Uncaught Exception

PocketMine-MP before 4.0.7 contains an unhandled exception vulnerability in the ModalFormResponsePacket handler when processing malformed JSON from clients. Attackers can send specially crafted form response packets with invalid JSON to trigger an uncaught InvalidArgumentException, causing server crashes.Show less

PocketMine-MP before 4.7.2 fails to properly handle exceptions from the adhocore/json-comment library when parsing skin geometry data. Attackers can send login or skin packets with invalid geometry JSON to trigger an unhandled RuntimeException, causing server crash.Show less

undici's WebSocket client crashes the whole Node.js process during the opening handshake when a server responds with a subprotocol that the client never requested. A default WebSocket connection sends no subprotocol, but if the server's 101 response includes a Sec-WebSocket-Protocol header, undici dereferences a null value while checking it against the requested list and throws an uncaught TypeError. Because that code runs inside a microtask with no surrounding error handling, the exception propagates and terminates the process under Node's default behavior, instead of gracefully failing the connection as required by the WebSocket protocol. Any application that opens a WebSocket to an attacker-controlled or compromised server, or over a plaintext connection subject to a machine-in-the-middle, can be crashed remotely without authentication in the default configuration. This affects undici versions from 6.7.0 up to 6.28.1, from 7.0.0 up to 7.29.1, and from 8.0.0 up to 8.10.2. Users should upgrade to undici 6.28.1, 7.29.1, or 8.10.2.Show less

undici bundles a WebSocket client whose permessage-deflate size-limit cleanup removes all listeners from the internal zlib inflate stream, including its error listener, while that stream can still emit. When a remote peer sends a compressed payload that crosses the built-in 128 MiB decompressed-payload limit and then contains a malformed DEFLATE byte, the inflate stream emits a data error with no listener attached, which Node.js treats as a fatal unhandled error and terminates the entire process. Exploitation is remote and unauthenticated, requires no application mistake, and is asymmetric, since roughly 130 KB on the wire expands past the limit and crashes the process, and reconnecting can repeat the crash. This affects undici versions from 6.25.0 up to 6.28.1, from 7.28.0 up to 7.29.1, and from 8.1.0 up to 8.10.2. Users should upgrade to undici 6.28.1, 7.29.1, or 8.10.2.Show less

undici's experimental WebSocketStream client crashes the whole Node.js process when a remote peer closes the TCP connection without a WebSocket close handshake. On an unclean close the internal socket-close handler calls abort on the writable stream unconditionally and discards the returned promise, but per the WHATWG Streams standard aborting a locked writable returns a promise that rejects with a TypeError. Because the application holds a writer on that writable, which is the only way to write, the rejection is never observed and Node's default unhandled-rejection behavior terminates the process. An untrusted server can therefore crash a client with a single abrupt disconnect, with no authentication and no application mistake. This affects undici versions from 7.0.0 up to 7.29.1 and from 8.0.0 up to 8.10.2. Users should upgrade to undici 7.29.1 or 8.10.2.Show less

undici's dump interceptor reads and discards a response body up to a configurable maximum size. When a response declares a Content-Length that exceeds the maximum, the interceptor aborts cleanly, but when a response has no Content-Length and is chunked, the interceptor instead signals completion early once the accumulated size reaches the maximum, without pausing or aborting the request. Because the underlying parser keeps delivering body bytes, a second completion signal fires and trips an internal assertion, which aborts the request and tears down the connection. The application is left observing a misleading successful status with an empty or truncated body while the connection has actually been disconnected. This affects undici versions from 7.1.0 up to 7.29.1 and from 8.0.0 up to 8.10.2. Users should upgrade to undici 7.29.1 or 8.10.2.Show less

Uncaught Exception (CWE-248) in Kibana can lead to a denial of service via Input Data Manipulation (CAPEC-153). An authenticated user holding only the low-privileged feature access required to use the Observability AI Assistant can submit a specially crafted request that produces an unhandled error condition, terminating the Kibana process and denying service to all users and spaces on that instance until it is restarted.Show less

