CVE-2026-32747
4.9
Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Exploitability: 1.2 / Impact: 3.6
Source: NVD
Description
SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the globalCopyFiles API eads source files using filepath.Abs() with no workspace boundary check, relying solely on util.IsSensitivePath() whose blocklist omits /proc/, /run/secrets/, and home directory dotfiles. An admin can copy /proc/1/environ or Docker secrets into the workspace and read them via the standard file API. An admin can exfiltrate any file readable by the SiYuan process that falls outside the incomplete blocklist. In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers. The exfiltrated files are then accessible via the standard workspace file API and persist until manually deleted. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.
Affected (1)
Related CWEs
CWE-184
Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
The product implements a protection mechanism that relies on a list of inputs (or properties of inputs) that are not allowed by policy or otherwise require other action to neutralize before additional processing takes place, but the list is incomplete, leading to resultant weaknesses.
CWE-22
Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
References (4)
Source: security-advisories@github.com
Patch
Source: security-advisories@github.com
Release Notes
Source: security-advisories@github.com
ExploitVendor Advisory
Source: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
ExploitVendor Advisory
Timeline
No history available yet.