Integer Overflow or Wraparound

Integer overflow vulnerability exists in SimplCommerce at commit 230310c8d7a0408569b292c5a805c459d47a1d8f in the shopping cart functionality. The issue lies in the quantity parameter in the CartController's AddToCart method.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring: check for overflows in io_pin_pages WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5834 at io_uring/memmap.c:144 io_pin_pages+0x149/0x180 io_uring/memmap.c:144 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5834 Comm: syz-executor825 Not tainted 6.12.0-next-20241118-syzkaller #0 Call Trace: <TASK> __io_uaddr_map+0xfb/0x2d0 io_uring/memmap.c:183 io_rings_map io_uring/io_uring.c:2611 [inline] io_allocate_scq_urings+0x1c0/0x650 io_uring/io_uring.c:3470 io_uring_create+0x5b5/0xc00 io_uring/io_uring.c:3692 io_uring_setup io_uring/io_uring.c:3781 [inline] ... </TASK> io_pin_pages()'s uaddr parameter came directly from the user and can be garbage. Don't just add size to it as it can overflow.Show less

Dell ECS, versions prior to 3.8.1.3 contains an arithmetic overflow vulnerability exists in retention period handling of ECS. An authenticated user with bucket or object-level access and the necessary privileges could potentially exploit this vulnerability to bypass retention policies and delete objects.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: EDAC/bluefield: Fix potential integer overflow The 64-bit argument for the "get DIMM info" SMC call consists of mem_ctrl_idx left-shifted 16 bits and OR-ed with DIMM index. With mem_ctrl_idx defined as 32-bits wide the left-shift operation truncates the upper 16 bits of information during the calculation of the SMC argument. The mem_ctrl_idx stack variable must be defined as 64-bits wide to prevent any potential integer overflow, i.e. loss of data from upper 16 bits.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Address an integer overflow Dan Carpenter reports: > Commit 78147ca8b4a9 ("svcrdma: Add a "parsed chunk list" data > structure") from Jun 22, 2020 (linux-next), leads to the following > Smatch static checker warning: > > net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c:498 xdr_check_write_chunk() > warn: potential user controlled sizeof overflow 'segcount * 4 * 4' > > net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c > 488 static bool xdr_check_write_chunk(struct svc_rdma_recv_ctxt *rctxt) > 489 { > 490 u32 segcount; > 491 __be32 *p; > 492 > 493 if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(&rctxt->rc_stream, &segcount)) > ^^^^^^^^ > > 494 return false; > 495 > 496 /* A bogus segcount causes this buffer overflow check to fail. */ > 497 p = xdr_inline_decode(&rctxt->rc_stream, > --> 498 segcount * rpcrdma_segment_maxsz * sizeof(*p)); > > > segcount is an untrusted u32. On 32bit systems anything >= SIZE_MAX / 16 will > have an integer overflow and some those values will be accepted by > xdr_inline_decode().Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: Prevent a potential integer overflow If the tag length is >= U32_MAX - 3 then the "length + 4" addition can result in an integer overflow. Address this by splitting the decoding into several steps so that decode_cb_compound4res() does not have to perform arithmetic on the unsafe length value.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: um: Fix potential integer overflow during physmem setup This issue happens when the real map size is greater than LONG_MAX, which can be easily triggered on UML/i386.Show less

Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow'), Heap-based Buffer Overflow, Integer Overflow or Wraparound vulnerability in RTI Connext Professional (Security Plugins) allows Overflow Variables and Tags.This issue affects Connext Professional: from 7.0.0 before 7.3.0.2, from 6.1.0 before 6.1.2.17.Show less

