Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

In server mode pgAdmin 4 validates a path into the user's storage directory with check_access_permission(), which builds the absolute path with get_abs_path(). Several callers then acted on a path they built differently, so the path checked and the path used could name different files: - Opening a file in the Query Tool, the Google client secret and, on Windows, Import/Export Data, Backup, Restore and saving a file joined the path to the storage directory after stripping leading slashes and backslashes. On POSIX a path checked as a name inside storage could become an absolute path once stripped, so any file the pgAdmin account can read could be opened; on Windows a path naming a drive discarded the storage directory, so these could read, or write, outside it. - Listing a folder decoded the path a second time after the check, so a folder named like an encoded "..", which a user can create, listed any directory on the host. - Download, delete, rename and the file-exists check appended the path to the storage directory without a separator, so in a deployment where one user's storage directory name is a prefix of another's, another user's files could be read, deleted or moved; download also checked the path appended to itself. - Creating a folder could create one in another user's directory. The fix makes check_access_permission() return the path it checked and every caller act on that path, decodes folder paths once, and opens, deletes and renames files relative to directories opened from the storage directory without following symbolic links. Desktop mode is not affected. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.Show less

praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1.Show less

The gettext family of functions in the GNU C Library version 2.0 and later accept LANGUAGE environment variable entries that contain '/' or that are equal to "..", unless the program is setuid or setgid (AT_SECURE). An attacker who can set LANGUAGE in the environment of a program that uses gettext can make it load a message catalog (.mo file) from an arbitrary location in the file system. A crafted .mo file can crash the program through out-of-range offsets, or supply translations whose format directives do not match the arguments passed by the program. That causes undefined behaviour in the printf family of functions and may allow arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the program. The safety of message catalogs relies on them being installed in trusted, read-only locations, and the directory traversal bypasses this. The fix for CVE-2014-0475 rejects ".." path components in locale names passed to setlocale or taken from the LC_ALL, LC_* and LANG environment variables. gettext reads LANGUAGE directly and appends each colon-separated entry to the message catalog directory, so that fix did not cover LANGUAGE. LANGUAGE is only used when the LC_MESSAGES locale is not "C", "C.<encoding>" or "POSIX", so the attacker must also be able to select another installed locale, for example through LANG or LC_ALL. Exploitation also requires that the attacker can place the crafted file in a location readable by the target program, and that the environment crosses a trust boundary without the program running as AT_SECURE. An example is an SSH server that accepts LANGUAGE and LANG from clients through the AcceptEnv directive and restricts an account to a forced command; the attacker may use this to escape the restriction.Show less

LM Studio before 0.4.22+1 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the model downloader's resolveDownloadRequest that allows attackers to write files outside the models directory using backslash-separated traversal filenames. Attackers can trick users into downloading a crafted model repository that plants a plugin manifest.json, install-state.json and mcp-bridge-config.json, running an attacker-supplied Python payload on every launch.Show less

The JS Help Desk – AI-Powered Support & Ticketing System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the setSupportCustomImage function in all versions up to, and including, 5.0.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php). Exploitation requires a two-step sequence: an administrator first saves a traversal-crafted value in the support_custom_img configuration field, then triggers deletion by uploading a new support custom image, at which point setSupportCustomImage() resolves and deletes the attacker-controlled path.Show less

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.77, `POST /api/scoutsuite/generate-gcp-report` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/routes/scoutsuite.py` admits admin and analyst users and validates the uploaded content as `GCPScoutSuiteJSON`, but passes raw `file.filename` from the multipart header to `save_file_to_directory` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/services/scoutsuite.py`. The writer combines this filename with `scoutsuite-report` using `os.path.join` without sanitization or a resolved-path containment check. A traversal filename therefore writes the supplied JSON outside the intended report directory. In the reported root-running backend, the researcher demonstrated root-owned writes outside that directory and into the application source directory. This permits host-file overwrite subject to the accepted JSON-content constraint and can disrupt application operation; the demonstrated primitive does not establish unrestricted executable contents or unconditional cross-tenant confidentiality loss. Version 0.1.77 removes caller-controlled filenames from the affected route; unrestricted-content and direct-code-execution claims require separate curator reconciliation.Show less

