Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Zebra before 6.4.0 contains an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability that allows unauthenticated peers to force full proof verification by serving forged block bodies with valid header hashes. Attackers can flip authorizing-only bytes such as a coinbase scriptSig, wasting Sapling, Orchard, and Ironwood proof verification without penalty and stalling sync for 67 seconds.Show less

Contrast 1.8.0 before 1.24.1 contains an improper verification vulnerability in Coordinator peer recovery that fails to confirm the serving peer uses the same manifest generation. Attackers with write access to manifest history can replay a superseded history head so withdrawn workloads obtain trusted mesh certificates, or with the secret seed disclose the Mesh CA key.Show less

A vulnerability was determined in InstantSoft icms2 up to 2.18.2. The affected element is the function validatePaypalOrder of the file system/controllers/billing/actions/paypal.php of the component Billing Module. Executing a manipulation of the argument bid/sig can lead to insufficient verification of data authenticity. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.Show less

Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. In versions 1.0.0 through 2.3.0, when an administrator enables the per-provider `emailfallback` option on an OpenID Connect provider, Vikunja links an SSO login to a pre-existing local (username+password) account using only the `email` claim from the IdP. The fallback never checks an `email_verified` (or Microsoft `xms_edov`) signal and never requires the matched account's password. An attacker who can obtain a token from the configured issuer carrying a victim's email logs in as that victim with a full session, with no consent or interaction from the victim. Version 2.4.0 fixes the issue.Show less

Jexactyl is a customisable game management panel and billing system. Prior to 4.0.5, the POST /api/client/billing/stripe/process endpoint accepts a client-supplied Stripe Checkout Session when payment_status is paid but does not compare amount_total or currency with the referenced order and configured billing currency. On an instance where the billing module is enabled and a Stripe secret key is configured, an authenticated client can therefore complete a lower-value or mismatched-currency payment and cause the order to be processed, provisioning, renewing, upgrading, or unsuspending the purchased server for less than the required price. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.5.Show less

IBM DataPower Gateway 10.5.0.0 through 10.5.0.22, 10.6.1 through 10.6.6, 10.6.0.0 through 10.6.0.10, and 11.0.0.0 through 11.0.0.2 could allow an authenticated user to forge signature requests due to improper verification of data authenticity.Show less

The Airwallex Online Payments Gateway WordPress plugin before 1.36.0 does not verify that an incoming payment notification genuinely comes from the payment provider when no webhook secret has been configured, allowing unauthenticated attackers to forge one and mark orders as paid without paying.Show less

The AsyncHttpClient (AHC) library allows Java applications to easily execute HTTP requests and asynchronously process HTTP responses. Prior to 3.0.12 and 2.16.1, WebSocketHandler.upgrade aborts a handshake whose Sec-WebSocket-Accept value is missing or invalid but continues into pipeline installation and onOpen delivery. Frames coalesced with the invalid 101 response can be decoded and delivered from a peer that did not prove the handshake, although the request future fails and the channel closes. This issue is fixed in versions 3.0.12 and 2.16.1.Show less

Vault's PKI secrets engine ACME server did not restrict certificate identities that ACME challenges do not validate when issuing certificates under the default directory policy. This may allow an ACME client to obtain a certificate containing unverified identity claims, potentially enabling impersonation toward systems that trust certificates issued by the affected Vault PKI mount. This vulnerability (CVE-2026-105818) is fixed in Vault Community Edition 2.1.2, and Vault Enterprise 2.1.2, 1.21.12, 1.20.17, and 1.19.23.Show less

This vulnerability exists in the ERP system due to improper validation of payment callback parameters and inadequate authentication controls in API endpoint. An unauthenticated remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by manipulating the parameter to cause the application to establish an authenticated session for an arbitrary user without valid payment verification. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow the attacker to bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access to other user accounts on the targeted system.Show less

The Nexi XPay Build WordPress plugin through 7.6.2 does not correctly validate the security token on its payment notification route, accepting the request when the target order has no stored token, which allows unauthenticated attackers to mark arbitrary orders as paid, or to mark genuinely paid orders as failed.Show less

wolfSSH does not validate that the ECDSA curve identifier in a KEXDH_REPLY host key blob matches the algorithm negotiated during key exchange. In ParseECCPubKey() (src/internal.c), the blob's algorithm string is used to derive the curve via NameToId/wcPrimeForId without checking against the negotiated ssh->handshake->pubKeyId, and the RFC 5656 curve identifier string is discarded via GetSkip() rather than compared. An active network man-in-the-middle attacker can substitute a host key blob containing a different ECDSA curve, causing the client to import the key on the wrong curve. Because the attacker controls the private key for the substituted curve, signature verification passes. Exploitation requires an active MitM position and a lax public key check callback (e.g., TOFU, algorithm-name-only check, or fingerprint match against the parsed key).Show less