### Summary `qs.stringify` throws a `TypeError` when it serializes an object whose own `constructor` property has a truthy, non-callable `isBuffer` member. `utils.isBuffer` duck-types buffers by calling `obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj)` after checking only that the property is truthy, so a value such as `{ constructor: { isBuffer: "x" } }` makes the call throw `TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function`. ### Details `lib/stringify.js:127` calls `utils.isBuffer` on every non-primitive value it serializes. `utils.isBuffer` (`lib/utils.js:332`) reads `obj.constructor.isBuffer` and invokes it without verifying that it is a function. `constructor` and `isBuffer` are ordinary property names, so any object carrying them as own properties reaches the unchecked call. Such an object can be built from untrusted input. `qs.parse("x[constructor][isBuffer]=y", { plainObjects: true })` or `{ allowPrototypes: true }` keeps the `constructor` key as an own property (the default parse options drop it), and `JSON.parse("{\"a\":{\"constructor\":{\"isBuffer\":\"x\"}}}")` produces the same shape with no qs option involved. Express 4 with its default `query parser` setting and body-parser with `extended: true` both call `qs.parse` with `allowPrototypes: true`, so on those stacks `req.query` and `req.body` can carry the shape directly. #### PoC ```js var qs = require("qs"); qs.stringify(qs.parse("x[constructor][isBuffer]=y", { plainObjects: true })); qs.stringify(JSON.parse("{\"a\":{\"constructor\":{\"isBuffer\":\"x\"}}}")); // TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function // at Object.isBuffer (lib/utils.js:332:78) // at stringify (lib/stringify.js:127:45) ``` #### Fix `lib/utils.js`, applied in e83d321 on `main` and released as v6.16.0: ```diff - return !!(obj.constructor && obj.constructor.isBuffer && obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj)); + return !!(obj.constructor && typeof obj.constructor.isBuffer === "function" && obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj)); ``` Real `Buffer`, `safer-buffer`, and browserify `buffer` polyfill instances serialize exactly as before; only the throw is removed. ### Affected versions `>=2.2.5 <6.16.0`, fixed in v6.16.0. The unguarded duck-type was introduced in 3768a75 and first shipped in v2.2.5 (September 2014). v2.2.4 and earlier used `Buffer.isBuffer` and are not affected. Every release from v2.2.5 through v6.15.3 contains the unguarded call. ### Impact An unauthenticated request can make any code path that re-serializes attacker-influenced data with `qs.stringify` (for example, rebuilding a query string from `req.query` for a redirect or an upstream request, or serializing a parsed JSON body) throw synchronously. In a typical Node.js HTTP framework the throw is caught by the framework error boundary and the affected request returns a 500; the process survives and other requests are unaffected. Where the call runs outside an error boundary, such as an `async` Express 4 handler (where the throw becomes an unhandled promise rejection) or a background job, the process exits, so the impact in that case depends on the application error handling rather than on qs.Show less

An unauthenticated party able to reach the port of a MongoDB Connector for BI (mongosqld) instance may generate enough routine connection log activity to exhaust the storage backing the configured log path. When a log write or log rotation operation subsequently fails, the resulting error is not handled and the shared mongosqld process ends, ending service for all connected SQL clients. The process continues to end on startup until an operator restores available storage, and the diagnostic message explaining the condition is not recorded.Show less

multer is a middleware for handling multipart/form-data in Node.js. A small multipart request containing two specially crafted text field names can cause an uncaught RangeError (Invalid array length) that terminates the Node.js process. The first field uses a very large numeric array index to allocate a maximum-length sparse array, and a second field then pushes past that length, which throws inside the append-field dependency and is not caught by multer. All versions before 2.3.0 are affected, and the issue is a remotely triggerable denial of service. The issue is fixed in multer 2.3.0. Upgrade to multer 2.3.0 to remediate.Show less

Starlette-Admin is a fast, beautiful and extensible administrative interface framework for FastAPI and Starlette applications. Prior to 0.16.1, the list API does not validate user-supplied order_by and structured where field names against the configured sortable_fields and searchable_fields allowlists. An authenticated user with access to an affected list endpoint can submit arbitrary field names to starlette_admin/base.py and the BaseModelView validation path, bypassing restrictions presented by the administrative user interface. Requests can sort or filter on fields that are not intended to be sortable or searchable, causing limited information exposure. Invalid field names and special Python attribute names such as metadata and the class dunder attribute can also trigger unhandled exceptions and HTTP 500 responses, causing limited denial of service for targeted requests. This issue is fixed in version 0.16.1.Show less