CallBackery versions before 0.60.1 for Perl let unauthenticated clients read the POD of any file via path traversal in the /doc route. Every CallBackery application mounts its documentation plugin at /doc, ahead of any session check. The route passes the requested name to Pod::Simple::Search->find without validation. find splits the name on "::" and joins the parts into a file path, so a name such as "..::..::..::etc::motd" escapes @INC. Any file the server process can read is reachable. Only POD is rendered, but a file with a POD directive and no "=cut" is POD to the end of the file.Show less

n8n from 2.14.0 through 2.46.3 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the Databricks node that allows unauthenticated attackers to reach arbitrary Databricks API endpoints by injecting unencoded resource identifiers. Attackers can supply ../ sequences and query strings via webhook, chat, or form inputs mapped to spaceId, indexName, or filePath to read secrets using the stored credential.Show less

Forgejo through 15.0.11, 16.0.0 through 16.0.7, and 17.0.0 through 17.0.1 contains a path traversal vulnerability in restore-repo that allows attackers to read files outside the dump directory via crafted asset paths. Attackers can supply a dump whose release.yml DownloadURL or PatchURL contains ../ sequences, importing files like app.ini as release attachments when an administrator restores it.Show less

Lightdash is an open source business intelligence platform. In affected versions through 0.3213.0, the dbt Cloud webhook `POST /api/v1/projects/{projectUuid}/dbt-cloud/webhook` has no authentication middleware or signature validation. In `packages/backend/src/controllers/projectController.ts`, `testWebhook()` accepts `accountId` and `runId` from a `job.run.completed` request and passes them to `createPreviewWithExplores()` in `packages/backend/src/services/ProjectService/ProjectService.ts`. These unsanitized values are interpolated into the server-side dbt Cloud API URL, which is requested with the victim project's API key in the `Authorization` header. Path traversal through `accountId` changes the requested path on `cloud.getdbt.com` without changing its host, so the credential-bearing request reaches an attacker-influenced path on that fixed host. The advisory claims API-key theft, but the supplied evidence does not establish that the attacker can observe the `Authorization` header. The unauthenticated webhook also allows preview creation. The target must be a `dbt Cloud IDE` project and the attacker must know its `projectUuid`; the UUID is not enumerable but can be discovered in shared or multi-tenant contexts. Version 0.3214.0 fixes identifier path traversal and verifies webhook HMAC signatures only when a secret is configured; without a secret, unsigned webhooks continue to be processed.Show less

DB-GPT v0.7.5 and 0.8.0 contains directory traversal in use_example_file (packages/dbgpt-app/src/dbgpt_app/openapi/api_v1/examples_api.py:129). A remote attacker can use the validated exploitation path to write files outside the intended workspace or storage boundary.Show less

modelscope agent-zero 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10 is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in python/helpers/file_browser.py:FileBrowser.save_text_file. The save_text_file method accepts user-controlled file paths without normalization or validation, allowing path traversal attacks.Show less

Kubeflow Pipelines enables users to build and deploy portable, scalable machine learning workflows. Prior to 2.18.0, the volume artifact handler for GET /artifacts/get?source=volume did not confine a caller-supplied file path to the selected volume. A caller who can reach the route and identify an existing mounted volume can use path traversal to read files outside that volume when the artifact-serving process can read them. The frontend pod serves the request when artifact proxying is disabled, while the selected namespace's artifact-service pod serves it when proxying is enabled. A deployment with authentication disabled requires no application credentials; in multi-user deployments, the caller ordinarily must be authorized for the supplied namespace. This issue is fixed in version 2.18.0.Show less

Szafir is vulnerable to Path Traversal in the uploaded filename. A man-in-the-middle attacker who can reroute update request to their server can prepare arbitrary XML file that will be saved in location chosen by attacker.  This issue was fixed in version 2.0 build 708.Show less

Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory in Progress Software WS_FTP Server versions prior to 2024.0.7 and 2025.0.4 on Windows could allow an unauthenticated attacker to affect files outside the intended directory.Show less

A path traversal vulnerability in Progress Software WS_FTP Server versions prior to 2024.0.7 and 2025.0.4 on Windows could allow a delegated Host Administrator to access locations outside their authorized scope, potentially enabling remote code execution.Show less