MCP TypeScript SDK is the official TypeScript SDK for Model Context Protocol servers and clients. Starting in version 1.12.0 and prior to versions 1.31.0 and 2.2.0, the SDK's OAuth client support let the MCP server a client connected to decide which authorization server received the client's OAuth credentials. Stored and pre-provisioned credentials were not bound to the authorization server they belong to. A malicious or compromised MCP server could name its own authorization server in its protected resource metadata. Without any user interaction, the client would send that server the `refresh_token` and `client_secret` stored from an earlier sign-in (1.x), or the configured `client_secret` or signed assertion of a bundled non-interactive provider (1.x and 2.x). Only those applications that use the SDK as an MCP client over HTTP with an `authProvider`: your own `OAuthClientProvider`, or the bundled `ClientCredentialsProvider`, `PrivateKeyJwtProvider`, `StaticPrivateKeyJwtProvider` or (2.x) `CrossAppAccessProvider` and that may connect to an MCP server the owners does not fully trust while holding credentials for a legitimate authorization server are affected. `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.31.0 (1.x) and `@modelcontextprotocol/client` 2.2.0 (2.x) patch the issue. A workaround for those who cannot upgrade is available. 2.0.0 and 2.1.0 already accept `expectedIssuer`. On 1.x, the only workaround is to connect OAuth-enabled clients only to MCP servers you trust.Show less

Insufficient verification of data authenticity (CWE-345) in the external OIDC login callback in Cloud Foundry UAA v4.5.0 to v79.6.0 (inclusive) allows an authenticated UAA user to bypass the OAuth authorization-code exchange and establish an authenticated external-OIDC browser session, via submitting a UAA access token or a cross-client ID token as the callback’s id_token parameter. The issue only manifests when a UAA zone is configured with an OIDC identity provider whose issuer exactly matches that zone’s own /oauth/token endpoint (a “self-UAA” OIDC configuration). In this configuration, the callback takes a supplied id_token directly instead of requiring the authorization code exchange, and does not verify that the token was actually issued as an ID token for the specific self-OIDC relying-party client. An attacker holding any valid UAA JWT for themselves — including a plain access token with only uaa.user scope, or a valid ID token issued to an unrelated client such as cf — can present it as the callback’s id_token and be authenticated into a mapped local (“shadow”) account. Because the resulting session is not verified against the originating token’s true audience or user_id, its effective privilege depends entirely on the shadow account’s group memberships, which can include administrative scopes such as clients.write. Exploitation requires a valid UAA user JWT, a valid browser login state for the target zone, and the presence of a self-referential OIDC provider configuration — this is not a pre-authentication vulnerability, and does not by itself grant privileges beyond those already held by the mapped shadow account.Show less

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. From 1.5.0 until 1.10.3, an IP spoofing vulnerability in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) configuration installation endpoint (POST /api/v1/mcp/project/{project_id}/install) allowed authenticated remote attackers to bypass the "local-only" access restriction. By sending a spoofed X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1 header, an attacker could make the server treat the request as originating from localhost, letting them write/overwrite an MCP client configuration file on the server's filesystem. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.10.3.Show less

DigitalCanion has discovered a vulnerability in the backup restoration functionality that allows an attacker with access to the configured backup repository to introduce arbitrary files into the system during restoration. The specific flaw exists within the backup restoration mechanism, which fails to properly validate the paths, file types, integrity, and authenticity of files contained within a restored TGZ archive. The application does not perform file-signature verification before extracting the archive, allowing a specially crafted backup to contain attacker-controlled files. An attacker with access to the backup SFTP or other configured repository can therefore provide a malicious TGZ archive that, when restored by the system, may place arbitrary files on the underlying Linux system. Depending on the location and permissions of the extracted files, this behavior can potentially be leveraged to achieve arbitrary code execution with root privileges and compromise the underlying virtual machine. The absence of enforced backup passwords further reduces the protection provided by the backup mechanism and may facilitate unauthorized access to the repository.Show less

A flaw has been found in invariant-systems-ai aiir up to 1.7.0. The affected element is an unknown function of the component Policy Gate Handler. Executing a manipulation can lead to improper verification of cryptographic signature. The attack can be executed remotely. It is advisable to upgrade the affected component. The GitHub repository of this project is not available anymore. This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.Show less

