Observable Timing Discrepancy

In Wagtail before versions 2.7.3 and 2.8.2, a potential timing attack exists on pages or documents that have been protected with a shared password through Wagtail's "Privacy" controls. This password check is performed through a character-by-character string comparison, and so an attacker who is able to measure the time taken by this check to a high degree of accuracy could potentially use timing differences to gain knowledge of the password. This is [understood to be feasible on a local network, but not on the public internet](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/django-developers/iAaq0pvHXuA/fpUuwjK3i2wJ). Privacy settings that restrict access to pages/documents on a per-user or per-group basis (as opposed to a shared password) are unaffected by this vulnerability. This has been patched in 2.7.3, 2.8.2, 2.9.Show less

There's a possible information leak / session hijack vulnerability in Rack (RubyGem rack). This vulnerability is patched in versions 1.6.12 and 2.0.8. Attackers may be able to find and hijack sessions by using timing attacks targeting the session id. Session ids are usually stored and indexed in a database that uses some kind of scheme for speeding up lookups of that session id. By carefully measuring the amount of time it takes to look up a session, an attacker may be able to find a valid session id and hijack the session. The session id itself may be generated randomly, but the way the session is indexed by the backing store does not use a secure comparison.Show less

The implementations of SAE in hostapd and wpa_supplicant are vulnerable to side channel attacks as a result of observable timing differences and cache access patterns. An attacker may be able to gain leaked information from a side channel attack that can be used for full password recovery. Both hostapd with SAE support and wpa_supplicant with SAE support prior to and including version 2.7 are affected.Show less

csrf-lite is a cross-site request forgery protection library for framework-less node sites. csrf-lite uses `===`, a fail first string comparison, instead of a time constant string comparison This enables an attacker to guess the secret in no more than (16*18)288 guesses, instead of the 16^18 guesses required were the timing attack not present.Show less