Faktory is a language-agnostic background job server. In versions prior to 1.10.0, the server is vulnerable to an unauthenticated denial of service in which a single malformed command crashes the entire process. Its wire protocol is line-based, and several command handlers slice or index the received line at a fixed offset, such as cmd[5:] for PUSH or qs[0] for QUEUE, without checking that a payload is present. Sending a bare verb with no payload, for example PUSH, ACK, FAIL, BEAT, PUSHB, or QUEUE, triggers a Go slice or index out-of-range panic. Because the codebase has no recover() anywhere in the command-dispatch path, an unrecovered panic in a handler goroutine terminates the whole Go process rather than just that connection, instantly disconnecting every other client, worker, and in-flight job. The attack requires only a connection to the command port and completion of the trivial handshake, with no credentials when no password is configured, and can be repeated to keep the service down indefinitely. This issue is fixed in version 1.10.0.Show less

rclone before v1.75.0 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the WebDAV TUS creation handler that dereferences a nil response before checking for transport errors. A malicious or compromised configured endpoint can reset connections during TUS uploads to trigger a panic that terminates unrecovered goroutines and halts unrelated work in long-lived processes.Show less

Tie::Hash::Regex versions before 2.0.0 for Perl will throw an exception on unparseable lookup keys. The FETCH, EXISTS and DELETE methods throw an exception when on malformed regular expressions. Each method falls back to a regex match when the key is not already stored in the hash, compiling the caller's key with a bare qr// and no eval guard. A key that is not a valid regular expression pattern, such as a single unmatched bracket, dies. An application that looks up externally supplied strings in a tied hash will die on an invalid key.Show less

RaTeX is a KaTeX-compatible math rendering engine written in Rust. Prior to version 0.1.11, the public parser entrypoint `ratex_parser::parse(&str)` panics on the 9-byte input `\verbéxé` (i.e. `\verb` followed by the non-ASCII delimiter `é`). When handling a `\verb` command, the parser slices the verbatim argument with byte indices (`arg[1..arg.len() - 1]`); if the delimiter character is multibyte UTF-8, index `1` lands inside that character and Rust panics with *“byte index 1 is not a char boundary”*. Because RaTeX’s release profile sets `panic = "abort"` (`Cargo.toml:48`), the panic aborts the entire process — not just the current request/thread — making this a hard denial of service for any service that renders untrusted LaTeX. Version 0.1.11 fixes the issue.Show less

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious block producer can terminate zebrad by placing the same shielded transaction in a non-finalized parent block and its child. In zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs, Chain::push originally inserted the transaction hash into tx_loc_by_hash and asserted uniqueness before updating shielded data and running the duplicate Sprout, Sapling, or Orchard nullifier checks. The repeated transaction therefore reached the transactions must be unique within a single chain assertion before contextual validation could reject it cleanly. Zebra release builds use panic equals abort, so the reachable assertion terminates the entire process; exploitation requires either two consecutive attacker-mined blocks or an attacker-mined child immediately after an honest block includes the attacker's shielded transaction. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.Show less

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs, the finalized-state writer originally applied every newly created output as a credit before applying any spent-output debit from the same block. That credit-first ordering can make the intermediate per-address balance exceed MAX_MONEY even though the final net balance is valid, causing an expect-based panic under the panic equals abort release profile. Because zcashd accepts the triggering block and Zebra encounters it again after every restart, the halt persists until patched software is deployed; exploitation requires mining the specially constructed block and temporarily committing sufficient ZEC to the self-spend chain. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.Show less

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, an attacker authenticated to an enabled Zebra RPC endpoint can terminate zebrad by supplying a getblocktemplate LongPollId containing multi-byte UTF-8 characters. In zebra-rpc/src/methods/types/long_poll.rs, LongPollId::from_str originally checked the input byte length and then sliced fixed byte ranges to parse encoded fields. A slice boundary can land inside a multi-byte character and trigger Rust's byte index is not a char boundary panic. Zebra release builds use panic equals abort, so one malformed authenticated RPC request terminates the entire node process and can be repeated after restart. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.Show less

websocket-driver is a WebSocket protocol handler with pluggable I/O. Prior to 0.8.2, WebSocket::Driver.server() passes a malformed Host header to URI.parse in lib/websocket/http/request.rb without catching URI::InvalidURIError, allowing a remote client to crash a TCP-backed WebSocket server when the application does not catch the error from parse(). This issue is fixed in version 0.8.2.Show less