CVE-2026-64449
7.8
Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Exploitability: 1.8 / Impact: 5.9
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 (Secondary)
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size
The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy
'count' bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf ==
PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without
bounding *ppos + count against size_buf.
vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size
(image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the
user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up
to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE. When the window
exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation.
Clamp count against size_buf in both helpers, with an early return when
*ppos is already at/after the buffer end. *ppos is >= 0 here (the caller
rejects negative offsets), so size_buf - *ppos cannot wrap. This mirrors
the existing clamp in the MASTER-path helpers resource_to_user() /
resource_from_user(), and matches the read()/write() convention of a
short transfer at end-of-buffer.
Found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model
checking) and confirmed dynamically under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68
_copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user]
vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0
ksys_write+0xb8/0x150
Affected (7)
Products: Linux: Linux Kernel
Configuration A
| Vulnerable Software | Affected Versions |
|---|---|
| From 2.6.32 to 6.1.178 |
References (6)
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Timeline
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