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, a truncated OpenPGP encrypted message was accepted with no error reported, and on the SEIPD version 1 path with no integrity check performed at all. RFC 9580 sec. 13.7 permits an implementation to release the cleartext of the fully authenticated chunks when streaming but requires it to indicate a clear error as soon as the truncation is detected, and to report suspect integrity when it discovers malleable ciphertext. The truncation was detected and then discarded: when a message is truncated but the length field of the enclosing packet is left unchanged, BCPGInputStream.PartialInputStream raises an EOFException for the missing ciphertext, and BCPGInputStream.nextPacketTag() reports an EOFException as a clean end of message, so the packet stream above it stopped as though no packets remained. On the AEAD path (SEIPD version 2 and the version 5 AEAD packet), when the literal data packet ended on an AEAD chunk boundary and the consumer read in increments smaller than one chunk, the look-ahead for the packet after the literal triggered the truncated chunk read, so BcAEADUtil and JceAEADUtil never reached the trailing message tag of sec. 5.13.2 that authenticates the total plaintext length; the caller received the plaintext of the fully authenticated chunks, every packet following the literal was silently dropped, and no exception was raised, so a signed and encrypted message read back as a well-formed unsigned one. Every byte released on that path remained individually authenticated, making this a missing truncation error rather than a forgery, and it is a residual of CVE-2026-12817, which closed the same outcome for an attacker who corrects the outer packet length. On the SEIPD version 1 path the consequence was more serious: IntegrityProtectedInputStream verifies the modification detection code from close(), and reached close() only by closing itself when a read of it returned -1, which a truncated message never produces, so PGPEncryptedData.verify() never ran and the recipient was handed CFB-decrypted plaintext on which no integrity check of any kind had been performed. Measured on a message truncated into that shape, 136 distinct single-byte modifications of the ciphertext produced accepted, altered plaintext with no exception raised. Reachability is a property of the message rather than of attacker-supplied input: the AEAD shape held for 3 of 131 consecutive payload lengths measured, and the SEIPD version 1 shape for one payload length in sixteen, at a truncation offset that did not move with the payload length. The low-level API is unaffected, a caller that invokes PGPEncryptedData.verify() directly getting the check regardless, as are consumers reading in increments of a whole AEAD chunk or more. The AEAD decryption streams now re-throw such an EOFException as a plain IOException, which nextPacketTag() does not launder; OpenPGPMessageInputStream.close() now closes its layer's integrity-protected stream itself rather than relying on that stream having seen the end of its data; and IntegrityProtectedInputStream.close() was made idempotent, as java.io.Closeable requires, which that depends on, since the stream is genuinely closed twice on the ordinary path and PGPEncryptedData.verify() consumes the digest state behind it and cannot be run a second time. This issue also affects Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.13, on the AEAD route only, as that edition does not ship the high-level OpenPGP API the SEIPDv1 route runs through. It also affects Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bcpg-fips 1.0.14 (1.0.X series), 2.0.14.1 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.14 (2.1.X series), on the AEAD route only, as those editions do not ship the high-level OpenPGP API.Show less

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP API accepted a data signature made by a signing subkey whose Subkey Binding signature carried no embedded Primary Key Binding (cross-certification) signature, in the case where that binding omits a Key Flags subpacket. RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.1.8 and sec. 10.1.3 require the embedded Primary Key Binding signature on any subkey that can issue signatures; it is the subkey's own statement that it belongs to the primary key it is bound under. OpenPGPCertificate resolved the subkey's key flags two different ways. isSigningKey() goes through getKeyFlags() and getApplyingSubpacket(), which falls back to the primary key's direct-key or primary User ID self-signature when the binding signature omits the subpacket, so the subkey inherited the primary's SIGN_DATA and counted as signing-capable; verifyEmbeddedPrimaryKeyBinding(), which enforces the requirement, reads the binding signature's own hashed subpackets, found no SIGN_DATA there, and returned early as a non-signing key without ever demanding the back signature. The same subkey was therefore signing-capable - so its signatures were attributed to the certificate and OpenPGPSignature.OpenPGPDocumentSignature.isValid() returned true - while being exempt from cross-certification, where GnuPG refuses the identical certificate and message. An attacker needs only the victim's public signing subkey, which is public material: they bind it to their own primary key with a Subkey Binding signature they are able to make, carrying no Key Flags and no embedded Primary Key Binding signature, which they cannot make without the subkey's private key, and a relying party verifying one of the victim's genuinely signed messages against that certificate is told the signature is valid and given the attacker's certificate as its issuer. Because a certificate's User IDs are self-asserted, a verifier that pins on the subkey's fingerprint or key ID while taking the identity from the enclosing certificate reports a real signature under an attacker-chosen identity. This is misattribution of a genuine signature rather than forgery of a new one: no private key is recovered, and the signature must be one the grafted subkey actually made. The low-level PGPSignature / PGPPublicKeyRing API performs no binding checks by design and is unaffected. Key Flags are a statement about the key the carrying signature refers to (RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29), so a subkey no longer inherits them from the certificate-wide signatures of the primary key: a Subkey Binding signature that omits the subpacket now leaves the subkey with no capabilities rather than the primary's, which makes the flags the cross-certification check consults the same flags every other decision consults. Preferences and the other subpackets a direct-key signature carries are inherited as before, and the primary key itself, whose flags legitimately come from its own direct-key or User ID self-signature, is unaffected.Show less