GStreamer is a library for constructing graphs of media-handling components. An integer underflow has been detected in the function qtdemux_parse_theora_extension within qtdemux.c. The vulnerability occurs due to an underflow of the gint size variable, which causes size to hold a large unintended value when cast to an unsigned integer. This 32-bit negative value is then cast to a 64-bit unsigned integer (0xfffffffffffffffa) in a subsequent call to gst_buffer_new_and_alloc. The function gst_buffer_new_allocate then attempts to allocate memory, eventually calling _sysmem_new_block. The function _sysmem_new_block adds alignment and header size to the (unsigned) size, causing the overflow of the 'slice_size' variable. As a result, only 0x89 bytes are allocated, despite the large input size. When the following memcpy call occurs in gst_buffer_fill, the data from the input file will overwrite the content of the GstMapInfo info structure. Finally, during the call to gst_memory_unmap, the overwritten memory may cause a function pointer hijack, as the mem->allocator->mem_unmap_full function is called with a corrupted pointer. This function pointer overwrite could allow an attacker to alter the execution flow of the program, leading to arbitrary code execution. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.24.10.Show less

GStreamer is a library for constructing graphs of media-handling components. The program attempts to reallocate the memory pointed to by stream->samples to accommodate stream->n_samples + samples_count elements of type QtDemuxSample. The problem is that samples_count is read from the input file. And if this value is big enough, this can lead to an integer overflow during the addition. As a consequence, g_try_renew might allocate memory for a significantly smaller number of elements than intended. Following this, the program iterates through samples_count elements and attempts to write samples_count number of elements, potentially exceeding the actual allocated memory size and causing an OOB-write. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.24.10.Show less

Animate versions 23.0.8, 24.0.5 and earlier are affected by an Integer Overflow or Wraparound vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file.Show less

In oemCallback of ril.cpp, there is a possible out of bounds write due to an integer overflow. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Show less

Integer Overflow or Wraparound, Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in RestApp Inc. Online Ordering System allows Integer Attacks. This issue affects Online Ordering System: 8.2.1. NOTE: Vulnerability fixed in version 8.2.2 and does not exist before 8.2.1.Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mremap: fix address wraparound in move_page_tables() On 32-bit platforms, it is possible for the expression `len + old_addr < old_end` to be false-positive if `len + old_addr` wraps around. `old_addr` is the cursor in the old range up to which page table entries have been moved; so if the operation succeeded, `old_addr` is the *end* of the old region, and adding `len` to it can wrap. The overflow causes mremap() to mistakenly believe that PTEs have been copied; the consequence is that mremap() bails out, but doesn't move the PTEs back before the new VMA is unmapped, causing anonymous pages in the region to be lost. So basically if userspace tries to mremap() a private-anon region and hits this bug, mremap() will return an error and the private-anon region's contents appear to have been zeroed. The idea of this check is that `old_end - len` is the original start address, and writing the check that way also makes it easier to read; so fix the check by rearranging the comparison accordingly. (An alternate fix would be to refactor this function by introducing an "orig_old_start" variable or such.) Tested in a VM with a 32-bit X86 kernel; without the patch: ``` user@horn:~/big_mremap$ cat test.c #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <err.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #define ADDR1 ((void*)0x60000000) #define ADDR2 ((void*)0x10000000) #define SIZE 0x50000000uL int main(void) { unsigned char *p1 = mmap(ADDR1, SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE, -1, 0); if (p1 == MAP_FAILED) err(1, "mmap 1"); unsigned char *p2 = mmap(ADDR2, SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE, -1, 0); if (p2 == MAP_FAILED) err(1, "mmap 2"); *p1 = 0x41; printf("first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p1); unsigned char *p3 = mremap(p1, SIZE, SIZE, MREMAP_MAYMOVE|MREMAP_FIXED, p2); if (p3 == MAP_FAILED) { printf("mremap() failed; first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p1); } else { printf("mremap() succeeded; first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p3); } } user@horn:~/big_mremap$ gcc -static -o test test.c user@horn:~/big_mremap$ setarch -R ./test first char is 0x41 mremap() failed; first char is 0x00 ``` With the patch: ``` user@horn:~/big_mremap$ setarch -R ./test first char is 0x41 mremap() succeeded; first char is 0x41 ```Show less

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/proc/task_mmu: prevent integer overflow in pagemap_scan_get_args() The "arg->vec_len" variable is a u64 that comes from the user at the start of the function. The "arg->vec_len * sizeof(struct page_region))" multiplication can lead to integer wrapping. Use size_mul() to avoid that. Also the size_add/mul() functions work on unsigned long so for 32bit systems we need to ensure that "arg->vec_len" fits in an unsigned long.Show less