Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information

TYPO3 is an open source PHP based web content management system. In TYPO3 before versions 9.5.23 and 10.4.10 user session identifiers were stored in cleartext - without processing with additional cryptographic hashing algorithms. This vulnerability cannot be exploited directly and occurs in combination with a chained attack - like for instance SQL injection in any other component of the system. Update to TYPO3 versions 9.5.23 or 10.4.10 that fix the problem described.Show less

An issue was discovered in the view_statistics (aka View frontend statistics) extension before 2.0.1 for TYPO3. It saves all GET and POST data of TYPO3 frontend requests to the database. Depending on the extensions used on a TYPO3 website, sensitive data (e.g., cleartext passwords if ext:felogin is installed) may be saved.Show less

The implementation of Brave Desktop's privacy-preserving analytics system (P3A) between 1.1 and 1.18.35 logged the timestamp of when the user last opened an incognito window, including Tor windows. The intended behavior was to log the timestamp for incognito windows excluding Tor windows. Note that if a user has P3A enabled, the timestamp is not sent to Brave's server, but rather a value from:Used in last 24hUsed in last week but not 24hUsed in last 28 days but not weekEver used but not in last 28 daysNever usedThe privacy risk is low because a local attacker with disk access cannot tell if the timestamp corresponds to a Tor window or a non-Tor incognito window.Show less

SonarQube 8.4.2.36762 allows remote attackers to discover cleartext SMTP, SVN, and GitLab credentials via the api/settings/values URI. NOTE: reportedly, the vendor's position for SMTP and SVN is "it is the administrator's responsibility to configure it.Show less

A cleartext storage of sensitive information vulnerability in FortiOS command line interface in versions 6.2.4 and earlier and FortiProxy 2.0.0, 1.2.9 and earlier may allow an authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information such as users passwords by connecting to FortiGate CLI and executing the "diag sys ha checksum show" command.Show less

Jenkins ElasTest Plugin 1.2.1 and earlier stores its server password unencrypted in its global configuration file on the Jenkins controller where it can be viewed by users with access to the Jenkins controller file system.Show less

django-celery-results through 1.2.1 stores task results in the database. Among the data it stores are the variables passed into the tasks. The variables may contain sensitive cleartext information that does not belong unencrypted in the database.Show less

"BigFix Platform is storing clear text credentials within the system's memory. An attacker who is able to gain administrative privileges can use a program to create a memory dump and extract the credentials. These credentials can be used to pivot further into the environment. The principle of least privilege should be applied to all BigFix deployments, limiting administrative access."Show less

Django Two-Factor Authentication before 1.12, stores the user's password in clear text in the user session (base64-encoded). The password is stored in the session when the user submits their username and password, and is removed once they complete authentication by entering a two-factor authentication code. This means that the password is stored in clear text in the session for an arbitrary amount of time, and potentially forever if the user begins the login process by entering their username and password and then leaves before entering their two-factor authentication code. The severity of this issue depends on which type of session storage you have configured: in the worst case, if you're using Django's default database session storage, then users' passwords are stored in clear text in your database. In the best case, if you're using Django's signed cookie session, then users' passwords are only stored in clear text within their browser's cookie store. In the common case of using Django's cache session store, the users' passwords are stored in clear text in whatever cache storage you have configured (typically Memcached or Redis). This has been fixed in 1.12. After upgrading, users should be sure to delete any clear text passwords that have been stored. For example, if you're using the database session backend, you'll likely want to delete any session record from the database and purge that data from any database backups or replicas. In addition, affected organizations who have suffered a database breach while using an affected version should inform their users that their clear text passwords have been compromised. All organizations should encourage users whose passwords were insecurely stored to change these passwords on any sites where they were used. As a workaround, wwitching Django's session storage to use signed cookies instead of the database or cache lessens the impact of this issue, but should not be done without a thorough understanding of the security tradeoffs of using signed cookies rather than a server-side session storage. There is no way to fully mitigate the issue without upgrading.Show less

In NGINX Controller 3.0.0-3.4.0, recovery code required to change a user's password is transmitted and stored in the database in plain text, which allows an attacker who can intercept the database connection or have read access to the database, to request a password reset using the email address of another registered user then retrieve the recovery code.Show less