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CVE-2024-26960

nvd nist
Published: May 1, 2024Modified: Jun 17, 2026

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5.5
Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Exploitability: 1.8 / Impact: 3.6
Source: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 (Secondary)

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: swap: fix race between free_swap_and_cache() and swapoff() There was previously a theoretical window where swapoff() could run and teardown a swap_info_struct while a call to free_swap_and_cache() was running in another thread. This could cause, amongst other bad possibilities, swap_page_trans_huge_swapped() (called by free_swap_and_cache()) to access the freed memory for swap_map. This is a theoretical problem and I haven't been able to provoke it from a test case. But there has been agreement based on code review that this is possible (see link below). Fix it by using get_swap_device()/put_swap_device(), which will stall swapoff(). There was an extra check in _swap_info_get() to confirm that the swap entry was not free. This isn't present in get_swap_device() because it doesn't make sense in general due to the race between getting the reference and swapoff. So I've added an equivalent check directly in free_swap_and_cache(). Details of how to provoke one possible issue (thanks to David Hildenbrand for deriving this): --8<----- __swap_entry_free() might be the last user and result in "count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE". swapoff->try_to_unuse() will stop as soon as soon as si->inuse_pages==0. So the question is: could someone reclaim the folio and turn si->inuse_pages==0, before we completed swap_page_trans_huge_swapped(). Imagine the following: 2 MiB folio in the swapcache. Only 2 subpages are still references by swap entries. Process 1 still references subpage 0 via swap entry. Process 2 still references subpage 1 via swap entry. Process 1 quits. Calls free_swap_and_cache(). -> count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE [then, preempted in the hypervisor etc.] Process 2 quits. Calls free_swap_and_cache(). -> count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE Process 2 goes ahead, passes swap_page_trans_huge_swapped(), and calls __try_to_reclaim_swap(). __try_to_reclaim_swap()->folio_free_swap()->delete_from_swap_cache()-> put_swap_folio()->free_swap_slot()->swapcache_free_entries()-> swap_entry_free()->swap_range_free()-> ... WRITE_ONCE(si->inuse_pages, si->inuse_pages - nr_entries); What stops swapoff to succeed after process 2 reclaimed the swap cache but before process1 finished its call to swap_page_trans_huge_swapped()? --8<-----

Affected (7)

1 product
Linux Kernel
1 product
Debian Linux
Configuration A
6 vulnerable
Vulnerable SoftwareAffected Versions
Linux
From 4.11 to 5.10.215
From 5.11 to 5.15.154
From 5.16 to 6.1.84
From 6.2 to 6.6.24
From 6.7 to 6.7.12
From 6.8 to 6.8.3
Configuration B
1 vulnerable
Vulnerable SoftwareAffected Versions
Version 10.0

References (16)

Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Patch
Source: af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108
Patch
Source: af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108
Patch
Source: af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108
Patch
Source: af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108
Patch
Source: af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108
Patch
Source: af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108
Patch
Source: af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108
Patch
Source: af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108
Mailing ListThird Party Advisory
Source: 0b142b55-0307-4c5a-b3c9-f314f3fb7c5e

Timeline

No history available yet.