPHeader, TLSHeader, and RequestID names. In proxy/http_proxy.go, HTTPProxy.ServeHTTP calls addHeaders to set these trust headers before Go ReverseProxy processes the inbound Connection header, allowing an unauthenticated client to name and remove the configured headers before the request reaches the backend. Deployments that enable the corresponding proxy.header options can therefore lose client-IP, TLS-termination, or request-correlation signals used by backend authorization and auditing; the options are empty by default, and the hardcoded protected forwarded headers are unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2.Show less

kcp is a Kubernetes-like control plane for form-factors and use-cases beyond Kubernetes and container workloads. Prior to 0.31.4 and 0.32.2, the kcp front-proxy does not remove inbound X-Remote-User, X-Remote-Group, or X-Remote-Extra-* identity headers before forwarding requests to shards. Any authenticated tenant can inject X-Remote-Group: system:masters, authorization.kcp.io/warrant, authentication.kcp.io/scopes, or a group used for per-workspace required-group gating, and the shard trusts these values as authenticated identity assertions. This allows cross-workspace impersonation, authorization bypass, and arbitrary reading, writing, or deletion of resources, secrets, RBAC data, APIExports, APIBindings, and LogicalClusters. This issue is fixed in versions 0.31.4 and 0.32.2.Show less

djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, the WebSocket `handle_mount` and `ViewRuntime._build_request` rebuild an `HttpRequest` via `RequestFactory().get(...)` with no `HTTP_HOST`, so `request.get_host()` defaulted to `"testserver"` on the live path. Host/subdomain/domain `TenantResolver`s then misresolved the tenant — `None` on the live path while the HTTP path resolved correctly. With `STRICT_MODE=False` the tenant-scoped managers returned unscoped rows (cross-tenant disclosure); with the default they returned an empty queryset (broken tenancy). This is fixed in djust 1.0.7. The handshake Host is extracted from the ASGI scope, validated against `ALLOWED_HOSTS` (the same logic as the CSWSH Origin gate, parsed with Django's `split_domain_port` so malformed Hosts are rejected at the boundary), and propagated — with the TLS scheme — into the reconstructed request, so live-path tenant resolution matches HTTP exactly. There is no known workaround on the live path short of upgrading. Users are most exposed when combined with `STRICT_MODE=False`.Show less

@fastify/proxy-addr is a Fastify plugin that determines a request's client address behind trusted reverse proxies, and it backs Fastify request.ip and request.ips. In versions 3.0.0 through 5.1.0, a trust subnet written in IPv4-mapped IPv6 notation with an IPv4-sized prefix, such as ::ffff:10.0.0.0/8 instead of the correct ::ffff:10.0.0.0/104, is accepted without error but trusts every IPv4 address on the internet rather than the block it names. Because the socket peer then becomes trusted at hop 0, any unauthenticated client can supply an arbitrary X-Forwarded-For header and control the address the application reads, which defeats IP-based access control, rate limiting, geolocation, and audit logging. The plugin inherited this defect from the upstream proxy-addr module (CVE-2026-90711). The issue is fixed in @fastify/proxy-addr 5.1.1, and users should upgrade to 5.1.1 or later. As a workaround, ensure any IPv4-mapped IPv6 trust subnet uses a prefix length of at least 97, or express the range in plain IPv4 notation.Show less

proxy-addr is a Node.js module that determines a request's client address behind trusted reverse proxies, and it backs Express req.ip and req.ips. In versions 1.1.0 through 2.0.7, a trust subnet written in IPv4-mapped IPv6 notation with an IPv4-sized prefix, such as ::ffff:10.0.0.0/8 instead of the correct ::ffff:10.0.0.0/104, is accepted without error but trusts every IPv4 address on the internet rather than the block it names. Because the socket peer then becomes trusted at hop 0, any unauthenticated client can supply an arbitrary X-Forwarded-For header and control the address the application reads, which defeats IP-based access control, rate limiting, geolocation, and audit logging. This is a fail-open regression introduced in version 1.1.0. The issue is fixed in proxy-addr 2.0.8, and users should upgrade to 2.0.8 or later. As a workaround, ensure any IPv4-mapped IPv6 trust subnet uses a prefix length of at least 97, or express the range in plain IPv4 notation.Show less

Forgejo 13.0.0 through 16.0.4, when "[federation] ENABLED = true" is set, has a spoofing issue that affects identity integrity but does not allow account takeover or content modification. It does not verify that the HTTP Signature on an incoming ActivityPub activity was produced by the key belonging to the actor named in the activity body. The signature verification in routers/api/v1/activitypub/reqsignature.go validates the request signature, but the inbox activity handlers subsequently read the acting identity from the attacker-controlled JSON body without binding it to the verified signing key. Additionally, the signed Digest header is not recomputed against the received request body. A remote attacker who hosts a single valid ActivityPub actor and keypair can therefore submit signature-valid activities attributed to any actor identity they name.Show less

Use of less trusted source vulnerability in PayTR Payment and Electronic Money Institution Inc. PayTR Virtual Pos iFrame API WHMCS Module allows Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers. This issue affects PayTR Virtual Pos iFrame API WHMCS Module: from v9.0.0 before v9.0.3.Show less

fastify is a fast and low overhead web framework for Node.js. Impact: the fix for CVE-2026-3635 added a guard on the forwarded-header reads used to derive the request host, protocol, hostname, ip, and ips values, checking the connecting address. That guard closes the IP, CIDR, and custom-function forms of trustProxy correctly, because those forms compile to predicates that inspect the connecting address. The hop-count form, where trustProxy is set to a number, compiles to a predicate that structurally ignores the address, so the guard is always satisfied for any hop count of one or more. Applications configured with a numeric trustProxy value, such as trustProxy set to 1 for a single reverse proxy, remain vulnerable: an attacker who can reach the Fastify origin directly, bypassing the front-facing proxy, can spoof the forwarded request fields exactly as in the unpatched version. The impact class matches the parent CVE-2026-3635, including host injection in generated URLs, HTTPS-enforcement bypass, secure-cookie and CSRF-origin bypass, and host-based routing and cache poisoning. Affected versions are fastify from 5.8.3 up to but not including 5.12.1. Patches: patched in fastify 5.12.1, where the numeric form of trustProxy is disabled at runtime and removed from the TypeScript type union. Workarounds: migrate to an IP, CIDR, or custom-function trustProxy value that validates the connecting address, and ensure the Fastify origin is only reachable through the trusted proxy chain.Show less

Ghost CLI before 1.30.1 contains an IP spoofing vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to bypass rate-limiting controls by manipulating the X-Forwarded-For header through a misconfigured Nginx configuration. Attackers can append attacker-controlled values to the header chain using the $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for directive to present an arbitrary IP address, circumventing Ghost's rate-limiting mechanisms on self-hosted instances.Show less

CodeIgniter is a PHP full-stack web framework. In versions prior to 4.7.4, IncomingRequest::isSecure() trusted the X-Forwarded-Proto and Front-End-Https headers from any incoming request, allowing an attacker could spoof these headers and cause the application to incorrectly treat an HTTP request as secure. This may have impacted applications that rely on isSecure(), force_https(), forceGlobalSecureRequests, or similar logic to enforce HTTPS-only access or make security-sensitive decisions. Exploitability depends on deployment configuration. Applications are most exposed if the backend is reachable directly over HTTP, or if a reverse proxy/load balancer forwards client-supplied forwarding headers without stripping or overwriting them. This issue has been fixed in version 4.7.4.Show less

In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.6.2 up to and including 1.25.1, when Unbound is configured with the 'respip' module in front of the validator together with a 'response-ip' redirect rule or an RPZ file with an RPZ-IP trigger, the rewriting handler does not check the security status of the upstream answer and can instead rewrite a BOGUS A/AAAA answer to point to an operator's configured IP. If the validator finds an expired or otherwise invalid RRSIG on an answer whose A record falls within a 'response-ip'/RPZ configuration, the answer is still rewritten and given a hard coded security level of INSECURE. This results in the client receiving an INSECURE NOERROR reply rewritten by the operator's configured IP. A malicious actor can exploit the possible poisonous effect by spoofing a BOGUS A/AAAA answer that falls inside the operator's configured subnet rewrites. Such DNSSEC protected answers are then insecurely redirected to the operator's configured target.Show less

FileCodeBox before 2.4 contains a rate-limit bypass vulnerability in the IPRateLimit class that allows unauthenticated attackers to circumvent request throttling by supplying attacker-controlled X-Real-IP and X-Forwarded-For headers without verification of trusted reverse proxy origin. Attackers can supply unique spoofed IP values on each request to enumerate all possible share codes and retrieve other users' files without authentication.Show less

Glance through 0.8.5 contains an IP address spoofing vulnerability in the authentication handler that allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass brute-force lockout protections by supplying arbitrary values in the X-Forwarded-For request header when the server proxied option is enabled. Attackers can manipulate the leftmost value of the X-Forwarded-For header to make each login attempt appear to originate from a distinct IP address, preventing the per-IP failed-login counter from reaching the lockout threshold and enabling unlimited credential guessing against the authentication endpoint.Show less

The Caddy Defender plugin is a middleware for Caddy that allows users to block or manipulate requests based on the client's IP address. Prior to version 0.10.1, Caddy Defender used `r.RemoteAddr` when evaluating whether a request should be blocked. `RemoteAddr` is the address of the immediate peer connected to Caddy. In deployments where Caddy is behind a trusted proxy, CDN, or load balancer, the immediate peer is usually the proxy, not the original client. Caddy resolves the original client address into its `client_ip` request variable after applying the configured `trusted_proxies` policy, but Defender did not use that value. As a result, clients from blocked IP ranges could bypass Defender when accessing Caddy through a trusted proxy whose own IP address was not blocked. This affects deployments that use Defender behind trusted proxies and expect it to enforce blocking based on the real client IP. The issue is fixed in version 0.10.1 by making Defender prefer Caddys resolved `client_ip` request variable when it is available. Defender falls back to `RemoteAddr` only when Caddy has not provided a resolved client IP. There is no complete workaround in affected Defender versions for deployments that rely on Caddy's trusted proxy client IP resolution. Until upgrading, affected users should enforce equivalent IP blocking at the trusted proxy, CDN, load balancer, firewall, or other edge layer before traffic reaches Caddy. Deployments where Caddy receives traffic directly from clients, without an intermediate trusted proxy, are not affected by this bypass.Show less

Eclipse Kura versions prior to 5.6.2 trust the client-supplied X-Forwarded-For HTTP header as the authoritative source of the client IP address in audit log entries. The org.eclipse.kura.web2 (Web Console) and org.eclipse.kura.rest.provider (REST API) components use this header as the primary IP source when initializing audit context, and org.eclipse.kura.jetty.customizer unconditionally installs Jetty's ForwardedRequestCustomizer on all HTTP/HTTPS connectors, causing HttpServletRequest.getRemoteAddr() to reflect the attacker-controlled header value. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to bypass IP-based brute-force protections — such as fail2ban — by spoofing the logged IP address to a non-routable value, allowing a brute-force attack to proceed undetected, or to cause a denial of service against a third party by injecting a victim's IP address and triggering a ban on that address.Show less